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ANSELM'S PROSLOGIUM

OR DISCOURSE ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

PREFACE.

IN this brief work the author aims at proving in a single argument the existence of God, and whatsoever we believe of God.—The difficulty of the task.—The author writes in the person of one who contemplates God, and seeks to understand what he believes. To this work he had given this title: Faith Seeking Understanding. He finally named it Proslogium,—that is, A Discourse.

AFTER I had published, at the solicitous entreaties of certain brethren, a brief work (the *Monologium*) as an example of meditation on the grounds of faith, in the person of one who investigates, in a course of silent reasoning with himself, matters of which he is ignorant; considering that this book was knit together by the linking of many arguments, I began to ask myself whether there might be found a single argument which would require no other for its proof than itself alone; and alone would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists, and that there is a supreme good requiring nothing else, which all other things require for their existence and well-being; and whatever we believe regarding the divine Being.

Although I often and earnestly directed my thought to this end, and at some times that which I sought

seemed to be just within my reach, while again it wholly evaded my mental vision, at last in despair I was about to cease, as if from the search for a thing which could not be found. But when I wished to exclude this thought altogether, lest, by busying my mind to no purpose, it should keep me from other thoughts, in which I might be successful; then more and more, though I was unwilling and shunned it, it began to force itself upon me, with a kind of importunity. So, one day, when I was exceedingly wearied with resisting its importunity, in the very conflict of my thoughts, the proof of which I had despaired offered itself, so that I eagerly embraced the thoughts which I was strenuously repelling.

Thinking, therefore, that what I rejoiced to have found, would, if put in writing, be welcome to some readers, of this very matter, and of some others, I have written the following treatise, in the person of one who strives to lift his mind to the contemplation of God, and seeks to understand what he believes. In my judgment, neither this work nor the other, which I mentioned above, deserved to be called a book, or to bear the name of an author; and yet I thought they ought not to be sent forth without some title by which they might, in some sort, invite one into whose hands they fell to their perusal. I accordingly gave each a title, that the first might be known as, *An Example of Meditation on the Grounds of Faith*, and its sequel as, *Faith Seeking Understanding*. But, after both had been copied by many under these titles, many urged me, and especially Hugo, the reverend Archbishop of Lyons, who discharges the apostolic office in Gaul, who instructed me to this effect on his apostolic authority—to prefix my name to these writ-

ings. And that this might be done more fitly, I named the first, *Monologium*, that is, A Soliloquy; but the second, *Proslogium*, that is, A Discourse.

CHAPTER I.

Exhortation of the mind to the contemplation of God.—It casts aside cares, and excludes all thoughts save that of God, that it may seek Him. Man was created to see God. Man by sin lost the blessedness for which he was made, and found the misery for which he was not made. He did not keep this good when he could keep it easily. Without God it is ill with us. Our labors and attempts are in vain without God. Man cannot seek God, unless God himself teaches him; nor find him, unless he reveals himself. God created man in his image, that he might be mindful of him, think of him, and love him. The believer does not seek to understand, that he may believe, but he believes that he may understand: for unless he believed he would not understand.

UP now, slight man! flee, for a little while, thy occupations; hide thyself, for a time, from thy disturbing thoughts. Cast aside, now, thy burdensome cares, and put away thy toilsome business. Yield room for some little time to God; and rest for a little time in him. Enter the inner chamber of thy mind; shut out all thoughts save that of God, and such as can aid thee in seeking him; close thy door and seek him. Speak now, my whole heart! speak now to God, saying, I seek thy face; thy face, Lord, will I seek (*Psalms xxvii. 8*). And come thou now, O Lord my God, teach my heart where and how it may seek thee, where and how it may find thee.

Lord, if thou art not here, where shall I seek thee, being absent? But if thou art everywhere, why do I not see thee present? Truly thou dwellest in unap-

proachable light. But where is unapproachable light, or how shall I come to it? Or who shall lead me to that light and into it, that I may see thee in it? Again, by what marks, under what form, shall I seek thee? I have never seen thee, O Lord, my God; I do not know thy form. What, O most high Lord, shall this man do, an exile far from thee? What shall thy servant do, anxious in his love of thee, and cast out afar from thy face? He pants to see thee, and thy face is too far from him. He longs to come to thee, and thy dwelling-place is inaccessible. He is eager to find thee, and knows not thy place. He desires to seek thee, and does not know thy face. Lord, thou art my God, and thou art my Lord, and never have I seen thee. It is thou that hast made me, and hast made me anew, and hast bestowed upon me all the blessings I enjoy; and not yet do I know thee. Finally, I was created to see thee, and not yet have I done that for which I was made.

O wretched lot of man, when he hath lost that for which he was made! O hard and terrible fate! Alas, what has he lost, and what has he found? What has departed, and what remains? He has lost the blessedness for which he was made, and has found the misery for which he was not made. That has departed without which nothing is happy, and that remains which, in itself, is only miserable. Man once did eat the bread of angels, for which he hungers now; he eateth now the bread of sorrows, of which he knew not then. Alas! for the mourning of all mankind, for the universal lamentation of the sons of Hades! He choked with satiety, we sigh with hunger. He abounded, we beg. He possessed in happiness, and miserably forsook his possession; we suffer want in unhappiness,

and feel a miserable longing, and alas! we remain empty.

Why did he not keep for us, when he could so easily, that whose lack we should feel so heavily? Why did he shut us away from the light, and cover us over with darkness? With what purpose did he rob us of life, and inflict death upon us? Wretches that we are, whence have we been driven out; whither are we driven on? Whence hurled? Whither consigned to ruin? From a native country into exile, from the vision of God into our present blindness, from the joy of immortality into the bitterness and horror of death. Miserable exchange of how great a good, for how great an evil! Heavy loss, heavy grief heavy all our fate!

But alas! wretched that I am, one of the sons of Eve, far removed from God! What have I undertaken? What have I accomplished? Whither was I striving? How far have I come? To what did I aspire? Amid what thoughts am I sighing? I sought blessings, and lo! confusion. I strove toward God, and I stumbled on myself. I sought calm in privacy, and I found tribulation and grief, in my inmost thoughts. I wished to smile in the joy of my mind, and I am compelled to frown by the sorrow of my heart. Gladness was hoped for, and lo! a source of frequent sighs!

And thou too, O Lord, how long? How long, O Lord, dost thou forget us; how long dost thou turn thy face from us? When wilt thou look upon us, and hear us? When wilt thou enlighten our eyes, and show us thy face? When wilt thou restore thyself to us? Look upon us, Lord; hear us, enlighten us, reveal thyself to us. Restore thyself to us, that it may

be well with us,—thyself, without whom it is so ill with us. Pity our toilings and strivings toward thee, since we can do nothing without thee. Thou dost invite us; do thou help us. I beseech thee, O Lord, that I may not lose hope in sighs, but may breathe anew in hope. Lord, my heart is made bitter by its desolation; sweeten thou it, I beseech thee, with thy consolation. Lord, in hunger I began to seek thee; I beseech thee that I may not cease to hunger for thee. In hunger I have come to thee; let me not go unfed. I have come in poverty to the Rich, in misery to the Compassionate; let me not return empty and despised. And if, before I eat, I sigh, grant, even after sighs, that which I may eat. Lord, I am bowed down and can only look downward; raise me up that I may look upward. My iniquities have gone over my head; they overwhelm me; and, like a heavy load, they weigh me down. Free me from them; unburden me, that the pit of iniquities may not close over me.

Be it mine to look up to thy light, even from afar, even from the depths. Teach me to seek thee, and reveal thyself to me, when I seek thee, for I cannot seek thee, except thou teach me, nor find thee, except thou reveal thyself. Let me seek thee in longing, let me long for thee in seeking; let me find thee in love, and love thee in finding. Lord, I acknowledge and I thank thee that thou hast created me in this thine image, in order that I may be mindful of thee, may conceive of thee, and love thee; but that image has been so consumed and wasted away by vices, and obscured by the smoke of wrong-doing, that it cannot achieve that for which it was made, except thou renew it, and create it anew. I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity, for in no wise do I

compare my understanding with that; but I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I believe,—that unless I believed, I should not understand.

CHAPTER II.

Truly there is a God, although the fool hath said in his heart,
There is no God.

AND SO, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak—a being than which nothing greater can be conceived—understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

CHAPTER III.

God cannot be conceived not to exist.—God is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived.—That which can be conceived not to exist is not God.

AND it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even

be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.

So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord, my God, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind could conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others. For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God (Psalms xiv. 1), since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that thou dost exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull and a fool?

CHAPTER IV.

How the fool has said in his heart what cannot be conceived.—A thing may be conceived in two ways: (1) when the word signifying it is conceived; (2) when the thing itself is understood. As far as the word goes, God can be conceived not to exist; in reality he cannot.

BUT how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive; or how is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? since it is the same to say in the heart, and to conceive.

But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said in his heart; and did not say in his heart, because he could not conceive; there is more than one way in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived. For, in one sense, an object is conceived,



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when the word signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity, which the object is, is understood.

In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist; but in the latter, not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water are can conceive fire to be water, in accordance with the nature of the facts themselves, although this is possible according to the words. So, then, no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist; although he says these words in his heart, either without any or with some foreign, signification. For, God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived. And he who thoroughly understands this, assuredly understands that this being so truly exists, that not even in concept can it be non-existent. Therefore, he who understands that God so exists, cannot conceive that he does not exist.

I thank thee, gracious Lord, I thank thee; because what I formerly believed by thy bounty, I now so understand by thine illumination, that if I were unwilling to believe that thou dost exist, I should not be able not to understand this to be true.

CHAPTER V.

God is whatever it is better to be than not to be; and he, as the only self-existent being, creates all things from nothing.

WHAT art thou, then, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be conceived? But what art thou, except that which, as the highest of all beings, alone exists through itself, and creates all other things from nothing? For, whatever is not this is less than a thing which can be conceived of. But this cannot be con-

ceived of thee. What good, therefore, does the supreme Good lack, through which every good is? Therefore, thou art just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better to be than not to be. For it is better to be just than not just; better to be blessed than not blessed.

CHAPTER VI.

How God is *sensible (sensibilis)* although he is not a body.—God is sensible, omnipotent, compassionate, passionless; for it is better to be these than not be. He who in any way knows, is not improperly said in some sort to feel.

BUT, although it is better for thee to be sensible, omnipotent, compassionate, passionless, than not to be these things; how art thou sensible, if thou art not a body; or omnipotent, if thou hast not all powers; or at once compassionate and passionless? For, if only corporeal things are sensible, since the senses encompass a body and are in a body, how art thou sensible, although thou art not a body, but a supreme Spirit, who is superior to body? But, if feeling is only cognition, or for the sake of cognition,—for he who feels obtains knowledge in accordance with the proper functions of his senses; as through sight, of colors; through taste, of flavors,—whatever in any way cognises is not inappropriately said, in some sort, to feel.

Therefore, O Lord, although thou art not a body, yet thou art truly sensible in the highest degree in respect of this, that thou dost cognise all things in the highest degree; and not as an animal cognises, through a corporeal sense.

in this life, may I at least advance from day to day, until that joy shall come to the full. Let the knowledge of thee advance in me here, and there be made full. Let the love of thee increase, and there let it be full, that here my joy may be great in hope, and there full in truth. Lord, through thy Son thou dost command, nay, thou dost counsel us to ask; and thou dost promise that we shall receive, that our joy may be full. I ask, O Lord, as thou dost counsel through our wonderful Counsellor. I will receive what thou dost promise by virtue of thy truth, that my joy may be full. Faithful God, I ask. I will receive, that my joy may be full. Meanwhile, let my mind meditate upon it; let my tongue speak of it. Let my heart love it; let my mouth talk of it. Let my soul hunger for it; let my flesh thirst for it; let my whole being desire it, until I enter into thy joy, O Lord, who art the Three and the One God, blessed for ever and ever. Amen.

ANSELM'S MONOLOGIUM

ON THE BEING OF GOD.

PREFACE.

In this book Anselm discusses, under the form of a meditation, the Being of God, basing his argument not on the authority of Scripture, but on the force of reason. It contains nothing that is inconsistent with the writings of the Holy Fathers, and especially nothing that is inconsistent with those of St. Augustine.—The Greek terminology is employed in Chapter LXXVIII., where it is stated that the Trinity may be said to consist of three substances, that is, three persons.

CERTAIN brethren have often and earnestly entreated me to put in writing some thoughts that I had offered them in familiar conversation, regarding meditation on the Being of God, and on some other topics connected with this subject, under the form of a meditation on these themes. It is in accordance with their wish, rather than with my ability, that they have prescribed such a form for the writing of this meditation; in order that nothing in Scripture should be urged on the authority of Scripture itself, but that whatever the conclusion of independent investigation should declare to be true, should, in an unadorned style, with common proofs and with a simple argument, be briefly enforced by the cogency of reason, and plainly expounded in the light of truth. It was

their wish also, that I should not disdain to meet such simple and almost foolish objections as occur to me.

This task I have long refused to undertake. And, reflecting on the matter, I have tried on many grounds to excuse myself; for the more they wanted this work to be adaptable to practical use, the more was what they enjoined on me difficult of execution. Overcome at last, however, both by the modest importunity of their entreaties and by the not contemptible sincerity of their zeal; and reluctant as I was because of the difficulty of my task and the weakness of my talent, I entered upon the work they asked for. But it is with pleasure inspired by their affection that, so far as I was able, I have prosecuted this work within the limits they set.

I was led to this undertaking in the hope that whatever I might accomplish would soon be overwhelmed with contempt, as by men disgusted with some worthless thing. For I know that in this book I have not so much satisfied those who entreated me, as put an end to the entreaties that followed me so urgently. Yet, somehow it fell out, contrary to my hope, that not only the brethren mentioned above, but several others, by making copies for their own use, condemned this writing to long remembrance. And, after frequent consideration, I have not been able to find that I have made in it any statement which is inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, or especially with those of St. Augustine. Wherefore, if it shall appear to any man that I have offered in this work any thought that is either too novel or discordant with the truth, I ask him not to denounce me at once as one who boldly seizes upon new ideas, or as a maintainer of falsehood; but let

him first read diligently Augustine's books on the Trinity, and then judge my treatise in the light of those.

In stating that the supreme Trinity may be said to consist of three substances, I have followed the Greeks, who acknowledge three substances in one Essence, in the same faith wherein we acknowledge three persons in one Substance. For they designate by the word *substance* that attribute of God which we designate by the word *person*.

Whatever I have said on that point, however, is put in the mouth of one debating and investigating in solitary reflection, questions to which he had given no attention before. And this method I knew to be in accordance with the wish of those whose request I was striving to fulfil. But it is my prayer and earnest entreaty, that if any shall wish to copy this work, he shall be careful to place this preface at the beginning of the book, before the body of the meditation itself. For I believe that one will be much helped in understanding the matter of this book, if he has taken note of the intention, and the method according to which it is discussed. It is my opinion, too, that one who has first seen this preface will not pronounce a rash judgment, if he shall find offered here any thought that is contrary to his own belief.

CHAPTER I.

There is a being which is best, and greatest, and highest of all existing beings.

If any man, either from ignorance or unbelief, has no knowledge of the existence of one Nature which is the highest of all existing beings, which is also suffi-

PREFACE

Abbreviations used in the Notes.

MGH = *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*

CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*

PL = Migne, *Patrologia Latina*

PG = Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*

In the Latin literature of the Middle Ages, the story of Abelard's adversities occupies a place which can truly be called unique. In those days, men were not accustomed to write about themselves; even the memorable example of St. Augustine in his *Confessions* has found hardly any followers. Moreover, Augustine's masterpiece was a sort of spiritual autobiography rather than the story of his own life. Peter Abelard's intention was quite different. In the *Confessions*, the central figure of the story was God; Abelard occupies the very centre of his own narrative. As though trouble were his natural element and with his own career and his adventures as a knight-errant in the schools of philosophy, he was always willing to challenge any adversary. Add to this the extraordinary romance of his sentimental adventures, which he did not hesitate to relate with somewhat blunt honesty, and it will become quite apparent that, in the vast sea of philosophical and theological speculation which fills up the Latin Patrology of Migne, this tale of Abelard constitutes a most welcome island and port of call that no one would care to miss. Even apart from the unforgettable Heloise, many picturesque characters animate the scene about Abelard. The world of the twelfth-century schools, of whose daily life and routine we know so little, discloses some of its secrets and we find ourselves plunged in the midst of those concrete historical facts which Thomas Carlyle considered more precious than all historical generalities.

Such a text as this, therefore, should be read by all historians of the Middle Ages as a necessary source of information not only about one of the most outstanding figures of those times but also in those cases when the general interpretation of the period is at stake. The *Story of Abelard's Adversities* is as typical of the civilization of the Middle Ages as the *Autobiography* of Benvenuto Cellini is of the Renaissance. Philosophy and theology dominate the life of Abelard just as thoroughly as art dominates the life of the sixteenth-century Italian goldsmith; workshops are a natural setting for Cellini's life just as schools are the only fitting stage for the somewhat histrionic activities of Abelard. Yet, when all is said and done, the life and works of these two representative men differ much more than do their personalities. There is much more of human passion in the life of Abelard than one should expect to find there according to the accepted interpretation of the Middle Ages; on the other hand, there remains a great deal more of religion in the life of Benvenuto Cellini than should be there if that life were to fit the current view of the so-called paganism of the Renaissance. Were it to serve no other purpose than to occasion a new and more objective examination of these widely discussed notions, the publication of such a document as the present one should be welcomed gratefully—still more perhaps than most of its readers probably imagine. Only a scholar of many qualifications could undertake this sort of work and successfully bring it to completion.

Father J. T. Muckle, C.S.B., is just such a scholar. Countless adaptations and more or less counterfeit renderings of the correspondence of Abelard and Heloise

have been published in modern times, particularly since the end of the seventeenth century. Many of them are quite entertaining pieces of literature; the only trouble is that they have so little to do with historical truth which, after all, is usually still more picturesque and unlikely than the wildest stretches of the imagination. To make this truth available to the English reading public, it was necessary, first of all, to proceed to a revision of the original text, something that had never been done since the time of Victor Cousin. For this was required a scholar equally at home in Classical and Mediaeval philology. Translating the Latin of Abelard was a still trickier task and only those who have not tried their hand at it will be deceived by its apparent simplicity. Last but not least, a great many problems of identification of persons and places had to be solved, some technical difficulties arising from philosophical terminology had to be cleared up. The foot-notes to the text of this translation, remarkable for their sobriety and precision, leave nothing to be desired in this respect.

This is no place to attempt an appreciation of the meaning and historical significance of this extraordinary document. Many good historians, all of them equally competent in their learning and sincere in their feelings, have set forth their personal views of the question without reaching too much agreement on most of the problems raised by the text. They do not agree on its authenticity, they question its historicity, some of them go so far as to doubt the very possibility of characters as strange as Abelard and Heloise. In fact, the nature of historical evidence is such that very few human documents are proof against all possible criticism. But is criticism itself

Bulgars and the control of the Slavonic tribes living along the Danube in Dacia and in neighboring territories. That the Franks are fighting the Bulgars deep in the Balkans by the time the annalists discontinue the official annals of the realm is a measure of the expansion which the Carolingian empire undergoes over the nine decades of Carolingian history recorded by the RFA.

The RFA assigns a special significance to the contacts between the Frankish kings and the Roman popes. The name of a pope, Zacharias, first appears in the RFA under the year 749, an error for 750, in connection with the famous question of Pepin the Short addressed to the pope: whether the man with the name of king or the one who had the power should rule in Francia. The RFA then becomes the history of the alliance between the Carolingians and the papacy. Under the year 753 it records the unprecedented journey of a pope, Stephen II, across the Alps to Francia; under 754 the anointing of Pepin and his sons by the pope; under 755 the first campaign against the Lombard Aistulf "to seek justice for the blessed apostle Peter"; and under 756 the donation of the exarchate of Ravenna and the Pentapolis to the pope. For the years 773 and 774 the RFA records the renewed intervention of the Frankish king in Italy, stressing the invitation and request of the pope, and the destruction of the Lombard kingdom. In 781 two sons of Charlemagne are crowned kings by the pope. In recording these events the annalists leave no doubt that the pope is the petitioner but at the same time the indispensable mediator of grace when he consecrates kings and princes.

The true nature of Charlemagne's relationship with the pope is revealed by later events. The pope threatens the emissaries of Tassilo of Bavaria "with the sword of his anathema" if they should break fealty to Charlemagne and thus supports with his spiritual power the policy of the Frankish king; the king, on the other hand, when faced with the problem of the Adoptionist heresy, tries the heretical bishop twice before his own synod, relegating the pope and his representatives to a supporting role (792, 794). Councils are convoked and ecclesiastical legislation is initiated by the king and emperor. The pope upon his consecration sends to the emperor the keys of the tomb of St. Peter and the banner of the city of Rome. Popes announce their election to the emperor and have to be confirmed by him; in 827 Pope Gregory is not ordained "until the emperor's ambassadors had come to Rome

and examined the character of the election by the people." The annalists record the imperial coronation of both Charlemagne and his son Louis the Pious by the pope, but they are obviously far removed from giving these acts a meaning even remotely similar to later papal interpretations. Instead, there seems to be much implicit criticism of the popes, although the language remains reverential throughout and the charges are reported as hearsay. In 799 Pope Leo III is saved from the fury of his Roman enemies by the agents of the king, but he is forced to purge himself publicly from all charges leveled against him. The emperor is displeased when the pope is reported to be responsible for the execution of some of his opponents (815). He examines carefully and by his own ambassadors the pope's blinding and decapitation of two papal officials whose crime is reported to have been that they always acted loyally toward the emperor's son Lothair, king of Italy. The annalist notes this charge as well as the pope's vigorous defense of the murderers and on another occasion claims that Roman affairs have been "confused due to the wickedness of several popes." As a result the RFA leaves the impression that the annalists think of the emperor very much in terms of the Christian Roman emperors whose foes are guilty of *lèse majesté*. The emperor is "the Lord's steward," *Dei dispensator*, holding his power from God and responsible alone to the Lord, but assisted in matters divine by a revered and prayerful Roman pope.

Such was the world of the Carolingians as observed and recorded by the nameless royal Frankish annalists, or rather a small part of that world, since the authors in the style of annalists remained indifferent to the complexities of personality and social life. It is a picture of the Carolingian world as viewed by a particular class of men. Although the annalists were men of greatly diverse mind and ability, they shared some common traits. The task, after all, for which they were called required peculiar talents and a special station in society. They were literate men in an age of illiteracy and thus more enlightened than most in their rough environment. They were members of the clergy or had at least attended monastic schools, which would have fostered in them, as it did in Alcuin and Einhard, a deep concern with the religious life and the current issues of theology. As writers they were obviously influenced by the language and thought of the Bible and easily borrowed the polished phrases of classical authors.

5

Jonas

Life of St. Columbanus

St. Columbanus (c.560-615), a contemporary of Gregory the Great, travelled from Ireland through Gaul and into Italy, where he founded a number of monasteries, the greatest being Bobbio in northern Italy. The independent and idiosyncratic Irish Christianity of the sixth century made much of both penitential pilgrimage out of Ireland and the conversion of pagans. Many such Irish monks came to Gaul, but the life of Columbanus by Jonas, derived from impressions of the saint's own companions, is the only complete one we possess.

6. Columban, who is also called Columba, was born on the island of Ireland. This is situated in the extreme ocean and, according to common report, is charming, productive of various nations, and free from the wars which trouble other nations. Here lives the race of the Scots, who, although they lack the laws of the other nations, flourish in the doctrine of Christian strength, and exceed in faith all the neighboring tribes. Columban was born amid the beginnings of that race's faith, in order that the religion, which that race cherished uncompromisingly, might be increased by his own fruitful toil and the protecting care of his associates.

But what happened before his birth, before he saw the light of this world, must not be passed over in silence. For when his mother, after having conceived, was bearing him in her womb, suddenly in a tempestuous night, while she was buried in sleep, she saw the sun rise from her bosom and issuing forth resplendent, furnish great light to the world. After she had arisen from sleep and Aurora rising had driven away the dark shadows from

the world, she began to think earnestly of these matters, joyfully and wisely weighing the import of so great a vision; and she sought an increase of consolation from such of her neighbors as were learned, asking that with wise hearts they should examine carefully the meaning of so great a vision. At length she was told by those who had wisely considered the matter, that she was carrying in her womb a man of remarkable genius, who would provide what would be useful for her own salvation and for that of her neighbors.

After the mother learned this she watched over him with so great care that she would scarcely entrust him even to his nearest relatives. So the life of the boy aspired to the cultivation of good works under the leadership of Christ, without whom no good work is done. Nor without reason had the mother seen the shining sun proceed from her bosom, the sun which shines brightly in the members of the Church, the mother of all, like a glowing Phoebus. As the Lord says: "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." So Deborah, with the voice of prayer, formerly spoke to the Lord, by the admonition of the Holy Spirit, saying: "But let them that love Thee be as the sun when he goeth forth in his might."

For the milky way in the heavens, although it is itself bright, is rendered more beautiful by the presence of the other stars; just as the daylight, increased by the splendor of Phoebus, shines more benignantly upon the world. So the body of the Church, enriched by the splendor of its Founder, is augmented by the hosts of saints and is made resplendent by religion and learning, so that those who come after draw profit from the concourse of the learned. And just as the sun or moon and all the stars ennoble the day and night by their refulgence, so the merits of the holy priests increase the glory of the Church.

7. When Columban's childhood was over and he became older, he began to devote himself enthusiastically to the pursuit of grammar and the sciences, and studied with fruitful zeal all through his boyhood and youth, until he became a man. But, as his fine figure, his splendid color, and his noble manliness made him beloved by all, the old enemy began finally to turn his deadly weapons upon him, in order to catch in his nets this youth, whom

he saw growing so rapidly in grace. And he aroused against him the lust of lascivious maidens, especially of those whose fine figure and superficial beauty are wont to enkindle mad desires in the minds of wretched men.

But when that excellent soldier saw that he was surrounded on all sides by so deadly weapons, and perceived the cunning and shrewdness of the enemy who was fighting against him, and that by an act of human frailty, he might quickly fall over a precipice and be destroyed,—as Livy says, "No one is rendered so sacred by religion, no one is so guarded, that lust is unable to prevail against him,"—holding in his left hand the shield of the Gospel and bearing in his right hand the two-edged sword, he prepared to advance and attack the hostile lines threatening him. He feared lest, ensnared by the lusts of the world, he should in vain have spent so much labor on grammar, rhetoric, geometry and the Holy Scriptures. And in these perils he was strengthened by a particular aid.

8. When he was already meditating upon this purpose, he came to the dwelling of a holy and devout woman. He at first addressed her humbly, afterwards he began to exhort her, as far as lay in his power. As she saw the increasing strength of the youth she said: "I have gone forth to the strife as far as it lay in my power. Lo, twelve years have passed by, since I have been far from my home and have sought out this place of pilgrimage. With the aid of Christ, never since then have I engaged in secular matters; after putting my hand to the plough, I have not turned backward. And if the weakness of my sex had not prevented me, I would have crossed the sea and chosen a better place among strangers as my home. But you, glowing with the fire of youth, stay quietly on your native soil; out of weakness you lend your ear even against your own will, to the voice of the flesh, and think you can associate with the female sex without sin. But do you recall the wiles of Eve, Adam's fall, how Samson was deceived by Delilah, how David was led to injustice by the beauty of Bathsheba, how the wise Solomon was ensnared by the love of a woman? Away, O youth! away! flee from corruption, into which, as you know, many have fallen. Forsake the path which leads to the gates of hell."

the man of God, blessed the water and sanctified the place, and remained there with his followers three years. . . .

Some time after, in the silence of the night, Gall, the elect of God, was laying nets in the water, and lo! he heard the demon of the mountain top calling to his fellow who dwelt in the depths of the lake. The demon of the lake answered, "I am here;" he of the mountain returned: "Arise, come to my aid! Behold the aliens come, and thrust me from my temple. Come, come! help me to drive them from our lands." The demon of the lake answered: "One of them is upon the lake, whom I could never harm. For I wished to break his nets, but see, I am vanquished and mourn. The sign of his prayer protects him always, and sleep never overcomes him."

Gall, the elect of God, heard this, and fortified himself on all sides with the sign of the cross, and said to them: "In the name of Jesus Christ, I command you, leave this place, and do not presume to harm any one here." And he hastened to return to the shore, and told his abbot what he had heard.

When Columban, the man of God, heard this, he called the brethren together in the church, and made the accustomed sign (the cross). Before the brethren could raise their voices, the voice of an unseen being was heard, and wailing and lamentation echoed from the mountain top. So the malicious demons departed with mourning, and the prayer of the brethren arose as they sent up their supplications to God.

less beasts. By this path the apostles are directed, the blessed martyrs are glorified. You say, "How?" To be sure, when they care for the sick, raise up the dead, despise the present, long for the future, treat torturers with contempt and feel no punishment, they are hastening to the Heavenly Kingdom. Beyond doubt they would not obtain this by their own virtue were they not heard by the Lord as they walk most righteously on the path of justice.²³

3. Preface of the First Book of "The Miracles of Blessed Martin the Bishop"²⁴

The miracles which the Lord our God deigned to perform through his priest, the blessed Martin, in the flesh, he now deigns to confirm daily to strengthen the belief of the faithful. God who acted in him when he was in this world now endows his tomb with miraculous powers, and He who then sent him as a priest to the nations about to perish offers blessings to Christians through him. Therefore let no one doubt past miracles when he beholds the gift of the present signs given forth, since he sees the lame made straight, the blind given sight, demons put to flight, and other kinds of disease cured by his healing. Verily to increase faith in that account which was written by earlier men concerning his life, at the command of the Lord I will relate for posterity as many current miracles as I can recall. I would not presume to do this, had I not been warned twice and thrice in a vision. Nevertheless I call Almighty God to witness that by chance I saw in a dream at noon in the basilica of St. Martin many sick and oppressed by different diseases cured, and I saw these things while my mother was watching, who said to me: "Why are you slow in writing that which you see?" I answered: "You know that I am not learned in literature and being simple and unskilled

quasi ventum roris flantem: Dan., 3.50, (Dan., 3.24-90 which was included in Vulg., although it was not in the Hebrew version, is excluded from the ARV).

²³This passage was printed as a preface by Ruinart, but as the first half of *Iul.*, 1 by Krusch.

²⁴Ruinart printed this preface under the title *epistola in quatuor libros de virtutibus sancti Martini episcopi*. This revision of a translation already published (McDermott, pp. 281f.) is used by the kind permission of Professor M. S. Enslin, editor of *The Crozer Quarterly*.

would not dare describe such awe-inspiring miracles. Would that Severus or Paulinus were alive, or indeed that Fortunatus were present to describe these deeds! Since I am incompetent, I would incur shame if I tried to do this." And she said to me: "Do you not know that on account of the ignorance of our people the way you can speak is considered more intelligible? So do not hesitate and do not delay doing this since it will be a charge against you if you pass over these deeds in silence." So I wish to do this but am afflicted by double dread, equally by grief and fear; grief because such great miracles done under our predecessors have not been described, fear of approaching so excellent a work, since I am a rustic. But led by the hope of divine favor I will approach what is advised. For He, Who produced water from a dry rock in the desert to quench the burning thirst of a people, is able, I believe, to display these things through me though I lack eloquence.²⁵ It will certainly be evident that He has again opened the mouth of an ass if opening my unlearned lips He deems it worthy to expound these deeds. But why do I fear my rusticity when the Lord, our Redeemer and our God, chose for the destruction of the vanity of worldly wisdom not orators but fishermen, not philosophers but rustics? And so I am confident because of your prayers that even if my rude speech cannot decorate the page, the glorious priest will make it gleam with his famous miracles.

4. Preface of the Second Book of "The Miracles of Blessed Martin the Bishop"

When we had written of the miracles of St. Martin, which we have seen or which we have been able to find from the past through faithful men, we burned with the thirst that there should not be handed over to oblivion that which the Lord deigned to perform for the praise of his priest. Indeed we wish to tell of those things at which we marvel as being done in our own time, and we leave little material for the more eloquent, since we appropriate in our writings the mighty works of his miracles so

²⁵ *Per me elinguem*, Krusch, *App.* In NA, 19 (1894), p. 37 Krusch defended this conjecture in place of the reading *per meae linguae* which he had originally printed. Bonnet defended *linguae sterilitatem*, a reading of ms 14b: p. 527, note 2.

that what skill will not spread over our pages, the very accumulation of numerous miracles might grant.

5. Preface of the Third Book of "The Miracles of Blessed Martin the Bishop"

When, Christ disposing, we begin to write the third book on the miracles of the blessed Martin, we give thanks to Almighty God who has deigned to grant such a healer to us who might cure our infirmities, heal our wounds, and grant health-giving medicine. For at his blessed tomb the soul is humbled and prayer rises on high. If tears flow, if true remorse is present, if sighs rise from the depths of the heart, if wicked breasts are beaten, lamentation finds joy, the fault pardon, the grief of heart arrives at a remedy. For often the touch of the blessed tomb has ordered the flow of blood to stop, the blind to see, the paralyzed to rise, and also the bitterness of the breast to depart afar. Although I have often experienced this power, I think I am not worthy that amid the might of such great miracles I should also insert those which he deigned to perform for me. But again I am afraid that I shall appear guilty if like a thief I steal them away. I call to witness God and, believing that I am not deceived by His pity, I call to witness the hope which I place in His miraculous power that, as often as a headache attacks me, or a sharp pain beats my temples, or my sense of hearing grows faint in my ears, or a cloud suffuses the sight of my eyes, or pain besieges my limbs, straightway as soon as I have touched the aching part to the tomb or the drapery which hangs there, I recover my health. Because of that very touch, as I marvel silently, the pain recedes in its course.

6. Preface of the Fourth Book of "The Miracles of Blessed Martin the Bishop"

The prophet warns us with extremely salutary advice, when he says:²⁶ "O God, Your friends must be honored." Also in another

²⁶ *Honorandi sunt amici tui, Deus* (Gregory): *Mihi autem nimis honorificati sunt amici tui, Deus* (Vulg., Ps., 138.17): "How precious also are thy thoughts unto me, O God!" (ARV, *Psalms*, 139.17).

psalm:²⁷ "He who exalts those who fear the Lord is joined with the blessedness of the eternal home." Therefore it is obvious to the human mind that not only those who are free from crime but also those who are given to the evil of guilty crime are warned that they should reverently grant respect to the friends of God. This action grants not only benefit in the present, but also offers consolation²⁸ in the future life. For often when we see the signs of miraculous power come forth from the tombs of the blessed, we are rightfully moved to pay reverent honor which is due them from whom we do not cease to beseech remedies for our illnesses. We do not doubt that remission of sins is gained by their prayers. Not only do we merit healing here, but also we are saved from the punishments of Hell by their intervention. For we are confident that, just as here they check all kinds of disease, so there they avert the savage torment of punishment; and just as here they ameliorate the heat of the body, so there they extinguish eternal heat;²⁹ and as here they cleanse the unclean sores of deadly leprosy, so there they obtain healing for the marks of crime by their intervention. And as here they bring back the dead to life, so there by placing their hands on those who have been buried in sin, they take them from the pools of Acheron and restore them to eternal life; wherefore each one rejoices in joy under the protection of his own patron, then more zealously pays the honor which is due his patron when he realizes that he has been cleansed by his patron's miraculous power of the weakness by which he was held. So now we in common with innumerable people have tried out the blessed priest Martin, the special patron for the whole world. And may our own worthless mind gain for him such veneration as befits a friend of God, who has so often restored us to health when we have been stricken by so many kinds of severe illness!

²⁷ *Qui timentes Dominum magnificat, beatitudine copulatur domus aeternae* (Gregory): *timentes autem Dominum glorificat* (Vulg., Ps., 144): "But honoreth them that fear Jehovah" (ARV, Psalms, 15.4).

²⁸ The double meaning of *refrigerium* "cooling, consolation" cannot be reproduced in English: cf. Bonnet, p. 243.

²⁹ *Febres* "fevers, heat" is used in a play on words in this sentence as *refrigerium* is used above. One copyist spoiled this play on words by changing *aeternus* (sc. *febres*) below to *flammas aeternas*: cf. Krusch, App.

7. Preface of "The Lives of the Fathers"

I had decided to write only of that which was done by divine power at the sepulchers of the blessed martyrs and confessors, but recently I have found material about those whom the merit of blessed conversation has borne to Heaven and whose path of life, known by definite accounts, in my opinion built the church. Under the pressure of this opportunity I will not delay saying something about them, since the life of the saints not only lays open their deeds, but also incites the minds of the hearers to imitation. And some ask whether we ought to say "The Life of the Saints" or "Lives." Aulus Gellius too and many of the grammarians³⁰ wished to say "lives."³¹ For the author Pliny says in the third book of his *Art of Grammar*:³² "the ancients spoke of the 'lives' (*vitas*) of each one of us, but the grammarians thought that 'life' (*vitam*) has no plural number." Whence it is obvious that it is better to say "The Life of the Fathers" than "Lives," because, although there is a diversity of merits and virtues, nevertheless one life of the body nourishes all in the world. I admit I have written in the following book of the confessors something on the life of certain ones who have performed fewer works in the body because, although they be counted great from the miraculous power of God, nonetheless there is but little to write about them. Although unskilled and unlearned, we presume to publish more lengthy accounts in this book, which we wish to call "The Life of the Saints." We pray to the Master that He deign to put the word in our mouth since he has often unlocked the lips of the dumb for

³⁰ *Philosophorum* "grammarians." Gregory often used such words as *philosophus* carelessly.

³¹ Gellius has no comment on this point in his *Noctes Atticae*, but he does use the plural in two places (1.3.1; 13.2.1). It is unlikely that Gregory consulted Gellius or Pliny the Elder. I assume that he found this reference, including quotations from Gellius and Pliny, in a glossary. However it is often assumed that he used those authors directly: cf. Arndt, p. 7; Bonnet, pp. 52f.; Manitius, NA, 21 (1896), pp. 555f.

³² Pliny refers to his own work on grammar in the preface of his "Natural History": (28) . . . *libellos, quos de grammatica edidi*. . . This is obviously the same as the *dubii sermonis octo (libri)* which is listed by the younger Pliny in his catalogue of his uncle's works (Ep., 3.5.5): cf. J. W. Beck, *C. Plinii Secundi librorum dubii sermonis VIII reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1894), pp. XVIII, 42.

In spite of their ecclesiastical garb their spirituality was superficial, superstitious, and legalistic, and their devotion to the pope tempered by their loyalty to the king. They were the king's men first, just as were the secular vassals, and cherished above everything the bond which personal fidelity tended to create between lord and faithful followers. They were probably men of aristocratic descent who shared the values and prejudices of their class; who served the king not only as priests and scribes but as emissaries and administrators; who would not wield a sword themselves but appreciated a good bout with plenty of blood and piles of spoils; who were proud of being Franks and contemptuous of their faithless enemies; who knew the court and its intrigues and competed with their peers for the honors and offices dispensed by royal bounty. They were men of limited sophistication who did not usually foresee the consequences of the acts they recorded, but they were also the men who supported Charlemagne's vision of empire and made possible its short-lived realization and the regeneration of Carolingian society.

Regardless of its authors' limitations, the RFA became an important source of information about the Carolingian age and, judging by the number of surviving manuscripts, for centuries was thought to deserve reading and copying.²¹ Among the immediate users of the RFA were Einhard in his *Life of Charlemagne* and Nithard in his *Histories*, Poeta Saxo, and the biographers of Louis the Pious.²² The RFA also served as a direct or indirect source for the other annalistic works of the ninth century, e.g., the *Annales Mettenses Priores* (678–831).²³

In the revised version the RFA was continued in the ninth century. A copy which contained minor additions for the years 741 to 829 was extended into the *Annales Bertiniani*, named after the location of the first manuscript. The first writer who added to the annals was a native of Belgian Gaul and loyal follower of Emperor Louis the Pious. From 835 on, Prudentius, chaplain of Louis the Pious and later bishop of Troyes (843/46–61), continued these annals. While he wrote at first as the annalist of the empire and with sympathy for the emperor, he identified himself after 840 with the interests of Charles the Bald and the western part of the Carolingian empire. After 853 his attitude towards Charles became more critical and reflected the resolve of the French episcopacy to guide and direct the

king. It was, therefore, only natural that after Prudentius' death Hincmar, archbishop of Reims, the most important statesman in the realm of Charles the Bald, took it upon himself to record the events of the kingdom until his death in 882.²⁴ The *Annales Xantenses* (790–873), whose main author, Gerward, was librarian in the palace of Aix-la-Chapelle and Einhard's successor as supervisor of building, for the years 797–811 incorporates an abridged version of the RFA.²⁵ The *Annales Fuldenses* (714–902), a source well informed on affairs in the eastern part of the empire, made extensive use of the RFA for the years 771–827. Like the *Annales Bertiniani*, it reflects some sort of official interest or inspiration, perhaps on the part of the archbishop of Mainz.²⁶ This threefold continuation of the RFA is a fitting symbol of the fate which struck Charlemagne's realm and eventually caused the official annalists to keep their silence.

Nithard's *Histories*

Nithard's *Histories* is the most important source for the wars among the sons of Louis the Pious, which set the stage for the dissolution of the empire. It provides the only evidence for many episodes between the old emperor's death in June 840 and the treaty of Verdun in August 843, which set the seal on the partition. Nithard attached himself to the emperor's youngest son, whose birth in 823 and investment with part of the empire a few years later had been the root of the conflicts between Louis the Pious and his three older sons in the 830's. For this reason, Nithard's work records the fraternal wars from Charles's and a western point of view and with obvious bias against Lothair. Nonetheless, in scope, in depth, in detail of information, Nithard far surpasses the other historians of the dying empire, such as Prudentius, the annalist of St.-Bertin, who shared Nithard's bias in favor of Charles; Rudolf, the annalist of Fulda, who from a partisan of Lothair gradually changed into a supporter of Louis, or the nameless annalist of Xanten, who favored Lothair but recorded little of relevance about him during these years.²⁷

Nithard's *Histories* is not only a significant source of information for a crucial event in the history of medieval Europe but an interesting and rather unusual piece of historical literature. It is

emporary, self-contained, and programmatic history, i.e., Nithard relates the events of his own time and experience, he limits himself to a specific and well-defined theme, and he frankly admits that he writes to prove a point and to forestall a different interpretation. Nithard wrote in this fashion apparently without following a literary model. Tacitus in his *Histories*, however, had written contemporary history. Similarly, Sallust, whom Nithard may have read, in his *Catiline* and *Jugurthine War* had written the histories of significant and self-contained episodes. Hardly a historian, on the other hand, had ever admitted partisanship as candidly before; instead, every writer claimed with Tacitus to be "unmoved . . . by either hatred or partiality." But the open profession of a point of view seems appealing today and did not prevent an upright man from writing an honest work. A further peculiar feature of Nithard's *Histories* is that the author was a layman—"for a long time the last layman to write history, without literary ambition, but with lucidity, insight, and honesty."²⁸ Like Einhard, also a layman, Nithard benefited from the reform of education and revival of learning in the days of Charlemagne, which improved Latin style, inspired a deeper interest in the knowledge of classical and Christian antiquity, gathered the native memories of the past, and introduced the historical tradition of Anglo-Saxon England. A wide-ranging, realistic, personal, and unparochial historiography was the result; Nithard was an important exponent of this.

Some knowledge of Nithard's family and public life can be gathered from his work. He was a grandson of Charlemagne, his mother being Bertha, the emperor's daughter by Hildegard. His father was the poet Angilbert, nicknamed "Homer" at Charlemagne's court, who received the abbey of St.-Riquier near Amiens and died shortly after his emperor.²⁹ The illicit relations between Angilbert and Bertha, which produced another son, Hartnid, and may have given rise to the tale of Einhard and Emma, occurred in the 790's, and Nithard thus must have been in his forties when he lived through the fraternal wars.³⁰ Although Nithard led the life of a soldier and held high public office, he was obviously a man of some learning. His position as Charles's official historian, his careful tracking of a comet which appeared in the winter of 841-42, his biblical quotations and Virgilian reminiscences indicate the breadth of his scholarship.³¹ Why Nithard took the side of the young Charles cannot be explained, but he looked

upon him as a ruler appointed by God.³² In the fall of 840 Charles sent Nithard and another count, Adalgar, as his envoys from Bourges to make peace with Lothair. Because the envoys refused to defect from their lord they lost the fiefs which they had received from Louis the Pious. The author participated in the fratricidal battle of Fontenoy on June 25, 841, and was able to lend crucial support to Adalgar. On October 18, 841, he was in Charles's headquarters at St.-Cloud near Paris, writing his record of the battle. In 842 the historian was chosen as one of twelve magnates representing the western half of the empire to consult with twelve nobles of the eastern half about the proposed division of the entire realm between Louis and Charles.³³

Little is known about Nithard beyond the data which he provides in his work. Like his father he became lay abbot of the monastery of St.-Riquier or Centulum, apparently in 843. He died in a battle against the Normans on May 15, 845.³⁴ An epitaph by the monk Mico notes his wisdom and fortitude and bemoans his brief tenure of office and death by the sword.³⁵ Hariulf's chronicle of St.-Riquier records that Nithard was first buried in the abbey next to his father but after the latter's translation in the eleventh century was placed in Angilbert's sarcophagus. At that time the head wound of which he died could still be seen.³⁶

Nithard, as he informs the reader in the preface to the first of his four books, wrote his work at the request of his lord, Charles the Bald, who asked him, before occupying the city of Châlons in May 841, to record the events of their time. Although the author accepted the task as an honor and an obligation which he owed to his lord, he was wary of the difficulties and of possible mistakes. He wondered whether he would have sufficient leisure in such troublesome times; whether he could apply the attention and care necessary and convey the proper meaning of events.³⁷ At the beginning of the third book Nithard revealed that he would have preferred to end with the second, since he was ashamed of what he had to record about his Frankish people. What alone impelled him to go on was the fear that someone else might produce an improper version of the history of his times.³⁸ The concern which Nithard voices here indicates the nature of the work: it was an official, partisan piece of history, intended to explain to posterity what Charles and his followers considered the cause and meaning of the fraternal wars. Nithard's main theme was Lothair's

tional and deceptive author of the life of Louis the Pious. Nithard believed that Charles's mother Judith had committed adultery with Duke Bernard of Septimania, but was hardly in a position to say so in his book; he nevertheless records the charge and does not dispute its validity. He candidly criticized the same Bernard for abusing his authority, although the man was one of Judith's and Charles's most loyal followers, and toward the end of his work he charges that his lord married the niece of the influential Adalhard "because he believed that with Adalhard he could win a large part of the people for himself."⁴²

The three last books of Nithard's *Histories* confirm the impression that the author, though a fervent partisan of Charles and an opponent of the empire, recorded the events of his time with honesty and objectivity. These three books are devoted to the political moves and military campaigns, the diplomatic missions and shifting alliances, the drafts for a division of the empire and the growing weariness of the people, which eventually resulted in the treaty of Verdun.⁴³ Book II was apparently written from memory, but in Books III and IV Nithard let little time elapse between the event and his record.⁴⁴ Charles remains in the center of things throughout the work, but in the later parts a change of method is noticeable. Apparently, Nithard took less pleasure in his task as the war dragged on; in the preface to his last book he not only welcomed a respite from the labor of writing but contemplated a complete withdrawal from the burden of public affairs. Only the prospect that he might dispel the haze of error to the benefit of future generations made him go on. Increasingly, the unity of his theme is disregarded and digressions creep in. Earlier in the work any digression was related to the fate of his hero, as in the story of the royal vestments and insignia which arrived unexpectedly at Troyes on Easter 841.⁴⁵ In his last two books, however, the author talks about the weather, a comet, his family, or the war games performed by the soldiers when the forces of Louis and Charles united in 842.⁴⁶ In the very last book Nithard's style almost resembles that of the monastic chronicler. Without definite plan and employing awkward connectives, he strings together events in which his hero is involved, but also describes the society of the Saxons, the invasion of the Saracens, an earthquake, and a lunar eclipse.⁴⁷ Want and disease and natural disasters abound in the last chapters and induce

pessimistic reflections on the selfish and bestial actions of men which provoke the judgment of God.⁴⁸ As he started his work with a eulogy to Charlemagne, Nithard ends with a nostalgic glance back at the reign of his grandfather when men were righteous and walked the ways of the Lord and peace and prosperity filled the realm of the Franks.⁴⁹ In the later books Lothair emerges again as indecisive, treacherous, and cowardly, Louis on the other hand, as a man of nobility and magnanimity. In both cases Nithard's assessment of the character of the man is generally confirmed by other contemporary sources. Only in his portrait of Charles does Nithard find no corroboration. The later history of his reign reveals Charles II as a spineless coward, greedy, crafty, "timid as a rabbit," in the words of a contemporary, but ruthless enough to have his own son, Carloman, blinded. In Nithard's *Histories* this *novellus Sennacherib* cannot be found; instead Charles, who was in fact a gifted and well-educated man, appears as a cautious diplomat, a resolute leader, a masterly strategist, a humble and charitable prince, almost a martyr. The contrast is striking. Nithard was describing a youth between the ages of seventeen and twenty, however, and his judgment may have been affected not so much by the spirit of party as by the hopes and expectations of a guide and teacher. That he was not an uncritical panegyrist his frank revelation of Charles's failures and defeats makes abundantly clear.⁵⁰

If Nithard was willing to provide an accurate picture of the events of his time, he was also in an excellent position to do so. Only in connection with the battle of Fontenoy does he mention his personal involvement in military action, but he evidently advised and aided Charles in many campaigns of these years. His detailed reports on marches and expeditions, their beginnings and ends, routes and obstacles, on the prevailing weather and the motives and purposes of his lord admit no other conclusion.⁵¹ Similarly, his intimate knowledge of delicate negotiations and deliberations at court, and of the aims and objectives of the main actors, leaves no doubt that he was close to the center of power and belonged to the innermost council of Charles and perhaps previously of Louis the Pious. He knows about the fears which troubled the doting father when Charles was born and of the consultations concerning Charles's future place and safety when the old emperor's days were drawing to an end; he is aware of

unjust persecution of Charles and his party. In Book I he tells why Lothair pursued Charles and his brother Louis after their father's death; in the rest of the work he describes "with how much vigor and zeal" Lothair tried to execute his resolution.³⁹ Nithard's *Histoires* thus consists of two distinct parts: one book of history in the customary sense and three books of contemporary history, the former covering the years from 814 to the death of Louis the Pious in 840, the latter from the summer of 840 to the spring of 843.

The summary in Book I of the events from the death of Charlemagne to that of Louis the Pious is a concise and necessary prologue to Nithard's topic. It is a more lucid and purposeful survey of the period than the biographies of Louis the Pious and has been called "the best guide to find a way out of the confusions of that time." In the welter of conflicting loyalties and uncertain alliances, Nithard clearly discerned the opposing principles: the unity of the whole versus the autonomy of the parts.⁴⁰ The story in Book I is selective; some important events are omitted because they did not seem relevant to Nithard's topic, but even here Nithard is often the only source of essential detail. He alone, for example, reports that Louis the Pious made his illegitimate brothers companions of his table and that it was Bertmund, prefect of the province of Lyons, who blinded Bernard in 818. Since the first book was written from memory and some of the events had occurred more than two decades earlier, Nithard makes some minor mistakes. He fails to mention the widows, orphans, and churches who received a share of Charlemagne's treasure when it was divided after the emperor's death. He erroneously maintains that Charles was held captive with his father at Soissons in the summer of 833, that Pepin met Louis the Pious in St-Denis instead of Quierzy, that Lothair was told to go to Italy in 834, that Judith's captors in Italy suddenly became her liberators. He underestimates the profound excitement caused by the meeting of the brothers Lothair and Louis at Trent in 838. He is confused in his chronology and refers to Bernard's revolt before the division of the empire in 817, although it was this event which caused the nephew to rise against the emperor; Judith purged herself of charges of adultery in 831 and not in 834; Louis the Pious died at age sixty-two and not sixty-four; he was emperor for twenty-six years and nine months, not twenty-seven years and six months.

The degree of Nithard's objectivity can best be established by an examination of the first book, where only in rare cases is his record the sole source for an event. Nithard proclaims himself a partisan of Charles the Bald at the beginning of his work and his prejudices affect his history. He is silent when the facts might hurt Charles or Louis the Pious; he does not mention Charles's total exclusion at the partition of 833 nor the humiliating act of public penance performed by Louis the Pious at Soissons in October 833.⁴¹ He places Lothair in the worst light, plays down the position of co-emperor which he was given in 817, calls him a breaker of oaths and promises, and makes much of the judgment which Lothair had to pronounce on his own followers when Louis the Pious regained the upper hand over his rebellious son in 831. Lothair is pictured as the lone instigator of the revolt of 830 when, in fact, his presence in Italy at its outbreak precluded his participation; he was, of course, the natural rallying point for all who were disturbed by Judith's influence and the emperor's misgovernment. Nithard permits himself an obvious misrepresentation of the facts when he portrays Counts Hugo and Mathfrid as invidious intriguers, although they opposed Judith solely because they wished to preserve the unity of the empire. On the other hand, he records the granting of Aquitaine to Charles as an incident of no significance when in reality it was highly unfair, made Pepin an open enemy of the empire, and constituted a threat also to the other brothers. Pope Gregory IV appears as a tool of the conspirators in 833, but Nithard neglects to report that the pope had a genuine interest in the unity and peace of the empire and did not savor the sad role he was forced to play in Lothair's service. The two other brothers of Charles, Louis and Pepin, are also treated unfairly on occasion: Louis' contribution to his father's restoration in 831 and 834 is not sufficiently noted; Nithard exaggerates when he claims that both Louis and Pepin strove for precedence over each other, when their real concern was simply the retention of their respective portions of the empire; the historian looks upon Louis as an inveterate troublemaker when Louis revolted against being deprived of territories he had controlled for many years. In spite of the fact that Nithard viewed events from Charles's perspective, he was not a mindless partisan; his prejudices are those of his environment, the court of Louis the Pious with its hostility to the older sons. This climate, however, did not demoralize the historian, as it did the emo-


tional and deceptive author of the life of Louis the Pious. Nithard believed that Charles's mother Judith had committed adultery with Duke Bernard of Septimania, but was hardly in a position to say so in his book; he nevertheless records the charge and does not dispute its validity. He candidly criticized the same Bernard for abusing his authority, although the man was one of Judith's and Charles's most loyal followers, and toward the end of his work he charges that his lord married the niece of the influential Adalhard "because he believed that with Adalhard he could win a large part of the people for himself."⁴²

The three last books of Nithard's *Histories* confirm the impression that the author, though a fervent partisan of Charles and an opponent of the empire, recorded the events of his time with honesty and objectivity. These three books are devoted to the political moves and military campaigns, the diplomatic missions and shifting alliances, the drafts for a division of the empire and the growing weariness of the people, which eventually resulted in the treaty of Verdun.⁴³ Book II was apparently written from memory, but in Books III and IV Nithard let little time elapse between the event and his record.⁴⁴ Charles remains in the center of things throughout the work, but in the later parts a change of method is noticeable. Apparently, Nithard took less pleasure in his task as the war dragged on; in the preface to his last book he not only welcomed a respite from the labor of writing but contemplated a complete withdrawal from the burden of public affairs. Only the prospect that he might dispel the haze of error to the benefit of future generations made him go on. Increasingly, the unity of his theme is disregarded and digressions creep in. Earlier in the work any digression was related to the fate of his hero, as in the story of the royal vestments and insignia which arrived unexpectedly at Troyes on Easter 841.⁴⁵ In his last two books, however, the author talks about the weather, a comet, his family, or the war games performed by the soldiers when the forces of Louis and Charles united in 842.⁴⁶ In the very last book Nithard's style almost resembles that of the monastic chronicler. Without definite plan and employing awkward connectives, he strings together events in which his hero is involved, but also describes the society of the Saxons, the invasion of the Saracens, an earthquake, and a lunar eclipse.⁴⁷ Want and disease and natural disasters abound in the last chapters and induce

pessimistic reflections on the selfish and bestial actions of men which provoke the judgment of God.⁴⁸ As he started his work with a eulogy to Charlemagne, Nithard ends with a nostalgic glance back at the reign of his grandfather when men were righteous and walked the ways of the Lord and peace and prosperity filled the realm of the Franks.⁴⁹ In the later books Lothair emerges again as indecisive, treacherous, and cowardly, Louis on the other hand, as a man of nobility and magnanimity. In both cases Nithard's assessment of the character of the man is generally confirmed by other contemporary sources. Only in his portrait of Charles does Nithard find no corroboration. The later history of his reign reveals Charles II as a spineless coward, greedy, crafty, "timid as a rabbit," in the words of a contemporary, but ruthless enough to have his own son, Carloman, blinded. In Nithard's *Histories* this *novellus Sennacherib* cannot be found; instead Charles, who was in fact a gifted and well-educated man, appears as a cautious diplomat, a resolute leader, a masterly strategist, a humble and charitable prince, almost a martyr. The contrast is striking. Nithard was describing a youth between the ages of seventeen and twenty, however, and his judgment may have been affected not so much by the spirit of party as by the hopes and expectations of a guide and teacher. That he was not an uncritical panegyrist his frank revelation of Charles's failures and defeats makes abundantly clear.⁵⁰

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Charlemagne's Kinsmen and Descendants in Carolingian Chronicles






Figure 1. The structure of the data set. The data set is divided into four main categories: 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D'. Each category is further divided into sub-categories, which are then divided into individual data points. The diagram shows the hierarchical relationship between these categories and their sub-categories.

day I have received the communion." This Copiosus straightway reported to the brethren in the monastery.

Then the brethren carefully reckoned the days, and it was the very day on which the thirtieth oblation was made for him. Copiosus did not know what the brethren were doing for his dead brother, and the brethren did not know that Copiosus had seen him; yet at one and the same time he learned what they had done and they learned what he had seen, and the vision and the sacrifice harmonized. So the fact was plainly shown forth how that the brother who had died had escaped punishment through the salvation-giving mass.

3. from the *Dialogues*: On Holy Men and Demons(I)

Andrew, by God's mercy bishop of Fondi, was a man of most holy life, but the ancient enemy of mankind sought to tempt him, by causing him to think evil thoughts.

Now one day a certain Jew was coming to Rome from Campania, and he traveled by the Appian Way. When he reached the hill of Fondi he saw that the day was darkening toward evening, and he did not know at all where he might sleep. He was near a temple of Apollo, and he decided to stay there.

He feared the sacrilegious character of the place, so, though he had not the faith of the cross, he took care to protect himself with the sign of the cross. In the middle of the night he was disturbed by the very fear of solitude, and lay awake. Suddenly he looked up, and saw a crowd of evil spirits. He who was in authority over the rest took his place in the midst of them and began to discuss the deeds of each spirit, and to ask how much evil each one had accomplished.

One of the spirits told how he had caused Bishop Andrew to think an unholy thought. Then the evil spirit and enemy of the human race exhorted that spirit to carry out what he had begun in Andrew's soul.

Then the spirit who commanded the rest ordered his followers to find out who had presumed to sleep in that temple. But the Jew made the sign of the cross, and all the throng of evil spirits, crying out "Woe, woe!" disappeared.

4. from the *Dialogues*: On Holy Men and Demons (II)

In Campania, upon Mt. Marsicus, a venerable man called Martin lived for many years the solitary life, shut up in a very small cave. Many of us knew him, and were witnesses of his deeds. I myself have heard much of him both from Pope Pelagius, my predecessor, and from other religious men who related anecdotes of him. His first miracle was this: hardly had he established himself in the cleft of the mountain, when from the very rock which was hollowed out to make his narrow cave burst forth a stream of water just sufficient to supply the daily need of the servant of God, and there was never too much or too little. . . .

But the ancient enemy of mankind envied the man's strength, and labored with his wonted skill to drive him forth from the cave. For he entered into the beast that is his friend—the serpent—and sought to make the monk afraid, and to drive him from his dwelling. He came at twilight, and stretched himself out before the holy man when he was praying, and lay down with him when he went to rest.

The holy man was entirely unafraid. He would hold to the serpent's mouth his hand or his foot, and say to him, "If thou hast leave to smite me, I do not say thee nay." After these things had taken place continually for three years, on a certain day the ancient enemy of mankind, vanquished by such great endurance, groaned; and the serpent let himself glide over the steep mountain side to a precipice. And the flame that went out from him burned all the trees in that place. Almighty God constrained him to burn the mountain side, and so compelled him to show forth the great virtue of the man from whom he had departed, conquered.

5. from the *Letters and Sermons*: Eschatology

With all my heart I have wished to answer you better, but the burden of my pastoral calls so overpowers me that I would rather weep than speak,—as your reverence undoubtedly gathers from the very character of my correspondence when I am remiss in addressing one whom I warmly love. In fact, so beaten about am I

by the billows in this corner of the world, that I can in no wise bring to harbor the ancient, rolling ship at whose helm I stand through God's mysterious dispensation.

Now the waves break over us from the front, now at the side the foaming mountains of the sea swell high, now in the rear the tempest pursues us. Beset by all these perils, I am forced first to steer directly in the face of the storm, again to swerve the vessel and to receive obliquely the onset of the waters. I groan, because I know that if I am negligent the bilge water of vice is deepening, and that if the storm assails us furiously at that instant the decaying planks forebode shipwreck. Fearful, I remember that I have lost my quiet shore of peace, and sighing I gaze toward the land which, while the wind of circumstances blows contrarily, I cannot gain. So, dearest brother, if you love me, stretch forth the hand of prayer to me amid these floods, and, as you aid me in my troubles, thus as a reward shall you come forth more valiantly from yours. . . .

[Of all the signs described by our Lord as presaging the end of the world], some we see already accomplished; the others we dread as close upon us. For we now see that nation rises against nation, and that they press and weigh upon the land in our own times as never before in the annals of the past. Earthquakes overwhelm countless cities, as we often hear from other parts of the world. Pestilence we endure without interruption. It is true that as yet we do not behold signs in the sun and moon and stars; but that these are not far off we may infer from the changes in the atmosphere. Before Italy was given over to be desolated by the sword of a heathen foe, we beheld fiery ranks in heaven, and even the streaming blood of the human race as it was afterwards spilt.

their original³³ use, and that He consider those deeds proclaimed in praise of Him which He orders written in the case of the saints.

8. Preface of "The Glory of the Confessors"

It is shameful for a foolish man, or a rascal, or an unskilled or lazy man, to attempt what he cannot fulfill. But what shall I do, since I will not allow concealment of the results which I have often seen of the miraculous powers of the blessed men, or which I have learned were accomplished through the testimony of good men of certain trustworthiness? But since I am ignorant of literature, rhetoric, and the art of grammar, I fear that when I shall have begun to write, men of education will say to me:

Ignorant rustic, why do you judge that your name should be placed among writers? Do you think that this work will be accepted by the learned, although artistic genius does not abound in it, and no knowledge of literature aids it? You have no useful subject in literature; you do not know how to distinguish among nouns; very often you put the feminine for the masculine, the neuter for the feminine, and the masculine for the neuter; you do not put prepositions in the proper place which the authority of noble teachers sanctions.³⁴ For you put the accusative for the ablative and again the ablative for the accusative. Do you think it is fitting that the sluggish ox should play the games of the palaestra, or the slothful ass should run with quick flight amid the ranks of the ball players?³⁵ The crow will certainly not be able to cover its blackness by the feathers of the white doves, nor will the darkness of pitch be changed by the color of white milk.³⁶ To be sure, it is not possible that these things should happen, nor will you be counted among other writers.

³³ *Praestinos*, i.e. *pristinos*: cf. Bonnet, p. 493, note 1.

³⁴ *Dictatorum* "teachers": Krusch (*Index*, p. 943) defined *dictator* in this passage as *qui scribenda dictat*; cf. also Bonnet, p. 30, note 2.

³⁵ For *sphaeristae* cf. Sidonius, *Ep.*, 5.17.7, and H. J. Leon, "Ball Playing at Rome," *Classical Bulletin* 23 (1947), pp. 65-7.

³⁶ On Gregory's use of proverbs cf. Manilius, *NA*, 21 (1896), pp. 552f.

But nevertheless I shall reply to them and say:

I do your work, and through my rusticity I shall offer to you material on which you may exercise your wisdom.³⁷ For in my opinion these writings will offer one benefit to you, to be sure so that, what we narrate briefly, crudely and in an obscure style, you may expand in more lengthy pages clearly and brilliantly in verse.

Therefore, in the first book we have inserted some of the miracles of the Lord, of the sainted apostles and of the rest of the martyrs, which so far have been hidden and which God deigns to increase daily to strengthen the faith of the faithful, because it were extremely harmful that they should be forgotten. In the second, we have placed the miracles of St. Julian. Four books on the miracles of St. Martin. The seventh on the lives of certain fortunate men.³⁸ We are now writing this eighth book on the miracles of the confessors. Since, as we have often testified before, artistic genius is not ours nor does eloquence in speaking aid us, we especially beg the reader to grant pardon freely for our rashness, since no worldly vanity causes us to write, but shame urges us to be silent while love and fear of Christ impel us to publish these works. And since I began the first book with the miracles of the Lord, I wish to make a beginning for this book with the miracles of the sainted angels.

³⁷ *Vestram prudentiam exercebo*: for the expansion in the translation cf. Bordier, and Bonnet, p. 79, note 6.

³⁸ *Feliciosorum*, Ruinart, Bordier, Krusch, and Morf. Bonnet follows the reading of ms 4 and prints *religiosorum* (p. 195, note 6; p. 238, note 7).

the miracles of the hermits and anchorites. However, in no case was he able to find our Martin inferior. He likened him to the apostles and the earlier saints so that he said: "Happy indeed was Greece which was worthy to hear the preaching of the apostles, but Gaul was not wholly forsaken by Christ since He gave it Martin."²⁶

2. The blessed Paulinus, bishop of Nola, wrote in verse²⁷ in five books those miracles which Severus had included and in the sixth book of his work he added those which occurred after the death of Severus.²⁸ He said:

When men possessed by demons were whirled through the air over the balustrades of the basilica, and ten were thrown into a well by the influence of the demon, they were pulled out and taken up again unharmed.²⁹

And we too have seen this done in our times.

Also another demon entered the body of a man and drove him headlong to a stream as if about to drown the prey which he had taken. But the aid of the blessed confessor did not fail the man in mortal danger. For he entered the river and sought the farther bank, and emerged unharmed with even his clothing dry. And when he had come to Marmoutier he appeared cleansed.

Paulinus even gives witness that this man was accustomed to pour forth many voices and to speak very frequently in the tongues of unknown nations and to prophesy³⁰ the future and confess crimes.

²⁶ *Dial.*, 2(3).17.6. As frequently happens, Gregory's citation is inexact: *nec for nequaquam* and *donavit* for *donaverit* represent careless citation rather than a different text or the errors of a copyist.

²⁷ *Versu*, Krusch, *App.*; cf. Bonnet, p. 755 (*add.* to p. 284).

²⁸ This poem was not by the famous Paulinus of Nola, but by the more obscure Paulinus of Périgueux (*Petricordia*). This error in assignment of the poem was common, it occurs again in Gregory (*GC*, 108). Paulinus' poems were edited by M. Petschenig in *Poetae Christiani minores*, CSEL, XVI, 1 (Vienna, 1888), pp. 1-190. Gregory's summaries are brief and somewhat inaccurate digests of the passages in the sixth book of the poem.

²⁹ 6.39-70.

³⁰ *Fari*, a reading approved by Bonnet (p. 258, note 2); Krusch preferred *fateri* (as the equivalent of *fari*) in *NA*, 19 (1894), p. 37.

But, as we have said, as soon as he touched the sacred threshold, he departed whole.³¹

When Egidius was besieged by the enemy and his troops were in disorder and all aid was cut off, he was attacked, but was freed after his enemies had been put to flight by prayer to the blessed man.³² And a man possessed by a demon at the very hour that this occurred prophesied in the midst of the basilica that relief had been granted by the power of St. Martin.³³

A certain girl, ill with a paralyzing disease, and, what is worse, entangled in the error of a fanatic cult, sought the tomb of the blessed one, and after celebrating a vigil there, was returned to health. Called back again to the vomit of her idolatry, she incurred again the weakness from which she had been freed by the power of the priest.³⁴

A certain Hun, driven impetuously by the inspiration of a demon, violently seized the crown of the sepulcher which declared the merits of the saint. Soon deprived of sight, he was forced by the pain to restore his booty and he recovered his sight.³⁵

When a certain man at the impulse of the Tempter attempted to strike another with drawn sword, his wrath was turned straightway back on himself. For by the judgment of God which followed swiftly, he pierced himself with that very sword.³⁶

Finally, when the rejoicing populace wished to bring columns to ornament the blessed church, a certain envious man was opposed to this work and threatened his wife severely because she gave them permission when they sought wagons.³⁷ And when that proud man spurred his horse headlong into a small stream, he

³¹ 6.71-105.

³² Arianus Syagrius Aegidius, who was appointed *comes et magister utriusque militiae* by Majorianus in 457, was besieged by the Visigoths in Arles in 459. He died in 464 and was succeeded by his son Syagrius. Cf. *HF*, 2.11, 12, 18 and Seeck in *RE*, I, cols. 476f., s.v. *Aegidius*.

³³ 6.111-151.

³⁴ 6.165-214.

³⁵ 6.218-249.

³⁶ 6.250-264.

³⁷ I have followed in part the conjectural additions of Petschenig (p. 149): *... multa <in uxorem> minabatur, pro eo quod solatium aliquod ad plaustra <vehenda> petentibus praeberet*. The addition of *vehenda* is unnecessary: it is omitted in the translation.

perished in the bosom of the waters suffocated by the blows of the flood.³⁸ Then following his funeral cortege they carried the columns to the blessed church.³⁹

As often as oil was placed near the blessed sepulcher, they report that they saw it increase.

Truly St. Perpetuus,⁴⁰ the bishop, worthily called the disciple of the blessed man, carried a jar of oil to the sacred tomb so that the miraculous power of that just man might infuse and sanctify it. And the oil, scraped from the marble by which the sacred members are covered, with dust intermixed overflowed in such a quantity of oil that oily water, gleaming with the odor of nectar, poured over the garments of the priest. And many sick found healing in this.⁴¹ And tempests too were often kept from fields purified by this liquid.

Then a certain devout man, when full of faith he had approached the sacred church and had thirsted for the grace of the saint, was reflecting on what he should take for protection from the blessed chapel. Approaching the sepulcher, he asked the attendant that he grant him a little wax from the tomb. When he received this, he departed joyfully and confidently placed it in a field in which he sowed a crop. When a very savage storm arose, such as had often laid waste the neighborhood in preceding years, it was kept from the field by the blessing, nor did it do the customary harm in that place.⁴²

In truth, at the approach of a magnificent and long-anticipated Easter festival, the people devotedly went to the cell of the blessed man in which he often had lingered in converse with angels. They licked each place with their kisses, or wet with their tears each place where the blessed man⁴³ had sat, or had prayed, or where he had taken food, or where he had granted sleep to his

³⁸In *sinu aquarum gurgitis ictibus suis suffocatus interiit*. Krusch interpreted this as meaning that he suffocated in shallow water in the sand which follows Severus, 6.278-80. Later in his appendix he adopted *sine*, a reading of a new ms, for *in sinu*.

³⁹*Funere* is a conjecture by Petschenig for *iuvene* (*populo* is a variant). For the whole paragraph, Severus, 6.265-290.

⁴⁰Sixth bishop of Tours: *HF*, 10.31, cf. Dalton, II, pp. 602f.

⁴¹6.298-319.

⁴²6.325-336.

⁴³*Aut*, Krusch, *App.* (replacing *ante*).

body after many labors. Then in a fleet of boats already prepared they made ready to cross the river, so that they might approach the blessed sepulcher, might pray with tears for forgiveness, and might prostrate themselves before the confessor. When they were sailing and a wind arose at the impulse of the Tempter, the ship was sinking in the depths and men and women were being snatched by the stream. And when they were being whirled amid the violence of the waves and all hope of escape had vanished, all with one voice shouted and said: "Compassionate Martin, snatch your servants from present death!" At these words, lo! a placid breath of wind raised up unharmed the limbs of those submerged by the waves, and restored them all to the shore that they longed for, and even the waters aided. Not one perished, but all were preserved and performed a festal Easter service with great exultation. For that miracle was not lacking, which parted the Jordan and led the people between the masses of water on a dry path, when Joshua consecrated on the farther bank twelve stones, taken from the bed of the river, and bearing the apostolic insignia,⁴⁴ or that which rescued Peter when, perishing, he held the Master's right hand lest he perish,⁴⁵ or that which drew forth from the depths of the sea a sailor, who was about to sink, and called upon the Master of Martin for aid.⁴⁶

A certain man eager to take something as a blessing from the sacred chapel received wax from the holy sepulcher and placed in within the inner part of his home as a heavenly treasure. However, it happened that a fire, started by the envy of the Tempter, was kindled⁴⁷ with greedy flame around the house and, spreading over the dry boards, was consuming everything. In the meantime, he raised a shout to heaven and begged the aid of the blessed Martin. Then he remembered the particle of wax brought from the church of the saint. When he found it and threw it on the

⁴⁴Cf. *Joshua*, 4.20. Gregory's phrase, *signa apostolica gestientes*, gives an allegorical interpretation not explicit in *Joshua*. Bordier printed the same text, but translated so as to keep the biblical meaning: "... qui devaient marquer comme un signe la mission d'Israël."

⁴⁵Cf. *Matthew*, 14.31.

⁴⁶6.351-460.

⁴⁷*Circumdaretur*, Krusch, *App.*: *circumureretur* (Ruinart) was supported by Bonnet (p. 194, note 8).

flame, straightway the whole fire died down, and by a new miracle wax, which was accustomed to nourish fire, repressed the violence of fire by the force of holiness.⁴⁸

These things Paulinus wrote in verse in the sixth book of his work, having used as his authority for these events St. Perpetuus the bishop. Indeed when the manuscript of his authority had come to him, his grandson was seriously ill. But he trusted the miraculous power of the saint and said: "If it please you, blessed Martin, that I write something in praise of you, let it appear from this sick boy." When he had placed the manuscript on the boy's breast, the fever immediately died down and he was healed who had been sick.⁴⁹ Also, the bishop Fortunatus composed a whole work on his life in four books in verse.

3. Though unskilled, nonetheless, I am induced by these writers to try to weave together for remembrance some of those miracles of the most blessed Martin which happened after his death. I shall be zealous in writing to find as much as I can which is not included in the works of Severus or Paulinus. The glorious master Martin, brilliant and shining in the whole world, a new sun arising when the universe was declining, born at Sabaria in Pannonia, as an earlier history tells, was sent for the salvation of Gaul by the aid of God.⁵⁰ Lighting it with his miracles and signs, unwillingly at the insistence of the people, he undertook the duties of the bishopric at the city of Tours. In this office he passed a glorious and almost inimitable life for five quinquennia, twice two months and ten days, and in the eighty-first year of his life, during the consulship of Caesareus and Atticus,⁵¹ died peacefully in the middle of the night. It is most manifest that his death on the Lord's Day was glorious and worthy of praise throughout the whole world, and we prove this in the following account by definite witnesses. It is thought that it is a sign of no small merit, that the Lord lifted him up to Paradise on that day on which the same Redeemer and Master rose a victor from the dead, and that,

⁴⁸6.467-499.

⁴⁹The story is told by Paulinus in a short poem *de visitatione nepotuli sui* (Petschenig, pp. 161-64). For a discussion of the relation of St. Perpetuus and Paulinus cf. Chase, *loc. cit.*, pp. 52-7.

⁵⁰Severus, *vita Martini*, 2.

⁵¹See p. 27, note 15 above.

as he had always celebrated the festivals of the Lord without pollution, so after the cares of the world he should be placed at rest on the Lord's Day.

4. Indeed the blessed Severinus, bishop of the city of Cologne,⁵² a man of honorable life and praiseworthy in all ways, was traversing the sacred places, according to custom, with his clergy on the Lord's Day. At the hour in which the blessed man died he heard a chorus of those singing on high. And when he had called his archdeacon, he asked him if the voices, to which he was attentively listening, were reaching his ears. He replied: "Not at all." Then he said: "Listen carefully." The archdeacon then began to stretch his neck upward, and to prick up his ears, and to stand on tiptoe with the aid of his staff. But I believe that he was not of great enough merit that he might be worthy to hear these things. Then he and the blessed bishop both prostrated themselves on the ground and prayed to the Master that divine love might grant that he hear this. When they stood erect the old man again asked: "What do you hear?" He said: "I hear the voices of those singing as if in Heaven, but I do not know what else there is." The bishop replied to him: "I will tell you what is happening. My master, Bishop Martin, has gone from the world, and now the angels are carrying him on high with song. And when there was a delay for a little time, and these things might be heard, the Devil was trying to keep him with the wicked angels. When he found nothing of his in that man, he departed in confusion. What then will be our lot, sinners as we are, if the evil side wishes to harm such a great priest?" When the priest spoke such things, the archdeacon quickly sent to Tours a man to inquire diligently about these things. And when he came, he learned that the blessed man had died on that day and at that hour at which St. Severinus had heard the chorus of singers. But if we go back to the history of Severus, he wrote that at that very hour St. Martin had appeared to him with a book containing his own life.⁵³

5. For at that time the blessed Ambrose, whose flowers of

⁵²This is the original source for the story of this vision. The account in the *vita et translatio Sancti Severini* is copied from Gregory. This *vita* is printed in AASS, 23 Octobris, X (Brussels, 1862), pp. 56-64 (the specific passage is 1.8 on p. 58.)

⁵³Severus, *Epist.*, 2 (Hahn, pp. 142-5).

always safer than the documents whose historicity it is so fond of questioning? Let us, therefore, enjoy reading such documents as this without spoiling our pleasure with pseudo-scientific scruples that are not likely to bring us nearer to historic reality. On the whole, it is a good thing that this world of ours, together with mankind and the course of its destiny, was created out of nothing by the Supreme Artist rather than imagined, according to the rules of verisimilitude, by the critical mind of some learned historian.

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THE STORY OF ABELARD'S ADVERSITIES

(Abelard's Letter of Consolation to a Friend)

The experiences of others often serve to arouse or allay man's feelings better than words. And so to follow up the conversation in which I tried to console you at our meeting, I have decided to write you a letter of further encouragement based upon the experience of my own misfortunes so that when you compare your trials with mine you may consider them of little or no account and be stronger to endure them.

(The Place of his Birth)¹

To begin, then, I was born in a town called Le Pallet² in Brittany near the border about eight miles I would say east of Nantes. I was lighthearted and had talent for letters, characteristics derived from my country and family. My father³ was a man who had acquired some literary knowledge before he donned the uniform of a soldier and he retained such a liking for learning that he intended to procure for whatever sons he was to have a training in letters before their military service. And he carried out his purpose. As he loved me the more, being

¹ This and the other headings are put in parentheses as they were not written by Abelard since they are in the third person.

² Le Pallet is about twelve miles east and a little south of Nantes.

³ Berengarius, as Abelard calls him later on. His mother's name was Lucia. There is documentary evidence that Abelard was the eldest of four boys; he mentions a sister also.

sensed this and in an attempt to have my school far removed from him he slyly used every means in his power before I withdrew from his school to hinder the furtherance of my plans and to deprive me of the place I had now arranged for. But some men of influence there were opposed to him and relying on their help I accomplished my purpose, as his open antipathy gained for me the support of many.

With the establishment of this my first school, my reputation in dialectical skill began to spread so that the fame not only of my former fellow-students but also of my master gradually lessened and went into eclipse. As a result, being more self-confident I transferred my school to Corbeil⁷ nearer Paris that I might prove a greater embarrassment and offer more frequent challenges to debate.

But after the lapse of a comparatively short time, owing to the heavy strain of study, I fell sick and was forced to

class was called *magister*. But once Abelard started a school of his own, a third class emerged independent of a monastery or cathedral. Some decades later, the term has a stereotyped meaning; it denotes the diocesan officer who ruled over the schools of a city or diocese and who granted the *licentia docendi*. He was also called *scholasticus* and *cancellarius*. But the period from 1100-1150 was one of rapid development and transition. At the same time there are few contemporary documents pertaining to education. Care has to be exercised not to give this term the meaning in 1102 that it had later on. There is no mention of the authority of such an official when Abelard set up his schools in Melun, Corbeil and at St. Genevieve. William of Champeaux would, it seems to me, have appealed to him against Abelard if there had been any such official authority at that time. It should be remembered too that William was archdeacon of Paris, an officer with jurisdiction but whether over schools or not at that time is not known. He may well have been archdeacon when Abelard first studied under him.

⁷ Corbeil, between Paris and Melun. Louis the Fat made it a royal fief just about this time and perhaps Abelard was again placing himself under the quasi-protection of the king. Cf. Remusat, *op. cit.*, p. 16, note.

return home; and though absent from France⁸ for several years, all those who were anxious for instruction in logic kept eagerly trying to seek me out.

After a few years had passed I was well recovered from my illness. My teacher William, archdeacon⁹ of Paris, had changed his state and entered the Order¹⁰ of Regular Clerics for the purpose, it was said, of being considered more pious and thereby of gaining promotion to the

⁸ Brittany did not become a part of the kingdom of France until late in the fifteenth century. It was ruled by a duke at this time.

⁹ The archdeacon, originally a deacon and helper of the bishop of the diocese, came in the course of time to be a priest possessing extensive powers which he exercised, often independently of the bishop. From the tenth century until the decline began in the thirteenth century these powers were constantly increasing and varied from place to place so that it is impossible to define the archdeacon's rights just at this date (*ca.* 1110) since they were not based on written legal sources. Moreover it had now become customary to have several archdeacons in each diocese, each claiming jurisdiction over a fixed territory. Some light is thrown on the subject by a dispute which arose in 1126 between Stephen, bishop of Paris, and Theobald, his archdeacon. Appealed to by the archdeacon, Pope Honorius III appointed three cardinals to examine the affair. The decision which they rendered defining the archdeacon's rights is found in the *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* XV, p. 331. For a brief history of the archdeacon a useful reference is the article by A. Amanieu, 'archidiacon', *Dictionnaire de droit canonique* I, 948-1004. See also, A. H. Thompson, *Diocesan Organization in the Middle Ages; Archdeacons and Rural Deans* (Oxford, 1944).

¹⁰ During the eleventh and early twelfth century a spirit of reform and a fervent desire on the part of many of the secular clergy to lead a more apostolic and perfect life led to the foundation of communities of regular canons distinct on the one hand from the monks and on the other from the secular canons. Their manner of life comprising the practice of individual poverty was based in a general way on the *decreta Patrum* and was intended to be a return to what was considered the primitive clerical tradition in the Church. The teaching of St. Augustine especially as contained in the *regula beati Augustini* gradually came to play a role of increasing importance in the organization of this way of life so that many writers of the twelfth and thirteenth century identify the regular canons with the order of St. Augustine. Consult the excellent article with recent bibliography by Father Charles Derein, 'Vie commune, règle de saint Augustin et chanoines réguliers', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* XLII, (1946), 365-406.

rank of a major prelate, as happened when he was made bishop of Châlons.¹¹ But his taking the religious habit did not withdraw him from Paris or from his former philosophical pursuits. On the contrary, he immediately conducted a public school as formerly, right in the monastery to which he had gone for a life in religion.

At that time I returned to him to hear him lecturing on rhetoric. Among other essays at discussion I forced him by clear proofs from reasoning to change, yes, to abandon his old stand on universals. For he held the position on the common existence of universals that the same thing exists wholly and essentially in all individuals of a class and that there is no distinction of essence in them but only variety through multiplicity of accidents.¹²

¹¹ The life of William of Champeaux is not known in detail. He was born in the village of Champeaux near Melun about 1070 and died as bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne about 1120. He studied under Manegold of Lautenbach, Anselm of Laon and, strange to say, under the extreme nominalist Roscelin. He was teaching in the cathedral school of Paris when Abelard first studied under him. He became archdeacon of Paris and before 1108 retired to the religious centre of St. Victor which became an abbey of Canons Regular under him. Although he is rightly considered the founder of the school of St. Victor which afterwards became famous in the field of mystical theology under Hugh of St. Victor and his successors, William can be called the founder of the abbey only in a modified sense. There was already a community with a superior there. William became bishop in 1113.

¹² In philosophy William was a realist as this passage shows. He taught the 'community' (*communitas*) or common existence of universals, that is, that the essence of a class (species and genus) is a thing totally and simultaneously present in all its individual members; only the variety of accidents differentiates the individual members. According to Abelard, he changed his position by substituting 'indifferently' (*indifferenter*, without differentiation) for essentially (*essentialiter*). This term *indifferenter* has a technical meaning in mediaeval philosophy which was probably derived from its use in theological treatises on the Trinity. It is difficult to say just what it signifies here. Perhaps it means that the same thing (universal, species, genus) exists in all the individuals of its class but in a state of indetermination or without differentiation with respect to individuality. In the only text of William which we have, bearing on

He subsequently so modified his position as to assert that the same thing exists in individuals, not essentially, but without differentiation. This problem of universals has always been a moot point among dialecticians and of such magnitude that even Porphyry when writing about universals in his *Isagoge* did not venture to settle it but said¹³ "it is a very deep question". Once William had corrected, yes under compulsion had abandoned his position, his lectures bogged down into such carelessness

the question, he says writing of the essence of God and the Trinity: "That we may exclude all ambiguity, you see that the two words *one* and *same* can be taken in two ways, according to indifference and according to identity of the same essence. According to indifference, as we say Peter and Paul are the same in this that they are men, for so far as pertains to their humanity (*humanitas*, manness), just as the former is rational, so also is the latter; and just as he is mortal, so also is the other. But if we would acknowledge the truth, there is not the same humanity in both since they are two men". *Guillelmi Campbellensis Sententiae vel Quaestiones XLVII* in G. Lefevre, *Les variations de Guillaume de Champeaux et la question des universaux* (Lille, 1898), p. 25. Does this passage constitute a third position of William? Some think so.

Abelard uses the term (*indifferenter*) again in his *Glosses on Porphyry*: writing of the realists he states: But since they would have all things so diverse from one another that none of them participates with another either in the same matter essentially or in the same form essentially, yet holding on to the universality of things they call things which are distinct (*discreta*) the same not essentially but indifferently (*indifferenter*), just as they say individual men who are distinct one from another are the same in manness (*homine*), that is, they do not differ in the nature of humanity (*humanitas*, manness) and the same men whom they call individuals according to their distinction, they call universals according to indifference and agreement of similitude. *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (1918), Band 21, Heft 1, pp. 13-14. This passage is also found in R. McKeon, *Selections from Mediaeval Philosophers* I, (London, 1928), p. 228. Abelard also treats the question in his treatise *On genus and species*, in V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, pp. 515 ff.

¹³ Cf. Translation of Porphyry in Boethius, *In Porphyrium Commentariorum* I; PL 64, 82A. Porphyry, a Greek scholar and neoplatonist philosopher, was born at Tyre about 232 and died about 302. He studied at Rome under Plotinus and afterwards taught there for several years. Iamblichus was one of his pupils. Among his works are an *Introduction* (Latin *Isagoge*) to the *Categories* of Aristotle. It was translated by Victorinus and also by Boethius who wrote two commentaries on it.

that they could scarcely be called lectures on logic at all, as though the whole art were confined to the problem¹⁴ of universals.

From then on my teaching gained such strength and prestige that those who formerly had somewhat vigorously championed the position of our master and had most forcefully attacked mine now flocked to my school and even he¹⁵ who had taken over the chair of our master in the cathedral school of Paris offered his place to me that along with the other students he might follow my lectures right where our common master had held sway. Within a few days after my taking over the chair of dialectics, envy began to eat the heart out of my master and anguish to seize him to a degree I can hardly express. His seething soul did not long endure the misery which had taken hold of him before he cunningly attempted to depose me. And because there was nothing he could do against me personally, he set out by laying the basest charges to take the school away from him who had turned the chair over to me and to put another, one of my rivals, in that position. I then returned to Melun and once more set up my school there. And the more openly he attacked me

¹⁴ The controversy over universals loomed large in mediaeval philosophy before the appearance of the New Logic and Latin translations of Avicenna and Averroes. In spite of his statement here, Abelard gave much attention to the problem: "Abailard's discussion of the universal naturally derives much from Boethius... It is an interesting indication of the change of philosophic emphasis in six centuries that Boethius should have devoted two-thirds of his discussion to the utility of the study of logic while Abailard spends four-fifths of his commentary on that discussion on the intricacies of the problem of the universal". R. McKeon, *Selections from Medieval Philosophers I* (London, 1928), p. 204.

¹⁵ Who he was is not known. Some think it was Robert of Melun but give no proof. See *Œuvres de Robert de Melun*, by R. M. Martin, o.p. (Louvain, 1932) I, VI, note 2.

in his jealousy, the more prestige he gave me, as the poet¹⁶ says:

"What is highest is envy's mark; winds sweep the summits."

Not long afterwards, when he saw that nearly all men of sense had grave doubts about his piety and were loudly whispering about the sincerity of his conversion because he had not left the city, he transferred his community and school to a certain village outside the city. Immediately I returned to Paris from Melun hoping for peace henceforth so far as he was concerned. But because, as I have mentioned, he had put a rival in my former chair, I pitched camp for my school outside¹⁷ the city on Mount St. Genevieve that I might, so to speak, lay siege to him who held my place. When my master heard of this, immediately and with no sense of propriety, he returned to the city and brought what students he had and his community back to his former monastery as if to raise the siege of his soldier whom he had abandoned. But while he meant to help him, he really greatly injured him. For, before, he had some students of a sort especially because of his lecturing on Priscian¹⁸ on whom he was

¹⁶ Ovid, *De Remedio Amoris I*, 369.

¹⁷ Mont Ste. Genevieve became part of the city in 1211 under Philip Augustus.

¹⁸ There were two authors in early times named Priscian. 1. Priscian, the famous grammarian (ca. 500 A.D.). His most famous work is a treatise on grammar (*Institutiones grammaticae*) composed at Constantinople. It is primarily a treatise on Latin Grammar but shows its relation to Greek and quotes many examples from Greek. It was much used down through the Middle Ages until comparatively recent times. Published in Keil, *Grammatici Latini*, II and III. 2. Priscian the Lydian who composed for Justinian a solution of questions on psychology, physiology and the natural sciences. It was translated into Latin, likely by Scotus Erigena. This translation is found in *Supplementum Aristotelicum I*, 2, (Berlin 1886). Likely the first is meant here.

considered a great authority. But after his master moved in, he lost every last one of them and so had to give up his charge of the school. Not long afterwards, as if giving up hope of any worldly glory, he too entered a monastery.

The disputes which followed the return of my master to the city between my students and him and his students and the outcome which fortune gave to my students and to me among them, facts have long since told you. But to speak with due moderation, let me boldly repeat those words¹⁹ of Ajax:

"...If you ask the result of this contest,
I was not worsted by him."

and if I should keep silence, the fact would cry out and tell the outcome.

While all this was going on, my mother Lucia who was very dear to me made me return home. After the entrance of my father Berengarius into religious life, she made up her mind to do the same. After that was over, I returned to France especially to study divinity. My afore-mentioned master, William, now occupied the see of Châlons-sur-Marne. In this branch his master Anselm²⁰ of Laon at that time held preeminence because of his age.

¹⁹ Ovid, *Metamorphoses* XIII, 89, 90.

²⁰ Anselm (Anselmus, more properly Ansellus) of Laon (died ca. 1117). Little or nothing is known with certitude of his education or the early part of his life. Likely he spent some time at Paris. Some have thought that he studied under St. Anselm at Bec. He taught theology at Laon with great distinction for many years. He became dean, chancellor and in his later years archdeacon of Laon. He and his brother Ralph conducted the school there. Some think Ralph taught the liberal arts. One should not form his estimate of Anselm from Abelard's bitter characterization. He was one of the greatest theologians of the time. Very many who became prominent in the field studied under him. The school of Laon, if not Anselm himself, played a prominent part in the

(Abelard goes to Master Anselm at Laon)

And so I enrolled under this old man whose great name rested on long practice rather than on ability or learning. If one in doubt about some point consulted him, he left him in greater doubt. He was a wonder in the minds of his listeners, but a nobody in the estimate of his questioners. He had a remarkable command of language, but it was despicable with respect to meaning and devoid of sense. While he kindled a fire, he filled his room with smoke but did not light it up. His tree appeared heavy with foliage to those viewing it from afar, but to those who came near and looked closely, it was found fruitless. And so when I went to this tree to gather fruit therefrom, I found that it was the fig tree which Our Lord cursed, or like the old oak to which Lucan²¹ likened Pompey saying:

"There he stood, the mere shadow
of a great name, like an oak
towering in a fruitful field."

Realizing this, I did not delay long in the idleness of his shadow. I went to his lecture more and more irregu-

history of systematic theology. He is considered the compiler of part, at least, of the *glossa ordinaria* of the Bible. Bliemetzrieder, the editor, attributes to him the treatises *sententie divine pagine* (sentences from Holy Scripture) and *sententie Anselmi* published in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Phil. des Mittelalters* (vol. 18, 1919) parts 2 and 3. Cf. L. F. Bliemetzrieder, 'L'œuvre de Anselme de Laon et la littérature théologique contemporaine' in *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* (1933) 275 ff. A. Wilmart gives some data on his life in 'Un commentaire des Psaumes restitué à Anselme de Laon', *op. cit.*, 1936. See pp. 341-3. Cf. Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1941), pp. 33 ff. *Hist. litt. de la France* X, pp. 170-89.

²¹ *Pharsalia* I, 135-6.

larly, and for this the distinguished among his students were offended with me as despising a man of such renown; they secretly aroused him against me and by unfair suggestions brought him to become hostile towards me. One day after a session of *Sentences*,²² we students started joking with one another. One of them, trying me, asked what I, who had studied only philosophical works, thought of the lectures on the sacred books. I replied that they were very beneficial since we thereby learn the way of salvation, but that I was greatly astonished that for those who were educated, to understand the commentaries of the saints, their writings or glosses were not enough without any other form of teaching. Many who were there derided me and asked if I could and would attempt to show them how. I replied that, if they wished, I was ready to try. Then they were loud in their cries of

²² In the early Middle Ages, the study of and meditation on the Holy Scriptures (*lectio divina*) followed the traditional pattern of the monasteries from the time of St. Benedict. The text of a book of the bible or a choice selection of texts was followed verse by verse by an explanation and exposition (*glossa*) of some Father of the Church. Most of the moral and ascetical doctrine down to Abelard's time was derived in that way. But theology, as we understand it today, was beginning to take shape. A teacher (*magister*) taught by enunciating or citing truths or conclusions from Revelation (*sententiae*) and explained, developed, discussed and proved them from Scripture, tradition (especially as found in the Fathers); arguments from reason were also sometimes given; he also met objections and refuted erroneous doctrines. These 'sentences' were ordered in a plan *v.g.* the unity and Trinity of God, His attributes, creation, angels, man, the fall, Incarnation, Redemption, etc., to constitute a systematic theology. Apparently Anselm was giving a course of this kind. It is exemplified in the *Sententiae divinae paginae* (Sentences from Holy Scripture) mentioned above (note 20). Abelard's position seems to imply that there is no need of such a method in the study of the Scriptures by a man of education. He can read and understand them with the help of a commentary (*expositor*) by himself. In view of Abelard's important place in the development of the scholastic method, it is difficult to see his consistency. Perhaps with his usual perspicacity, he is quite right when he says that most of his troubles were caused by his pride.

derision and exclaimed: "All right, take some commentary on some unusual passage of scripture, and let us put your claim to the test." All agreed on a very obscure passage of the prophet Ezechiel. Taking the commentary, I straightway invited them to come to hear me on the next day. They started to give me unsolicited advice saying that I should not hasten to such a task, but, inexperienced as I was, I should take a longer time to establish and confirm my interpretation. I indignantly replied that it was not my custom to advance through practice but through talent, adding that either they were not to object to coming to hear me at the time of my own choosing or else I would break the bargain.

At my first lecture there were only a few, as all considered it ridiculous that I, utterly unlearned in sacred science, should attempt this so hastily. But those who did attend thought my lecture so good that they praised it highly and constrained me to comment on the text in the same vein as that in which I had lectured. When those who had not attended heard this, they vied with one another in getting in on my second and third lectures, and all alike were anxious to make a copy of the glosses which I had begun on the first day.

(*Anselm persecutes Abelard*)

As a result, this old man, inspired by bitter envy and spurred on by the urgings of some against me, as I mentioned above, began to persecute me for my lectures in divinity with enmity no less than that of my master William for those in philosophy. There were then in the school of this aged man two students who appeared to

excel, Alberic²³ of Rheims and Lotulph the Lombard, who were the more incensed against me as they thought highly of themselves. Moved especially by the suggestions of these two, as I afterwards learned, that old man arrogantly forbade me to continue in the place where he was teaching the work of interpretation which I had entered upon. He gave as an excuse that I might perhaps in that capacity write something erroneous, as I was unschooled in that branch, and the error would be imputed to him.²⁴ When the students heard this, they became highly indignant at this open manifestation of envy and spite such as no one had ever experienced before. And the more open it was, the more it redounded to my credit, and by his persecution, he made me more esteemed.

(Abelard at last enjoys Renown in Paris)

After a few days I returned to Paris and for some years enjoyed peaceful possession of the school of which, though

²³ Alberic of Rheims and Lotulph were two of Abelard's chief opponents at the Council of Soissons as we shall see. Alberic became archdeacon of Rheims in 1113-14, and he and Lotulph conducted the school there. Alberic became Archbishop of Bourges in 1137. Cf. P. B. Gams, *Series Episcoporum*, p. 523. In 'Vita Hugonis abbatiss Marchianensis' in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* XIV, p. 398, we read of Alberic: As a lecturer he was thorough, charming and eloquent but not so in the solution of questions. Little is known of Lotulphus.

²⁴ Here we find a *magister* forbidding Abelard to teach divinity and Abelard left Laon and went straight to Paris where he resumed the same course of lectures without molestation on that score. It will be recalled that William of Champeaux took no such action against Abelard a few years before. How explain this difference in his treatment at Paris? An easy explanation would be that Anselm was chancellor and perhaps archdeacon at the time. But surely there was a chancellor at Paris and William himself was archdeacon. And after a lapse of several years Abelard goes back and finds himself free to teach divinity there. All this only emphasizes the caution one should observe in making general statements about the organization and control of schools at that time.

long ago it had been yielded and turned over to me, I had been deprived. As soon as I took over there, I was eager to finish the commentary on Ezechiel begun at Laon. My lectures proved so popular with my hearers that they considered I had acquired no less charm in lecturing in divinity than they had witnessed in philosophy. Through desire for lectures in both branches, my students increased greatly in number, and the financial gain and glory which accrued to me you know well from report. But success always puffs up fools and worldly repose weakens the strength of one's mind and readily loosens its fiber through carnal allurements. At a time when I considered that I was the one philosopher in the world and had nothing to fear from others, I, who up to that time had lived most chastely, began to relax the reins on my passions. And the more success I had in philosophy and sacred science, the more I withdrew from philosophers and divines through an unclean life. For it is well known that philosophers, not to speak of divines—I mean men attentive to the lessons of sacred scripture—were especially adorned with the virtue of chastity. And while I was laboring under my pride and lechery, God's grace provided a cure for each, though I willed it not, first for my lechery by depriving me of the organs by which I practised it, then for my pride which my scholarship especially nursed in me in accordance with the saying of St. Paul: *Knowledge puffs up*. This was accomplished by humiliating me through the burning of the book which was my special glory.

I would have you know correctly the story of each cure, just at it occurred, from the facts and not from hearsay. I had always detested unclean harlots and my constant

attention to my books had kept me from frequent association with women of nobility and I knew little of society among women in the world. But perverse fortune, as the saying goes, by her blandishments found an easier way to cast me down from the height of my glory, or rather God in His goodness claimed me for Himself, a humbled man instead of one most proud and forgetful of the grace he had received.

*(How Abelard's Love for Heloise brought about a Fall
which afflicted both Body and Soul)*

There lived in Paris a maiden named Heloise, the niece²⁵ of a canon named Fulbert, who from his deep love for her was eager to have her advanced in all literary pursuits possible. She was a lady of no mean appearance while in literary excellence she was the first. And as gift of letters is rare among women, so it had gained favor for her and made her the most renowned woman in the whole kingdom.

²⁵ Several theories have been brought forward regarding the parentage of Heloise: one that she was of the noble house of Montmorency; another that she was illegitimate. There is no documentary proof of either assumption. Heloise herself in her letters to Abelard implies that her family was of lowly estate. There is an entry in the necrology of the Paraclete which gives her mother's name as Hersinde; under date of December 1st we read: Hersinde the mother of our lady abbess; *Recueil des historiens de la France. Obituaires de la province de Sens, IV, Diocèses de Meaux et de Troyes*, p. 428. The name of her father is not known. There is also an entry for December 26th on p. 429 of the same edition of the necrology which reads: Hubert, a canon and uncle of lady Heloise. *Hubertus* is probably a corruption of *Fulbertus*. The date of the birth of Heloise is not known. Abelard tells us she was a girl (*adolescensula, puella*) when he first met her. It is generally assumed that she was born about 1100 or 1101. She died in 1163 or 1164, likely on May 16. Cf. Enid McLeod, *Heloise*, (London, 1938), notes 212, 220, pp. 287 ff.

I considered all the qualities which usually inspire lovers and decided she was just the one for me to join in love. I felt that this would be very easy to accomplish; I then enjoyed such renown and was so outstanding for my charm of youth that I feared no repulse by any woman whom I should deign to favor with my love. And I felt that this maiden would all the more readily yield to me as I knew she possessed and cherished a knowledge of letters; thereby we, though separated, could through interchange of missives live in each other's presence and, by writing more boldly than conversation permits, we could constantly engage in pleasant talks.

And so, all on fire with love for her, I sought opportunity to enable me to make her familiar with me by private and daily association, the more easily to win her over. To effect this, through the intervention of some friends, I arranged with her uncle to receive me at his own price into his home which was near my school on the pretext that the care of my household greatly interfered with my studies and proved too heavy a financial burden. He was a very avaricious man and also most anxious that his niece advance in her literary studies. Because of these two traits, I easily gained his assent and got what I desired since he was all eager for the money and considered that his niece would profit from my teaching. On this latter point he strongly urged me beyond my fondest hopes, acceding to my wishes and furthering my love. He put his niece entirely under my control that whenever I was free upon returning from school I might devote myself night and day to teaching her, telling me to use pressure if I found her remiss. I was astonished at his simplicity in this matter and would have been no more

astounded if he had been giving over a tender lamb to a ravenous wolf. For when he handed her over to me not only to teach but to discipline, what else was he doing but giving free rein to my designs, and opportunity, even if I were not seeking it, easily to subdue her by threats and stripes if blandishments did not work? Two factors especially kept him from suspecting any wrongdoing, namely his fondness for his niece and my own reputation in the past for chastity.

What was the result? We were first together in one house and then one in mind. Under the pretext of work we made ourselves entirely free for love and the pursuit of her studies provided the secret privacy which love desired. We opened our books but more words of love than of the lesson asserted themselves. There was more kissing than teaching; my hands found themselves at her breasts more often than on the book. Love brought us to gaze into each other's eyes more than reading kept them on the text. And the better to prevent suspicion, I sometimes struck her not through anger or vexation but from love and affection which were beyond the sweetness of every ointment. No sign of love was omitted by us in our ardor and whatever unusual love could devise, that was added too. And the more such delights were new to us, the more ardently we indulged in them, and the less did we experience satiety. And the more these pleasures engaged me, the less time I had for philosophy and the less attention I gave to my school. It became wearisome for me to go there and equally hard to stay when I was using nightly vigils for love and the days for study. I became negligent and indifferent in my lectures so that nothing I said stemmed from my talent but I repeated

everything from rote. I came simply to say again what had been said long ago and, if I composed any verses, the theme was of love and not of the secrets of philosophy. Many of these songs, as you yourself know, are still popular in various places and sung by people of like tastes. It is not easy even to realize the sadness, the expressed regrets and sorrow of my students when they saw the preoccupation and disturbance of my mind with such things.

Such a course could have escaped the notice of very few and of no one at all, I feel, except the man most disgraced by such base conduct, I mean the uncle of the maiden. When it was suggested to him at times by some, he could not believe it on account of his extreme love of his niece noted above and of my well-known chastity in the past. For it is hard for us to suspect those we love and the taint of suspicion of evil cannot exist along with strong affection. As St. Jerome says in his letter²⁶ to Sabinianus:

"We are usually the last to know of the scandal in our own household and the sins of our wife and children remain hidden from us although they are the common gossip of the neighbors."

But at length we come to find out and recognize it and what is common knowledge cannot easily be kept from just one person.

And in the course of several months that is what happened with regard to us. Imagine his bitter sorrow when her uncle found it out. Imagine the grief of us lovers at being separated; how I was filled with shame and remorse over the maiden's trouble. Imagine the

²⁶ Epist. 147, 10; CSEL 56, I, 3, p. 327; PL 22, 1203.

sadness which flooded her soul from my sense of shame. Neither one of us complained of our own trials or bewailed our own misfortune but those of the other. The bodily separation became a strong link to bind our hearts together and our love became the more inflamed, denied opportunity. But shame gradually disappeared and made us more shameless and it became less as acts became easier. What the poet²⁷ tells us of Mars and Venus caught in the act happened also to us. For not long afterwards the girl noticed that she was pregnant and she wrote me about it with great exultation and asked what I thought should be done. One night, when her uncle was away, I secretly took her from his house, as we had arranged, and had her taken²⁸ directly to my native place. There she stayed with my sister until she gave birth to a boy whom she named Astralabe.

Upon his return, her uncle almost went mad and no one could appreciate except from experience the anguish which wrenched him or the shame he felt. He did not know what to do to me or by what plan he could waylay me. He was very much afraid that, if he maimed or killed me, his dear niece would pay for it in my native place. He could not get hold of me and coerce me any-

²⁷ Cf. Ovid, *Ars Amat.* II, 561 ff.; *Metamor.* IV, 169-189.

²⁸ In his second letter to Heloise (PL 178, 206A) Abelard tells us that she travelled to Brittany disguised as a nun. He gives no hint that he accompanied her.

Astralabe (Astrolabe) was not uncommon as a proper name in France in this period. Why it was given to this child I do not know. In an entry of the necrology of the Paraclete he is called Peter Astrolabe (in one *ms.* Astralabe). After Abelard's death, Heloise wrote to Peter the Venerable asking him to get a prebend for Astralabe from the bishop of Paris or elsewhere. Peter replied that he would try. There is some evidence that he became an abbot. Cf. McLeod, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-4.

where against my will especially since I was very much on my guard for I had no doubt that he would quickly attack me if he could or dared to. After a while I began to sympathize with him in his extreme anxiety and blamed myself for the deceit which love had wrought which was, as it were, a base betrayal. I went to see him and, begging forgiveness, promised to make whatever amends he decided on. I told him that whoever had felt the force of love or recalled to what a crash women from the beginning have brought even the greatest men would not be surprised at my fall. And further to appease him, I made an offer beyond his fondest hopes to make satisfaction by marrying her whom I had defiled, provided this be done secretly so that my reputation would not be damaged.²⁹ He agreed both by his own word and kiss of peace and by that of his backers. He thereby became on good terms with me which was what I asked but he did it only the more easily to betray me.

(The Arguments of Heloise against their proposed Marriage)

I straightway returned to my native land and brought back my beloved to marry her. She disapproved of the plan and tried to dissuade me from it on two counts, the risk involved and the disgrace I should incur. She stated with an oath that her uncle could never be placated by such satisfaction, as we afterwards found out. What

²⁹ Scholars have speculated on the reason that Abelard stipulated that the marriage be kept secret. See, amongst others, E. Gilson, *Héloïse et Abélard* (Paris, 1948), pp. 31 ff. Could not the chief reasons have been a marriage made 'necessary' because of the birth of Astralabe, and also that Abelard thereby put himself in the category of clerics who could not keep continent?

glory, she asked, would she derive from me since she would bring me to disgrace and humiliate both of us alike. What punishment would the world demand of her if she deprived it of such a shining light? What curses, what loss to the Church, what weeping among philosophers would ensue from our marriage; how disgraceful, how lamentable would it be, if I, whom nature had produced for all, should devote myself to a woman and submit to such baseness! She utterly abhorred such a marriage which would prove a disgrace and a burden to me. She pointed out both the loss of my reputation and the hardships of marriage, which latter the Apostle exhorts us to avoid when he says:³⁰

"Art thou freed from a wife? Do not seek a wife. But if thou takest a wife, thou hast not sinned. And if a virgin marry, she has not sinned. Yet such will have tribulation of the flesh. But I spare you that... I would have you free from care, etc."

But if I would not heed the advice of the Apostle and the exhortations of the saints on the great burden of marriage, she said, I should at least listen to the philosophers and pay attention to what has been written by them or of them on this matter. The saints in general have carefully done this to rebuke us. One instance is St. Jerome in his first book *Against Jovinianus*³¹ when he recalls how Theophrastus carefully set forth in great detail the unbearable troubles and constant cares of marriage and confirmed by patent proofs his declaration that a philosopher should not marry and concludes his

³⁰ I Cor. VII, 27, 28, 32.

³¹ Chapter 47; PL 23, 289A.

reasons based on the exhortation of philosophers by saying: "When Theophrastus so reasons... what Christian should not blush, etc.?" And again in the same work³² St. Jerome goes on:

"When Cicero, after divorcing Terentia, was requested by Hirtius to marry his sister, he emphatically declined saying that he could not devote himself to a wife and philosophy alike."

He did not say simply 'to devote himself' but added 'alike', not wishing to do anything which would compete with his zeal for philosophy.

To say no more about the hindrance to the study of philosophy,³³ she went on, consider the status of the dignified life. What could there be in common between scholars and wetnurses, writing desks and cradles, books, writing tablets and distaffs, styles, pens and spindles? Or who is there who is bent on sacred or philosophical reflection who could bear the wailing of babies, the silly lullabies of nurses to quiet them, the noisy horde of servants, both male and female; who could endure the constant degrading defilement of infants? You will say that the rich can do it whose palaces or mansions have private rooms, and who with their wealth do not feel expense and are not troubled with daily anxieties. But I answer that the status of philosophers is not that of millionaires and of those who, engrossed in riches and entangled in wordly cares, will have no time for sacred or philosophical studies.

³² Ibid. 291AB.

³³ This and the following sentences smack of St. Jerome. Cf. *De perpetua Virginitate B. Mariae* 20; PL 23, 214AC. *Ep. 54 ad Furiam*, 4, 5; PL 22, 551-552; CSEL 51, I, 1, pp. 469-70. *Ep. 50 ad Dominionem*; PL 22, 516; CSEL loc. cit., p. 394.

And so it is true to say that the great philosophers of old utterly despising the world fled rather than retired from it and renounced all pleasures that they might repose in the embrace of philosophy alone. The greatest of them, Seneca,³⁴ says in instructing Lucilius:

"You are not to pursue philosophy simply in your free time. Everything else is to be given up that we may devote ourselves to it for no length of time is long enough... It makes little difference whether you give up or interrupt the study of philosophy for, once it is interrupted, it does not abide... We must resist occupations which are not simply to be regulated but avoided."

What those among us who truly bear the name of monks endure for love of God, that they, the esteemed philosophers among the pagans, endured for love of philosophy. For among every people, whether Jew, Gentile or Christian, there have always been some who were outstanding for their faith and uprightness of life and who cut themselves off from the rank and file by their distinguished chastity and abstinence. Among the Jews of old there were the Nazarenes³⁵ who consecrated themselves to the Lord according to the Law. And there were also the sons of the Prophets, the followers³⁶ of Elias and Eliseus who, as St. Jerome³⁷ witnesses, are called monks in the Old Testament. Later on there were three classes of philosophers whom Josephus distinguishes in his *Antiquities*³⁸ calling some Pharisees, others Sadducees, still others

³⁴ Epist. LXIII, 3.

³⁵ Cf. *Numbers* VI, 21; *Judges* XVI, 17; *Amos* II, 11.

³⁶ Cf. *IV Kings* VI, 1.

³⁷ *Ep.* CXXV, 7; PL 22, 1076; CSEL 56, I, 3, p. 125. Cf. also *Ep.* LVIII, 5; PL 22, 583; CSEL 54, I, 1, p. 534.

³⁸ XVIII, 1, 11.

Essenes. Among us there are the monks who imitate the common life of the apostles or the earlier life of solitude of John the Baptist.³⁹ And among the Gentiles, as we have mentioned, there are the philosophers. For the term wisdom or philosophy was used to refer not so much to acquisition of knowledge as to a religious life as we learn from the first use of it and from the testimony of the saints themselves.

In line with this, St. Augustine in the eighth book⁴⁰ of his *City of God* distinguishes the classes of philosophers:

"The Italians had Pythagoras of Samos as the founder of their school who, it is said, first used the term philosophy. For before him, anyone who appeared to be outstanding by a praiseworthy manner of life was called a sage. But when he was asked what his profession was, he answered that he was a philosopher, that is to say, one who pursues and loves wisdom; it seemed to him that to say that such a one was already a wise man would be the height of arrogance."

And so in this passage where he says "appeared to be outstanding by a praiseworthy manner of life, etc.", he clearly shows that the wise men, that is, the philosophers, among the Gentiles were so called in praise of their life rather than of their knowledge. How temperately and chastely they lived is not for me to adduce from instances lest I appear to teach Minerva⁴¹ herself.

Now, she continued, if lay people and pagans so lived, men who were bound by no religious profession, what should you, a cleric⁴² and canon, do to avoid preferring

³⁹ Cf. *Mark* I, 2, ff.

⁴⁰ VIII, 2; CSEL 40, p. 355.

⁴¹ The goddess of wisdom.

⁴² It is certain that Abelard was a priest when he was abbot of St. Gildas, for he tells us toward the end of this letter that attempts were

base pleasure to sacred duties lest such a Charybdis drag you down headlong and you shamelessly and irrevocably swamp yourself in such obscenities. And if you do not regard the privilege of cleric, at least uphold the dignity of philosopher. If you despise reverence for God, let the love of uprightness at least restrain your shamelessness. Recall that Socrates had a wife, and the degrading incident by which he atoned for this defilement of philosophy to put others on their guard by his experience.

made on his life by putting poison in his chalice for Mass. It is not known when he was ordained a priest. Perhaps he began the study of theology with Holy Orders in view, especially if he intended to teach theology.

The words here, *clericus et canonicus*, indicate that he was not a priest at this time for the term cleric alone in the writings of the age usually means one who is only tonsured or at most has Minor Orders. If he had been in Major Orders, his rank would most likely have been added. In all probability, he was ordained priest some time after his marriage and after both he and Heloise had taken the vow of chastity in religion. A married man can by dispensation be ordained priest today provided his wife has taken a solemn vow of chastity in religion.

For reference to the legislation of the time relative to the marriage of clerics and canons, see the article by T. P. McLaughlin: 'The Prohibition of Marriage Against Canons in the Early Twelfth Century,' *Mediaeval Studies* III (1941), 94-100. A priest, deacon or subdeacon could validly contract marriage, but he forfeited his benefice thereby. A cleric in Minor Orders could marry and retain his benefice. A canon of any clerical rank lost his benefice if he married; that would explain the force of the clause: *ne divinis officiis turpis praeferas voluptates*.

When was Abelard made a canon and of what churches? We do not know. We know from a letter of Heloise, as will be seen, that he was head of the school in Paris at this time. Perhaps a canonry was attached to this office as Remusat thinks (*op. cit.*, I, p. 39). But there is no positive proof that he was a canon of Paris, although he likely was; on the other hand there is some evidence that he was canon of Sens, Tours and also of Chartres. Duchesne thinks he was canon of Sens and not of Paris. Father McLaughlin, *art. cit.*, 99, n. 40, is of the opinion that, apart from the Canons Regular who were bound by the law of celibacy the same as monks, there were two classes of secular canons: the first, those composing a Cathedral Chapter; second, those not belonging to a chapter.

Is it not possible that at that time a cleric could be a canon, without a benefice, of several churches, either at the same time or successively?

Jerome himself in his first book *Against Jovinianus*⁴³ brings this out when writing of Socrates:

"Once, after he had withstood numberless words of invective which Xanthippe hurled against him from the upper story, she threw some filthy water down upon him; Socrates wiped his head and exclaimed: 'I knew that a shower would follow such rumblings'."

Heloise went on to point out what a risk it would be for me to take her back and that it would be dearer to her and more honorable to me to be called my lover than my wife so that her charm alone would keep me for her, not the force of a nuptial bond; she also stated that the joys of our meeting after separation would be the more delightful as they were rare. When she could not divert me from my mad scheme by such arguments of exhortation and discussion and could not bear to offend me, she sighed deeply and in tears ended her final appeal as follows: "If we do this, one fate finally awaits us: we shall both be ruined and sorrow will thereby pierce our hearts equal in intensity to the love with which they are now aflame." And, as all the world knows, she was possessed of the spirit of prophecy in this statement.

And so when the infant was born we entrusted it to my sister and returned secretly to Paris. After a few days, we spent a night in a secret vigil of prayer in a church and early on the following day we were joined by the nuptial blessing in the presence of her uncle and some of his and our friends. We straightway separated and left secretly. After that we saw each other only rarely and then on the quiet, hiding by dissimulation what we had done.

⁴³ I, 48; PL 23, 291BC.

But her uncle and the members of his household seeking solace for his disgrace began to make our marriage public and thereby to break the word they had given regarding it. Heloise on her part cursed and swore that it was a lie. Her uncle became strongly aroused and kept heaping abuse upon her. When I found this out, I sent her to the convent of nuns in a town near Paris called Argenteuil where as a young girl she had been brought up and received instruction. I had a religious habit, all except the veil,⁴⁴ made for her and had her vested in it.

When her uncle and his kinsmen heard of this they considered that now I had fooled them and that by making her a nun I wanted easily to get rid of her. They became strongly incensed against me and formed a conspiracy. One night when I was sound asleep in an inner room of my lodgings, by bribing my attendant they wrought vengeance upon me in a cruel and shameful manner and one which the world with great astonishment abhorred, namely, they cut off the organs by which I had committed the deed which they deplored. They immediately fled but two of them were caught and had their eyes put out and were castrated; one of these was my servant already mentioned who while in my service was brought by greed to betray me.

When morning came, the whole city flocked to me and it is hard, yes impossible, to describe the astonishment which stunned them, the wailing they uttered, the shouting which irritated me and the moaning which upset me. The clerics and especially my students by

⁴⁴ She took the veil later when she formally became a nun of the convent; see *infra*.

their excessive lamentation and wailing pained me so that I endured more from their expressions of sympathy than from the suffering caused by the mutilation. I felt the embarrassment more than the wound and the shame was harder to bear than the pain. I fell to thinking how great had been my renown and in how easy and base a way this had been brought low and utterly destroyed; how by a just judgment of God I had been afflicted in that part of my body by which I had sinned; how just was the betrayal by which he whom I had first betrayed paid me back; how my rivals would extol such a fair retribution; how great would be the sorrow and lasting grief which my mutilation would cause my parents and friends; with what speed the news of this extraordinary mark of disgrace would spread throughout the world; what course could I follow; how could I face the public to be pointed at by all with a finger of scorn, to be insulted by every tongue and to become a monstrosity and a spectacle to all the world.

This also caused me no little confusion that according to the letter of the Law,⁴⁵ which kills, God so abominated eunuchs that men who had their testicles cut off or bruised were forbidden as offensive and unclean⁴⁶ to enter

⁴⁵ Notice that Abelard does not refer to any ecclesiastical law preventing eunuchs as such from being ordained or from exercising the duties of the ministry. It was men who had been guilty of self-mutilation only who incurred an irregularity *ex delicto* as they do today. Cf. *Codex Iuris Canonici* 986, 5.

For legislation on the matter previous to Abelard's time, cf. Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum*, Pars VI, Cap. 374; *Panormia* III, 56; PL 161, 523, 1143; Gratian, *Decretum*, Dist. IV, Canon 4: *Canones Apostolorum* XXI, XXII, XXIII in *Ecclesiae Occidentalis Monumenta Iuris Antiquissima* I (C. H. Turner, Oxford, 1899), p. 117; Council of Nice, Canon I; *ibid.* p. 112.

⁴⁶ No one who had any serious blemish could become a priest. Cf. *Lev.* XXI, 21.

More prestigious and powerful are the positions of the counts or wardens of the marches along the frontiers of the empire or the special posts of command given from time to time to the *missi* of the Frankish king. The most important of these offices are held by relatives of the royal family. An incident which the RFA relates in the revised part of the annals under the year 782 indicates that kinship gives a man higher prestige than any official rank or position. The chamberlain Adalgis, the marshal Gailo, and the count of the palace Worad are defeated by the Saxons because they do not go into battle with a Frankish host under the command of the king's kinsman Theodoric for fear that he would receive all the credit for victory. The king's personal appearance is still the most effective and often the only way of enforcing the royal will, and this is another explanation for the king's ceaseless journeyings through his realm. The Carolingians, under the influence of their clerical advisers, attempt to replace the Merovingian notion that the kingdom is simply the monarch's personal property by the idea that king and community are bound together by mutual obligations. The kings continue to divide the kingdom among their heirs, however, just as they split their booty and distribute their spoils.

Filling the king's treasury, preserved apparently in the royal bed-chamber and guarded by the chamberlain, is one of the unadmitted objectives of Carolingian foreign policy. The incessant conflicts of the Carolingians with their neighbors are a means to provide the king with sufficient funds to reward his vassals and to compensate for the meager resources and inadequate revenues of his kingdom. Tributes, gifts, and booty are therefore constant themes of the RFA. The Saxons have to present three hundred horses every year; Charlemagne carries away the gold and silver stored in the Saxon sanctuary called the Irmsul; he captures the treasure of the Lombard king Desiderius. Duke Eric of Friuli takes the treasure of the Avars, which has been accumulated by centuries of conquest and pillage and is stored in their central fortress, the "ring," and Charlemagne shares it with his vassals and the pope. Similarly, the spoils after the defeat of Ljudovit, duke of Lower Pannonia, are avidly seized and carried home.

The RFA usually fails to reveal the underlying objectives of campaigns and diplomatic missions, but it indicates the direction and the changing thrust of Carolingian foreign policy. In the begin-

ning Pepin and Charles have their hands tied because they are forced to subjugate independently minded powers within the borders of the kingdom, in particular the dukes of Alamannia (742), Aquitaine (742-69), and Bavaria (743-88). These conflicts end with the seizure and submission of the rebels. The annalists make no attempt to determine the deeper causes of these revolts. They are most explicit in the case of Tassilo, duke of Bavaria, who is charged with wickedness, breach of oaths and promises, inconstancy, mendacity, disobedience, treachery, desertion, an attempt on the king's men, *lèse majesté*, with inciting the Huns against the Frankish king, and with permitting his wife Liutberga, a daughter of deposed King Desiderius of Lombardy, to set him against the Franks. His crime is not that he sought autonomy for his tribe but that he broke his oath of loyalty and deserted his lord.

The alliance of the Frankish kings with the papacy involves the Franks in the affairs of northern Italy, and the ensuing destruction of the Lombard kingdom results in the first great expansion of the Carolingian realm. The annalists describe the conflict from a narrow, self-righteous point of view as a struggle for the pope and the rights of St. Peter and against a wicked and oath-breaking tyrant and his arrogance and oppression. Next, the Saxon war consumes the energy of the Frankish king for more than two decades, ending in the permanent subjugation of the Saxons. Whereas Pepin conducts only occasional retaliatory raids against the pagan Saxon tribes (743, 744, 747, 758), Charles presses the war by annual campaigns (772-85), numerous battles, calculated brutalities, and the systematic depredation of Saxon territory. Charlemagne's determination and at the same time his sense of frustration are indicated by the revisor of the RFA when he writes that the king "decided to attack the treacherous and treaty-breaking tribe of the Saxons and to persist in this war until they were either defeated and forced to accept the Christian religion or entirely exterminated." Although this author is writing long after the Saxons have become part of the Carolingian empire, he does not trust them and maintains, under the year 785, that "the stubborn treachery of the Saxons quieted down for a few years, mainly because they could not find convenient opportunities for revolt." In 793 the Saxons, in fact, rebel again, and even the almost continuous presence of the king and his army between 793 and 799 does not entirely root

out an opposition; as late as 804 the emperor has recourse to deportation and resettlement. Whereas the revisor of the RFA explains the bloody campaigns against the Saxons primarily as a consequence of their rebellion, their inroads into Frankish territory, and their stubborn treachery and perfidy, the original annalist sees the conflict above all as a war between Christians and pagans. One of the first acts of Charlemagne in Saxony is the destruction of the Irminsul, the heathen sanctuary; three times Frankish exploits and victories are accompanied by miracles; and phrases like "by the will of God," "with the help of God," "God frustrated their intentions," and "How much the power of God worked against them for the salvation of the Christians, nobody can tell," seem to indicate that to this annalist the Saxon campaign is almost a holy war to increase the kingdom of God.

The conquest of the lands between the Rhine and the Elbe involves the Carolingians with the eastern and northern neighbors of the Saxons. Charles considers the Elbe and the Saale as his eastern frontier and builds castles along these rivers, but the presence of Frankish power easily leads to Frankish interference in the affairs of the Slavs living on the eastern banks of the Elbe and the Saale. Deep inroads into Slavonic territory, like the attack on the Bohemians in 805, however, remain exceptional. The Slavs appear in the RFA for the first time in 780, but from then on Wilzi, Sorbs, Smeldingi, Linones, and especially the Obodrites are of continued interest to the annalists (782, 789, 806, 810, 811, 812, 815, 816, 817, 819, 821, 822, 823, 826). Charles plays the petty Slavonic chieftains against each other and punishes the attacks of the Slavs by expeditions beyond the Elbe, devastating the land and leaving only after hostages have been given. In this way the Slavs are compelled to recognize Frankish overlordship; they remain a potential threat to the Franks because they tend to ally themselves with their northern neighbors, the Danes. The annalists reveal no sympathy or understanding for the interests of these tribes. If the Franks wage war on them it is for breach of faith, or, if the people have at no time been subject to the Franks, because of their arrogance and hatred.

The Danes move within range of the annalists for the first time in 782 when their king Sigifrid sends ambassadors and the Saxon Widukind seeks refuge with them. Their relations with Franks and Slavs and their unending internal squabbles receive much attention in

the RFA between 804 and 829. The annalists note that the Vikings infest the North Sea in 800 and are ravaging the Frankish coast in 810 and 820. In later years the RFA is extremely well informed on Danish affairs. The author knows, for example, about their exploits against Scotland and Ireland. Perhaps his information stems from the Frankish ambassadors sent to the Danish kings in 823, Counts Theothari and Hruodmund, who "carefully studied the dispute with the sons of Godofrid as well as the condition of the whole kingdom of the Norsemen and informed the emperor of all they could find out in these lands," or from Archbishop Ebbo of Reims, "who had gone to preach in the land of the Danes, on the counsel of the emperor and with the approval of the Roman pontiff, and had baptized many converts to the faith during the previous summer." The initial point at issue between Franks and Danes is apparently the question of Saxon fugitives. Later, the factions battling for the Danish throne seek outside support, and Charlemagne sponsors the cause of Heriold, who is baptized in 826 and given a base in Frisia for any emergency that might arise. The Danish kings are represented as haughty and foolhardy potentates who fail to recognize the power and majesty of the Frankish emperor, and references abound to "the mad king," "the arrogance and pride of the Danish king," his being "inflated with the vain hope of victory," his "hypocrisy" and "empty talk." But the concern with the Danes during these years indicates that the authors of the RFA were not only writing with all the frontiers of the wide empire in mind but perceived that the Norsemen constituted a growing threat in their time.

While the annalists frequently complain about the stubborn resistance of Saxons and Slavs, they are equally dissatisfied with the conduct of Basques and Bretons in the west. The Basques inflict a stinging defeat on the Frankish army in 778 in which many officers of the court are killed. The original annalist keeps silent on this episode; the revisor is frank but blames the disaster on "the unfavorable terrain and the unequal method of fighting" and considers the Franks superior to the Basques in arms and valor. Here again the charge of the annalists is that of "customary recklessness," "insolence," and "treachery." The Bretons rebel repeatedly (786, 799, 811, 818, 822, 824, 825), and the revisor as well as the later annalists similarly charge them with "fickleness," "treacherous spirit peculiar to the nation,"

"senseless obstinacy," and speak of the "arrogance of this faithless tribe," whose opposition, however, quickly collapses under the fierce blows of Frankish counts. Central and southern Italy, in particular the duchies of Spoleto and Benevento, enter the Frankish sphere of influence with the destruction of the Lombard kingdom in 774—and with Charlemagne's growing imperial ambitions. While the dukes of Spoleto are usually Franks appointed by the king, the dukes of Benevento retain a measure of independence but pay tribute. With the exception of the annal for 787 in the original version of the RFA, the affairs of central and southern Italy appear to be of marginal interest to the annalists. In any case, they appear to be of less significance than matters pertaining to Danes or Slavs.

The expansion of the empire and the growing prestige of its ruler bring the Franks into contact with the more distant powers of their world. In 777 a Moslem embassy from Spain is noted for the first time in the RFA; it is followed by a campaign which takes the emperor across the Ebro to Saragossa. Spanish affairs receive much attention between 797 and 828. Repeatedly peace is made with the emirs of Cordova and subsequently broken again. The Frankish kings concentrate their efforts on the areas of Pamplona and Saragossa and create the Spanish March in what later becomes the kingdom of Navarre and the county of Barcelona. But even at the end of the period covered by the RFA the Spanish March is not entirely secured, as the revolt of 827, the ravages of Abumarvan, the failure of the Frankish army, and the punishment of its commanders indicate. In the meantime the Franks are compelled to fight the Moslems on a much more uncertain front, the islands of the Mediterranean—Sardinia, Corsica, the Balearics—and the coasts of Italy which suffer from constant raids of Moslem pirates. The Christians repeatedly suffer severe losses. At one time eight merchant ships are sunk on their way from Corsica to Italy, and at another five hundred prisoners are discovered with a defeated Moslem force. They strike out, however, against the pirates from Italian ports, and Frankish counts fight the Moslems in Sardinia, Corsica, the Balearics, and even in North Africa.

Charles's conflicts with the Umayyad emir of Cordova make him an ally of the Abbasid caliph of Bagdad, the celebrated Harun al-Rashid. The RFA records two embassies sent by Charlemagne to Bagdad and two missions in return from the caliph (797–807).

Harun's emissaries carry presents which include an elephant, a clock, and a beautiful tent. Harun al-Rashid even cedes certain rights of the Holy Places in Palestine to Charlemagne. The embassy from the oriental ruler—called the "king of Persia" by the annalists—and his exotic gifts receive much attention in the RFA and seem to confirm in the authors' minds their lofty notion of Charlemagne's place in the world.

For a period of about twenty years (797–817) the RFA gives evidence of close diplomatic relations between Francia and Constantinople. As in the case of Harun al-Rashid the annalists take note of the Byzantine emperor first as the donator of expensive and unwonted presents; in the year 757 the emperor sends an organ to Pepin the Short. The next encounter recorded by the RFA is less friendly; Emperor Constantine V orders his Sicilian governor to attack the Beneventan allies of Charlemagne. He is enraged "because he had been denied the king's daughter," a piece of information contained only in the original version of the RFA. The issues which divide the Frankish and the Byzantine emperors are vaguely identified by the annalists as "the Dalmatian question," the position of Venice, or the role of the archbishop of Grado. The sensitive problem of Charles's imperial title receives only implicit attention. After Venice has been restored to the Byzantines in 810, however, the Greek ambassadors at Aix-la-Chapelle "acclaimed him according to their custom, that is in Greek, and called him Emperor and Basileus." Although there is actual military conflict between Franks and Greeks in the years 806 to 810, the authors of the RFA refer to the Byzantines with respect, note the honorable treatment of Frankish emissaries, and record with interest events in the Byzantine world which have no bearing on the affairs of the West. The hostile and abusive tone which the annalists frequently affect when dealing with the opponents of the Franks is conspicuously absent in their description of Byzantine-Frankish relations.

Two powers complicate the relations between the Franks and the Byzantines in the course of the last ten years covered by the RFA. First the duke of Lower Pannonia, Ljudovit, revolts against Carolingian rule, and the Franks attack him on many campaigns. After Ljudovit's timely death in 823 the Franks encounter a new foe in the Bulgars, whose emissaries appear before Emperor Louis the Pious for the first time in 824. At issue is the border between Franks and

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENTS 3 and 4

Do half of the following questions. The answers should be considerably shorter than on your previous two homework assignments. For the less straightforward or less factually oriented questions, please cite references (where you rely on a source other than class discussion).

You may, but need not, submit the assignment in two parts. But the last date for submission of your answers is Monday, June 29.

The questions are not in any particular order.

- ✓ 1. Why did Muslims translate Aristotle prior to Christians?
- ✓ 2. What is the significance of handwriting reform under Charlemagne?
3. Who taught Aquinas? Where did Aquinas teach?
- ✓ 4. In what field did Aquinas get his doctorate? What was his "nickname?"
- ✓ 5. Where was Aquinas born? What was the name of the monastery he entered early on? What sort of monastery was it?
- ✓ 6. What is Abelard's son's name?
7. Name one follower of Bonaventure.
8. State one of the reasons for Eriugena's condemnation.
9. Define scholasticism.
10. Who was William of Champeaux?
- ✓ 11. When is "Roland" written and by whom?
- ✓ 12. Describe in one line the subject matter of "Roland".
13. Why is Yvain called the "knight of the lion"?
- ✓ 14. Why did Heloise need a tutor?
15. State one reason for saying that Anselm is an Augustinian.

✓ 16. Give the dates for the following:

Avicenna

Alfarabi

Algazali

Averroes

✓ 17. Which of the people in question 16 most influenced Aquinas?

✓ 18. What is the difference (be brief) between the Dominicans and Franciscans?

19. What is the binarium famosissimum?

✓ 20. What is important about Chartres aside from the magnificent cathedral?

21. What is the significance of a lion that is painted limping or mutilated or wounded by the spear of Hercules?

22. What is the ontological/ethical doctrine of truth?

23. State one of Bonaventure's complaints about Aristotle.

24. What is esse?

1. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory

2. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory
3. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory
4. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory
5. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory
6. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory
7. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory
8. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory
9. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory
10. What is the difference between the following:
a. Axiom
b. Hypothesis
c. Assumption
d. Postulate
e. Theory

GUIDELINES FOR WRITING PAPERS

1. Do not exceed the assigned lengths, which are stated for double spaced, typed pages. You will have more control over a short paper, and you will not have room to ramble.
2. Introduce your paper by stating your thesis (the point you will defend in the body of the paper). You might also outline briefly your main points in your introduction. Do not give background information about your subject or author. You have no room for it.
3. Assume that your reader has read the same material you have read, but do not assume that your reader understands the material. Explain all difficult points. Define all ambiguous terms.
4. The topics will be about problems, so write about problems. Do not merely rehash what your authors have said about the problems. Think for yourself. I do not urge beginners to consult secondary literature, since it is important that they learn to grapple with the problems on their own.
5. Argumentation is essential to philosophical writing. You argue when you give reasons for the claims which make up the point of your paper. Of course you cannot give reasons for your reasons, ad infinitum. You must employ premisses for which you have not argued. But in every case try to make these premisses ones with which an imaginary opponent could agree or against which, if he/she cannot agree to them, he/she can produce no destructive argument.
6. Do not assume your reader agrees with you. Argue to convince an imaginary opponent. Thus, rhetorical questions are out of place in a paper of this type.
7. Do not tackle too much. One point made well makes a better paper than several poorly made and or disconnected points.
8. Answer the obvious objections to your position. That is, state one or two of what you think are the strongest objections to your view, and explain why they do not carry any weight and why your position remains tenable.
9. Do not tuck your point away in a final paragraph. Spread it across the main body of the paper. It will not suffer from exposure if you have defended it well.
10. Papers take time. A quick job is often a poor one, no matter how full of inspiration you might feel. Generally, two separately-written out drafts will be needed before making the final draft. Your writing pad is your laboratory in this business. Read each draft over to see whether you would stand by it had someone other than yourself written it.
11. Clarity is a sine qua non of a passable paper. Without it the reader is unable to judge originality, argumentation, or organization. Look at each sentence you write with maximum possible detachment and ask "Does it say what it is supposed to say?" The reader will not attempt to guess what it was supposed to say if it is unclear. Ask yourself if the key words in your discussion do any more than stand in for ideas you do not really have yet. In short, tie down the meanings of key words.
12. Papers with more than three spelling errors or grammatical errors will have fifteen points deducted from their totals. This means you can have at most one spelling error and two grammatical errors, for example. If you cannot ascertain whether your writing is grammatically correct, get help early on. Proofread!!

page 2--GUIDELINES FOR WRITING PAPERS

13. Document your claims about what the authors you refer to hold. Be certain you refer to the appropriate text. Papers that do not clearly demonstrate that the student has done the reading and not merely relied on class notes will receive a grade of no higher than "65".
14. Write a brief conclusion in which you summarize what you think you have shown.
15. Don't get up-tight before or during writing a paper. Try to write to find things for yourself. After all, if you don't like your first draft, you can always revise it.
16. Before sitting down to make the final draft of a paper, reread 1 - 15.

Marge Ragona
TH299
Dr. Katz

Homework Assignment 2

1. Romans were those acculturated into the Roman Empire and in possession of what remained of the Graeco-Roman civilization at that time. While they may not have been literally Roman, i.e. citizens of Rome, they were thoroughly enculturated and Romanized dwellers in the ecumene/Roman hegemony around the Mediterranean.

Barbarians, on the other hand, were those members of -- in this case -- Germanic tribes, particularly Huns and Goths, who were the invaders of Rome, bringing with them a far less developed civilization (basically still at the pastoral/warrior stage) (pastoral in the historic rather than theological sense!) and ethos.

An interesting historical sidelight is that history repeats itself endlessly. The Roman move from warrior to settled acriculture and the attendant rise in population prompted the spread of Rome into neighboring areas and gave rise to the Roman Empire. Likewise, the Germanic tribes' movement to settled agriculture and its attendant rise in population prompted their movement southward and eventually brought to a close the Roman Empire.

Obviously, a Barbarian could become a Roman by adopting Roman culture and citizenship, but few Romans (except merchants who by so doing made a bundle) would choose to journey the other way. Yet, the barbarization of Rome did occur, and because it did, it facilitated the crossing into the Rhineland and Western Europe thus allowing for the spread of Christianity and Graeco-Roman learning.

nicely put

2. Porphyry's 3 questions, according to Ragona, were:

- A. Do genera and species exist on their own in reality or are they a mental construct?
- B. If they exist, do they actually exist in any single corporeal being? (Are they corporeal or incorporeal?) (Porphyry: They subsist in sensibles but are understood without bodies.)
- C. Are they present in individuals or are they merely a means of making a particular quality understandable in a sense general to all things in a particular category. (Porphyry: When it is in individuals it is made sensible, when in universals it is made intelligible.)

What I think Porphyry is asking is essentially does a quality which is general to all things in a particular category exist in that same way in the individuals in that category or is it merely an abstract way of describing how all of the individuals in a particular category have some specific characteristic, quality or group of characteristics which can be universalized from that quality to all members of that category.

3. Gregory of Tours saw history not necessarily as a chronicle of happenings to be analyzed and supported by documents, but rather his view of history was that all history was salvation history, and everything he wrote had a practical purpose, i.e. the purpose of making people better human beings. He had other practical reasons for writing Dialogues; for example, his Dialogues were written to popularize monasticism.

Gregory's "histories" are a trip! They probably fall more readily into the genre of hagiography (holy writings) than history. Most hagiography would be devoted to writing Saints' biographies.

On the other hand, do not discount Gregory. His correspondence is one of the richest first sources of information about the Middle Ages, but this was unintentional on his part.

a little glib,
but ok

4. The significance of Clovis' conversion was occasioned by the fact that not only was Clovis converted, but so were all of his lieutenants and principal followers. However superficial the conversion was, it brought to the Franks not only churches and monasteries, but literacy and a general Romanization (to a great extent) and initiation into Christian civilization. (See answer to Question 1.)

With Clovis firmly in the Christian camp, the beginning of the Germano-Roman amalgam which became Western Civilization was underway.

also he was never an Arian, but
became a Catholic straight off

~~20~~ 24

You should give your sources whenever they
are easily identifiable

The Commission on the Status of Women, established in 1946, was the first
of its kind to deal with the status of women, and in 1948 it was
the first to recommend that women should be treated as equals with men,
and to recommend that women should be given the same rights as men in
the field of education, employment, and pay. The Commission also
recommended that women should be given the same rights as men in
the field of political participation, and that women should be given
the same rights as men in the field of social and economic life.
The Commission's recommendations were adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations in 1948, and have since been the basis for
the work of the United Nations on the status of women.

Also he was very active in
the United Nations.

54

You should give your sources references that
are easily accessible.

93

Ragona, Mid-Term
Th 299
Dr. Katz1. 9
4. 7
5. 9
6. 9
7. 9
8. 10

MIDTERM EXAMINATION

1. This answer makes a great deal more sense if it begins with a quotation from Martin Buber: "There are two, and in the end only two types of faith...the one from the fact that I trust someone, without being able to offer sufficient reasons for my trust in him; the other from the fact that, likewise, without being able to give a sufficient reason, I acknowledge a thing to be true." Judaism and Protestantism are more closely allied to the first; Catholic Christianity, with the blending of Judeo-Christian elements with Greek philosophic elements is more like the second.

The cosmology of the Jews, in which an anthropomorphic^{God} creates a world out of chaos, creating the earth, heavens, the seas, etc. is uncomfortably paired with the Greek philosophic constructs which bring into Christianity the problems inherent in the Greek dualism. In the Judeo-Christian Scriptures, God creates everything, and it is all good. Carried to the extremes to which Gnosticism carried it, the implications were that there was not a supreme single God, since the God of the Old Testament was inferior to the God of the new, revealed in Jesus Christ. This God of the Old Testament is a Demiurge who for some made the independent and original principle of evil. Matter was evil and therefore no good God would have created matter, hence, the O.T. God had to have been less good than the N.T. God. While not all the Greeks would have put it quite that way, there was enough of the dualism^{present} for the early Church fathers to have spent many years answering the Gnostics and trying to divide out the purely Christian from the Platonic/Pythagorean elements. One of the more constant choruses is that the existence of God can be proven. No Jew would have thought in those terms. The

existence of God was a given, and man had only to turn to him ("Return to me and I will return to thee.") Origen, for example, gets himself into exceedingly hot water when he attempts to reconcile Platonism with Christianity. He holds that God, who is purely spiritual, created the world from eternity and by a necessity of his nature. God is the creator of matter, and evil is a privation of good, therefore God does not create evil. The Logos is the creator acting as mediator of God and creatures. The Logos proceeds from God and the Holy Spirit from the Logos, and then all sorts of created spirits, who through the Holy Spirit are lifted up to become sons of God in union with the Son/Logos and finally with the Father.

how does this follow from the preceding sentence?

For a Protestant this is strange language, but does demonstrate the kinds of attempts made to blend the two radically different thought systems.

Most of the early Mediaeval philosophers borrowed from Plato, and many contended that Plato was ^{define} pre-Christian and even got his ideas from the Hebrew Scriptures.

Gregory of Nyssa blends them in this way: The cosmic order proves the existence of God; God must have a Logos, a word, a reason because man has a reason, a word. The Logos is one in nature with the Father because there is One God and the distinction is a distinction of relation.

All of the philosophers have to deal with the fact that if God created everything, where does evil come from? Gregory says God created the world out of ~~an~~ abundance of goodness and love, in order that there might be creatures who could participate in the divine goodness. God did not create the world out of necessity, but freely. A share in this ~~freedom~~ God has given to man, and God respects this freedom, permitting man to choose evil if he wills. Evil is the result of man's free choice and God is not responsible. God foresaw evil and permitted it.

And in spite of this foreknowledge, went ahead and created man, knowing that eventually man would be restored to God, as would all things, including the fallen angels. (Wherever they came from!!)

For all of them, it seems that the major problem is the creation of evil and man's free will. Centuries would be spent attempting to resolve these problems, and any philosopher of religion, even today, could produce an arguable article on these two problems.

It was indeed just this kind of thinking which led Protestants to the cry of "sola scriptura" some centuries later, and a return to a more Judaic way of relating to God.

This answer is nicely reflective, however, it is not always clear (to me) that it answers the question asked. I appreciate the synthesis you are drawing, yet ~~for~~ ~~too~~ it may be ^{contrasts} at the expense of being more precise about philosophical problems.

4. Augustine's theory of illumination says that we cannot perceive the truth of things unless they are illuminated as by a sun. This divine light which illuminates the mind comes from God. The human mind is temporal and changeable, what is immutable and eternal transcends it and is incomprehensible, unless illuminated by God. Divine ideas are too high (in Augustine's hierarchy) and cannot be grasped by the soul itself. To get knowledge, the soul needs God's help. If the soul has knowledge, it cannot come from the soul by itself, but the soul does have knowledge. The knowledge comes from something other than the soul working on its own. (If you don't know what you are looking for, you will not find it!), therefore the object of knowledge must be in the person latently. Jesus, the true teacher within you, provides the illumination.

For Augustine, the Christian elements in illumination relate to his need to understand how man obtains revelation, truths which are necessary, immutable, and eternal; or, how does the soul operate? Also, these truths proved God's existence, and that was important to Augustine, since it led the soul Godward. But the philosophy of knowledge was important also, and the relation of sense-experience (and reflection thereon) coupled with the question of how we attain knowledge which is not sense oriented, but rather normative and comparative ideas. Augustine uses Beauty as an example. How does the mind understand more beautiful or less beautiful? How does the mind appreciate the greater or less approximation to a changeless standard? So, in effect, this is a question of epistemology, in philosophic terms, and Augustine uses epistemological tools to try to understand this special kind of knowledge.

your answer is basically all right, but it smacks of being "too quick": you need to step back and fill in more connections

exactly how high
are they? what
is meant by
'high'?

explain

are not
illumination
distinct?

5. Augustine's hierarchy (in Neoplatonic terms) says that in creation there are beings arranged in hierarchical order downward from God.

There are: The One (Good, Just, Being)
 Angels
 Human souls
 The physical world (including human bodies)
 Devils/demons

All causality runs downward. God, angels, etc. can affect human souls and the soul can affect the body. The causality does not run upward. The devil (for example) cannot make you do it! *be more pedestrian and explain the connection*

Augustine says that moral perfection consists in loving God and if this is so, then evil will consist in turning away from God. Moral evil cannot be something positive in the sense of being something created by God, because the Good cannot create evil. The cause of moral evil is not the Creator but the created will, which turns away from the Good. But evil is not a "thing", since this word (to Augustine) implies a positive reality, and if it were a positive reality it would have to have been created by the Creator, (and the creature cannot create out of nothing) so evil must be non-being ... "It tends to make that which is cease to be." The will is good, but the privation of right order, for which the human agent is responsible, is evil. Moral evil is thus a privation of right order in the created will.

In some senses this is adequate: If, for example, someone were deprived of moral training and because of this did evil, the evil would be caused by privation. If a quality of good, like nurturance, were absent, and the child thus deprived of nurturance did wrong because the child perceived a need, would this not fit Augustine's hierarchy? In that case, one might posit that the soul had a hunger which the body was trying to fill, and evil resulted.

good, but explain how it think this makes sense.

On the other hand, Augustine's hierarchy is in trouble, because if the causality only goes one way, how does he account for lust, rape, and gluttony not to mention common physical laziness, all of which are the body invading the human soul and causing it problems. *can the soul not choose lust or its own?*

I like the idea of evil being privation, but I think the hierarchy has some problems. (And I still don't understand where they got the angels, which are everpresent, nor do I understand what power angels have over the soul, but then I am not in the mediaeval mind set and not Catholic, so angels are a closed issue to me.) I don't think the devil can make you do it, and I do think that evil is based, most of the time, on bad choices which one has some control over, so I think Augustine had some very good points. We do not order things aright, we get our priorities out of order and that indeed is evil, looked at in the Augustinian view. *only that which they choose to exercise*
good summary

6. Boethius improves on Augustine's solution to the problem of foreknowledge and free will by proposing that there is no foreknowledge on the part of God.

The problem prior to Boethius was that if God foreknew, there was no free will. What God knew was to happen would happen. Therefore, if it would happen, man was not free. Augustine said, Yes, but God didn't cause it.

In the Consolation, Lady Philosophy (who, of course, knows everything) *free her* proposes that God knows in God's own special way. (This is an Aristotelian epistemological principle: What is known, is known according to the mode of the knower.)

To get to this point Boethius sets out an inconsistent Tetrad:

1. What must be the case is not subject to free will.
2. What God knows must be.
3. God is omiscient; God knows our future actions.
4. Our future actions are free. (the inconsistent point)

well, he does not do it quite this way

Boethius points out that causality has nothing to do with the truth of the statement, the problem is that it is foreknowledge that doesn't exist. *is this too strong?* Augustine would argue that foreknowledge has nothing to do with it, but Boethius says he is wrong. The problem stems from the nature of knowledge, not futurity. For God, time is on a par; past, present, future. God knows them all in an instant. Boethius has a hierarchy of knowledge, which begins with sensory knowledge in the present moment; goes to imagination, where there can be remembrance of sensation, the sensation may be fictitious, or imagined; then to reason, which grasps universal essences, and finally to intelligence which grasps pure form itself, or the divine idea. God's ^{wisdom} knowledge is by intelligence and is eternal. Eternity is the "complete, simultaneous and everlasting possession of everlasting life. (God knows everything all at once, but God does not have foreknowledge.) Boethius does not believe in predestination.

the points you make in this paragraph need clarification

God sees the thing as it happens, in an eternal present, but some of the happenings are the result of free will, the others from necessity. And you have the freedom to change and alter your will, but God will still see that and know that that's what you are doing, have done, will do. Man's freedom is inviolate because the will is free of all necessity. God is not immutable (to Boethius) and prayer is not in vain. And Lady Philosophy concludes, "A great necessity is laid upon you, if you will be honest with yourself, a necessity to be good, since you live in the sight of a judge who sees all things." (And wouldn't dream of stopping you from making a fool of yourself, but sees you while you do it.) *he he again*

good, but you could
have spoken a bit
of popular
poetry too

Ragona - Question 7
TH299
Dr. Katz

Early ~~m~~diaeval culture can be thought of as monastic culture because most of what we would define as "intellectual life" went on in the monasteries during those centuries.

Whatever educating, learning, writing, and scholarship in general that was going on in Europe during the early Middle Ages, particularly after the decline of Rome, was going on particularly in the monasteries of Western Europe, England, and Ireland -- with a great many of the extant writings coming from what is now France, Italy and Germany.

Lt it not be assumed that in the early Middle Ages the quality of scholarship was of an exceeding high order, except where the Roman model was still apparent. Rather, in many places, education was on a very rudimentary level and was intended primarily for the monks and secular clerks of the area. Under Charlemagne particularly, children were included. The education was such that the bishops, older monks, and priests had to give (although many of the priests were not particularly well educated). If they had little to give, little was gotten.

If culture is assumed to be poetry, music, the folk literature of any people, philosophy, history and the like, then the monasteries were indeed the very places to keep those alive. All of the primary sources which are being used in this course date from monastic circles which kept alive Greek philosophy, used Latin models for its histories and sagas, followed Roman historical methods, and except for the expected religious works, were the conservators of the culture which had gone before.

With Alcuin and the Carolingians, scriptoria would be begun in many monasteries, thus allowing for whatever spread of learning would occur, and the cathedral schools would promote further intellectual life, but until then, the monasteries of the early Middle Ages were the seat of learning.

good

8. The problem with universals is the question of whether they exist at all. Using Porphyry's 3 questions we begin:

1. Do universals subsist in reality or only in the mind?
2. If they exist, are they material or immaterial, corporeal or noncorporeal?
3. Are universals separate from real objects; that is do they really occur in objects or are they abstractions.

Following Copleston's logic, we see and touch particular things but cannot help thinking in general terms. I touch this tree. If I know its genus and species, I think "pretty tree, elm probably." This is not the only tree of its type. There are others and I can conceive of many trees having the same type of bark, with the same type of leaves and same configuration of branching and I can extrapolate, "Trees, elms." I can see the individual trees, know they are not the same tree, but seeing their characteristics I can generalize. Does elmness occur in any one tree or is it a construct I use to classify trees to make them understandable? And yes, there is a group of characteristics which occur in enough "elms" for me to say that this tree fits the category elm because it has those characteristics.

*note way
of setting it
up.*

Theologically, the question of original sin gets attached to this kind of questioning. Man is a substantial unity of many objects. We can classify human beings as Man. Homo sapiens. We share the same "substance." God does not invent a new substance every time a new child is born. That child partakes of the universal substance, Man. And if it does, it is stuck with original sin given to it at generation, and that what God has created is simply a new being out of an already existing substance.

Also, the question of the Trinity is answered in this. The "substance" God exists, but it does not exist corporeally, except as a construct in our minds. We do not have to invent a new substance, a new God, for Jesus and the Holy Spirit. They all share the one nature, a nature which is numerically

One. (This problem Anselm deals with.) A universal can be merely a word which conveys the meaning -- i.e. Trinity or God and we universalize a concept utilizing that word, understanding it to mean the quality which we have extrapolated from all things of that kind. We extrapolate Godness from Jesus, from the Father, from the Holy Spirit. They share that universal which we think of as Godness, and it is not a different godness for each of them but the same One Godness. Therefore, we think of them as One God. (I think.) At least, it is my understanding of what they are trying to do.) Since Godness is an intellectual construct, we can conceive of all three persons as "images" ^(persons) (Boethius) and they cannot be plural, because for Boethius, plurality implies otherness, and they are not other, they are the same. (Is this the homoousion/homoiousion problem? I think so. Are they the same substance or like substance? For Boethius they are the same substance and an implied Oneness is there because they share that one substance.)

At any rate, Porphyry's question of universals is attached to original sin~~g~~ and to questions on the Trinity and an attempt is made to understand both using his categories.

*answer represents
this is a good job at ~~and~~ giving
an independent answer*

Chapter 52:

Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Illumination

Please read Volume 2, Text 19, below. This passage is from Scotus' *Ordinatio*, Book I, distinction 3, question 4. The *Ordinatio* is Scotus' Oxford commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. This is *not* the same as Scotus' Paris commentary. (He commented on the *Sentences* more than once.) The Oxford commentary is revised by *Scotus' own hand* for publication. That's what the word '*ordinatio*' means in this context. Publication in this case, of course, meant sending it off to the scribes to be copied out by hand. The printing press was still quite a long way off.

Given our discussion in Chapter 51, we ought now to be in a position to understand what Scotus' question is about (Text 19, lines 1-4):

... whether any certain and pure truth can be *naturally* known by the understanding of [someone] *in this life* without a *special* illumination from the *uncreated* light?

I have italicized the key words in this statement of the question. The term 'special illumination' refers to Bonaventure's distinction between general and special influences. (See Chapter 51.) The phrase 'certain and pure truth' translates the Latin '*certa et sincera veritas*'. '*Certa*' (= "certain") is a word with Arabic overtones. The Latin translations of the Arabs frequently spoke of the 'certitude' of a thing. This is literally "certitude" or "certainty", but it would be quite wrong to think of it in a predominately epistemological sense. The "certitude" of a thing was its fixity, its definiteness - in short, its essence or nature. We still retain traces of this usage in English when we speak of a "certain person". We *don't* mean "one who has made up his mind". Rather we mean a fixed or definite person. In the present context, 'certain truth' does not mean truth we can be sure of, but rather *a fixed or definite or immutable* truth. (The word '*sincera*', on the other hand, is of Augustinian lineage.)

A Survey of Mediaeval Philosophy

Now, after setting out the preliminary arguments (we have the *quaestio*-form here - see, for example, Chapter 35 above), Scotus reviews the opinion of one Henry of Ghent. Henry of Ghent was an important philosopher. Much of Scotus' doctrine is set in the context of what Henry had to say. Henry was a "secular" master (that is, he was not one of the "regular" clergy - see Chapter 33 above), and taught at the University of Paris from 1276 to 1292. (Once again, a non-Frenchman.) Scotus' summary of Henry's view is quite a fair account of it, so we don't have to look at Henry's text separately, at least not for present purposes. Here is how Henry's view went:

Recall how Augustine had said that the term 'man' signified only the *soul*, but with a kind of oblique reference to its governing and ruling a *body* (Chapter 14 above). So too, Henry thinks, with the terms 'being' and 'true'. They are what had come to be known as *transcendental* terms. That is, they have the broadest possible application, and are truly predicable of everything whatever. Hence, they cut across all the Aristotelian categories, "transcend" them in this sense. If there were such a thing as a super-genus, including all the categories, these terms would belong there. The theory of the "transcendentals" was part of the common coin of the philosophical realm by Henry's day, although of course different people would be likely to develop the theory in different ways. 'Being', of course, is a transcendental term, but most people also included 'true', 'good', 'one', and perhaps some others. Note that, in view of our discussion of Augustine and the neo-Platonists, the "equivalence" of 'being', 'one', and 'good' is by no means something to be taken for granted. The development of this peculiar theory of the transcendentals is part of the Augustinian heritage of the Middle Ages. Just how you fit 'true' into the picture is not obvious at first. Here is how Henry does it.

'True', Henry says, is predicated of exactly the same things as 'being' is. But 'true' in addition makes a kind of oblique reference to the thing's *conformity to an exemplar* (lines 60-61), just as for Augustine 'man' makes a kind of oblique reference to the *body* that the soul governs and rules. This "conformity to an exemplar" is connected with the ontological/ethical notion of truth, part of the Augustinian "complex". (See Chapter 49 above.) It goes back at least to Anselm, if not before.

In a sense, what Henry has is a kind of "correspondence"-theory of truth. But it is broader than what we usually mean by that phrase. We usually have in mind the correspondence between our thoughts or our judgments or sentences and some external reality or fact. Here, however, we have *any* kind of correspondence between a thing and its exemplar. The particular case in which we have a correspondence between our *thoughts* or *statements* and a reality they are supposed to be patterned after is just that - a particular case.

Illumination: Henry of Ghent, Scotus

Now it is possible in theory to know *the true* (that is, *what* is true, the thing that is true because it conforms to an exemplar), without knowing *its truth* (that is, without knowing its conformity, or knowing *that* it conforms, to an exemplar).

Henry thinks this is not just possible in theory. It is also obvious in practice, if we just consider the acts of the mind. In concept formation, for instance - what Henry calls "simple apprehension" (the terminology here is quite standard - simple apprehension is "simple" as opposed to what happens when we put concepts together into judgments, or "complexes") - it is possible for us to grasp *what* is true, the thing that is true. But *its truth* is grasped only in *judgment*, only when we *compare*. And of course we can form concepts without making judgments with them. (Lines 63-67.)

Now the intellect, Henry thinks, can know or understand *the true* - that is, *what* is true - by simple apprehension, by its *unaided natural powers* (lines 68-70). But those powers are *not* enough for knowing *its truth* - that is, its *certain and pure truth* (recall Scotus' formulation of his question), infallible and unshakeable truth.

Truth, we said, is conformity to an exemplar. But there are two kinds of exemplars involved in knowledge (lines 78-84):

(a) The *created* exemplar. That is, the concept in our mind, caused (at least in part) by the external thing. It is this that we form by simple apprehension. The conformity of the object to *this* exemplar is *one* kind of truth. Let us call it "first truth". (Note: This is *not* conformity to a *judgment*. Note also: Why doesn't it go the other way? Why doesn't Henry think of the *concept* as conforming to an *exemplary reality*? That would seem more natural. Then we would speak of the *concept* as being true or false according as it does or does not succeed in conforming to its object. As it stands, it is the *object* that is said to be true or not insofar as it does or does not conform to our *concept* of it. I do not know the explanation for this.)

(b) The *uncreated* exemplar. That is, the divine idea. Conformity to this amounts to another kind of truth. Let us call this one "second truth". (Since *every* real object is patterned after some divine idea or other, it seems to follow therefore that *every* object is a true something or other - by "second truth". The terminology of "first" and "second truth" is mine, not Henry's.)

Hence the picture we get is this:

There is a certain amount of truth in what is said in the first paragraph. It is true that the world is a very large place, and that there are many different kinds of people living in it. But it is also true that there are many things that we can learn about the world by studying its history.

History is the study of the past. It is the study of the events that have happened in the world, and of the people who have lived in it. History is a very important subject, because it helps us to understand the world that we live in. It helps us to see how things have changed over time, and it helps us to see how we have come to be the people that we are today.

History is also a very interesting subject. It is full of stories of great men and women, of great battles and of great discoveries. It is a subject that can fascinate us for hours, and it is a subject that can help us to become better people.

There are many different ways to study history. Some people like to read books about history, while others like to look at pictures or to visit museums. No matter how you study history, it is a subject that is worth studying.

The world is a very large place, and there are many different kinds of people living in it. But it is also true that there are many things that we can learn about the world by studying its history. History is the study of the past, and it is a very important subject because it helps us to understand the world that we live in. It helps us to see how things have changed over time, and it helps us to see how we have come to be the people that we are today.

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A Survey of Mediaeval Philosophy




Fig. 52-1: Henry of Ghent's Theory of Illumination

Why do we need the third side of this triangle - illumination? Well, Henry thinks, we can at least know first truth (and not just *the true* - see above) by our unaided powers. We can, in other words, tell whether an object conforms to our concept of it all by ourselves. But our unaided powers are *not* enough to give us an *infallible truth* - a *certain and pure* truth. (Here is the familiar Augustinian exalted notion of truth.) Why not? There are three reasons:

(a) (lines 97-101). The created and therefore mutable object cannot cause an immutable and unshakable concept (exemplar). But we can only be *certain* that something is true in virtue of some *immutable* reason. In short, the mutable cannot cause the immutable.

(b) (lines 105-110). The soul itself is creaturely and mutable. We forget, change our minds, and so on. And the *concept* is even more flimsy than the soul itself. Therefore, the concept, the created exemplar, cannot *correct* the mind, cannot provide a basis for firm knowledge and unshakable truth.

(c) (lines 113-118). The created exemplar (the concept) is not by itself enough to enable us to distinguish real truth from mere appearance. I'm not entirely confident I understand this point. It seems to imply that the truth we *can* get through the created exemplar (first truth) is merely *phenomenal truth* ("such and such *appears* to me"). This sounds rather weaker than what we were led to believe earlier, when we were told that our unaided minds were sufficient to grasp the conformity of the object to our concept of it. Henry gives the example of *dreams*. In short, he seems now to be saying that by our unaided powers we can only be sure that it *appears* that *x* is white, but not that *x* is white.

Illumination: Henry of Ghent, Scotus

For all the difficulties involved here, you begin to see how epistemological and skeptical problems were starting to worry people at this time. This is the sort of thing that led to the Cartesian and Kantian emphasis on knowledge. (See Chapter 50 above.)

For these three reasons, therefore, Henry thinks that infallible knowledge requires a different exemplar - the *uncreated* exemplar, the divine idea (lines 126-131). How does it work? Well, let's see.

Contrary to Bonaventure, Henry does *not* think that we see the divine exemplar as an object. We do not catch a direct glimpse (even an obscure one) of the divine ideas in this life. Rather we see objects *in the light of* the divine exemplars, as we see things in the reflected light of the sun (lines 132-147). This of course is just the second view that Bonaventure considered. For Henry, the "influence" involved here is not just a case of the *general* cooperation of God with his creation; it is a *special* influence, supernatural. It is an "actualizing light" - that is, it triggers the mind, turns it on. It is an "altering species" - that is, it shapes the created exemplar in our mind. It is a "configuring stamp" - a kind of epistemological branding iron. (I must admit, the last one is a little mysterious. The allusion of course is to the familiar seal-ring metaphor.)

For *perfect* knowledge, both the created and the uncreated exemplars are needed.

Now Scotus does not say so in his report of Henry's view, but in fact Henry goes on to claim that this light is *open to all*, but is not given to us as a *right*. If it were not open to all, then we get problems about how infidels can have knowledge. For Henry, this light has nothing to do with *merit*. But neither do we have any *right* to demand it. It is not ours *by nature*; we have no claim to it. The fact that God distributes his illumination equally to all (or if not exactly *equally*, at least we all get *some* of it) is not a matter of nature. It just turns out that this is the way God wants to do it.

If you push it, of course, this might seem to lead straight to skepticism. If we don't have any kind of right to this illumination, if it is not ours by nature, then how can we ever be sure we are getting it at any given moment?

I am by no means an expert on Henry of Ghent, so there are many aspects of this theory I am not quite sure how to interpret. Nevertheless, insofar as I understand it, the real difficulties with the theory arise over Henry's reasons (a)-(c) why we need the uncreated exemplar. If we ignore Henry's actual reasons (a)-(c) for a moment, I think we can motivate the rest of the theory by thinking of it like this:

Consider how we do science. We gather information about how, for instance, balls behave when they roll across a billiard table. We observe how gases behave when compressed in various ways. And so on. No doubt we observe all this and store that information away in the various concepts produced by

A Survey of Mediaeval Philosophy

those observations, the "created exemplars" as Henry says. And, just as Henry says, we are quite capable, by our own natural powers, of checking all this and making dead sure that the objects conform to our concepts, that we have accurately pictured the facts of the matter. But that's not the whole story. In order to do serious science, in order to discover the scientific *laws* that govern the behavior of these objects, we must do something else. We have to *idealize*. The laws that govern the physical world are laws that appeal to things like perfectly elastic bodies, frictionless surfaces, ideal gases. The actual billiard balls we observe are only *approximations* of those perfectly elastic bodies, the billiard table is not quite a frictionless surface, and the gases we compress don't really measure up to the behavior of ideal gases. Nevertheless, it really is true that the best way to understand the behavior of those *real* physical objects is to view them "in the light of" *other* things that they are *not* - namely, idealized, "perfect" versions of themselves. We never get to observe any of those perfectly elastic bodies, frictionless surfaces or ideal gases, of course. We don't even get a "glimpse" of them. And yet the whole of physical nature *refers* to them, *appeals* to them. Everything we really observe is just crying out to be viewed against the background of those ideal objects we don't really observe. And we don't really understand what we do observe, we don't know the laws that govern it, until we come to think in those terms. Those unseen ideal objects serve as an "actualizing light"; they trigger our mind to see the relevant patterns. They are "altering species"; the concept of the billiard ball itself is somehow altered once I come to think of the ball as an *approximation* of a perfectly elastic body. (I confess I don't know quite what to do here with Henry's third phrase, 'configuring stamp'.)

Now of course Henry of Ghent was not thinking in terms of ideal gases and frictionless surfaces. People just didn't do science in this idealized way in his day. But nevertheless, I think his theory of illumination can be viewed in very much the same terms. We can of course record the *facts* we observe in the world around us, and we can check and double-check to make sure those facts conform to the ideas we have of them. In short, we can get at the so called "first truth". But we don't *really* understand those facts, we don't really understand the immutable laws that govern them, we can't get at "second truth", until we come to understand the *patterns* in accordance with which these facts are fashioned - and that of course is a matter involving the divine Ideas. (Remember Bonaventure's fondness for number symbolism, and his view that theological truths are found reflected in all the *arts*? We are now in a position to see how this kind of symbolism has a theoretical basis, and is not necessarily just a matter of arbitrariness and "anything goes" caprice. If the whole world is patterned after the divine Ideas, this kind of thing is just what we ought to expect.)

Illumination: Henry of Ghent, Scotus

If this interpretation is not entirely off the mark, then perhaps the best way to interpret Henry's three reasons - (a)-(c) above - why we need an *uncreated* exemplar for certain and pure truth is along these lines. Where Henry talks about "immutability" and "unshakable" concepts, let us just read 'lawlike'. (This still leaves reason (c), however, which I continue to find puzzling.)

Notice that, on this interpretation, the skepticism that I said might seem to be threatening, once Henry said that illumination was not something we have by right or by nature, is really not a threat at all. Our human nature does not *guarantee* that everyone will have the peculiar ability to see the ideal patterns behind the far-from-ideal realities around us. But so what? That's no basis for skepticism, any more than the fact that not everyone is a talented scientist is a basis for skepticism.

On this interpretation, the reasons Henry himself actually gives for why illumination is necessary are rather off the mark. He speaks of immutability and unshakable certainty. But, as we have come to view it, all that is really involved is *lawlikeness*.

In any case, it is on the basis of exactly the three reasons Henry gives - (a)-(c) - that Duns Scotus questions Henry's theory, and finds it wanting. On the basis of the reasons Henry actually gives, Scotus thinks, illumination does not *guarantee* our natural knowledge; on the contrary, it in effect makes it *impossible*.

If the *created* exemplar is insufficient for knowledge, illumination from an *uncreated* exemplar is not going to help one bit - at least not if problems (a)-(c) are the ones we're concerned about.

Ad (a): (Lines 178-185) With respect to Henry's reason (a) above, if the object is so mutable, because it's a creature, then the unchanging light is not going to stop it; it's *still* a creature. There can simply be no "certitude" about such an object. It is not "certain". (See above on this term.) In fact, Scotus thinks there is enough stability in things to provide certainty, contrary to Henry. There is a *common nature* that provides *limits* to change (see Chapter 3 above, on Aristotle). But of course this means that, contrary to Henry, the *created* exemplar is enough after all to give us certainty. We don't need any divine illumination to give us a concept of that common nature; it's out there to be observed in the object itself.

Ad (b): (Lines 186-197) With respect to Henry's reason (b), if the *created* exemplar and the soul are so changeable, then *nothing* in the soul is going to rectify this: "... since whatever is put in the soul as in a subject is mutable, even the very act of understanding, it follows that *nothing* in the soul corrects the soul so that it not fall into error."

A Survey of Mediaeval Philosophy

Henry speaks of the *concurrence* of the created and the uncreated exemplar. But something changeable plus something unchangeable yields a sum that is changeable. That is, *mutability is contagious*. If any *part* of a whole is changeable, then the whole itself is changeable. How then can the divine idea in any sense concur with our changeable mind to yield an unchangeable result?

Notice that, as long as Henry continues to speak in terms of *mutability*, Scotus appears to have him. Not even a divine influence is going to make a mutable creature immutable. Mutability is *the mark of a creature*; immutability is reserved for God alone. This applies to creaturely minds as well as to creaturely concepts and creaturely knowledge. On the interpretation I have suggested above, what we really need here is not *mutability*, but *lawlikeness*. Scotus has not said anything that addresses *this* point.

Ad (c): With respect to Henry's reason (c), Scotus says (lines 198-203):

... if the species abstracted from the thing concurs in every knowledge, and [if] it cannot be judged when it represents itself as itself and when [it represents] itself as the object, therefore, whatever else concurs, no certitude can be had through which the true might be distinguished from the apparently true.

In short, Scotus thinks all Henry's reasons simply aren't going to work. On the contrary, he thinks it is possible to have quite *natural* certitude. That is, we don't need any special illumination in order to be certain of our facts. In particular, we can have this natural certitude in four kinds of cases (lines 256-260):

(1) In the case of *self-evident* propositions and the conclusions drawn from them by strict logic. 'Self-evident' (literally, "known through themselves") should here be taken in the Aristotelian sense: such truths can be known to be true by anyone who has the requisite concepts. (That is not to say that everyone *does* have the requisite concepts. 'Self-evident' does not imply "universally agreed upon", but it does imply that no one "*dis-agrees*".) For instance, whoever has the concept of a whole and the concept of a part sees at once that the whole is greater than the part. We don't need any special illumination for this, Scotus thinks. (Lines 286-363.)

(2) "Experiential" knowledge of *general* truths. Scotus gives a curious and, in my opinion, ultimately unsatisfactory discussion of something like the Principle of Induction. Take a look at it. (Lines 364-423.)

Illumination: Henry of Ghent, Scotus

(3) Our own actions - that is, our internal mental states. Recall Augustine, in Chapter 13 above, and compare Avicenna's famous *Suspended Man* passage, in Chapter 53 and Text 20 below. (Lines 424-469.)

(4) *Present* sensory knowledge. Here too, Scotus appeals to a kind of Principle of Induction. (Lines 470-523.)

The details of these need not concern us now. To Henry's three reasons for why the created exemplar isn't sufficient, and an uncreated exemplar is needed, Scotus replies:

Ad (a): (lines 528-574) The changing world has unchanging features in it - enough to ground quite certain knowledge. These unchanging features are found in *common natures*. (See Chapter 3 again.) We will talk more about Scotus on common natures later on.

Ad (b): (lines 575-592) As for the mutability of the soul, this notion can cover two quite different kinds of change: (i) From ignorance to knowledge or vice versa, in learning and forgetting. But *this* kind of change is going to be possible for *any* theory of knowledge. (ii) Change from error to correctness. Scotus *denies* that the soul is indeed mutable in this sense in the case of "evident" knowledge of the above four kinds. We simply cannot make a mistake about whether the whole is greater than the part, once we get the requisite concepts that go with those words. We cannot *be* in a state of *error* about that, and hence we cannot change from or to that state of error.

Ad (c), the claim that the created exemplar cannot distinguish between truth and falsehood. To this Scotus replies (lines 593-621): On Henry's view of the created exemplar, this is correct. For him, the exemplar is a kind of *image* - a *representation* from which you have to *infer* what is going on outside, what is causing it. Scotus is much more Aristotelian on this point. For him, the created exemplar is the *intelligible species*, and is *formally identical* with the object; there is no *inference* involved. (See Chapter 3, above.) Henry's argument (c) was the one with which I had the greatest difficulty to begin with, so that I do not pretend to be able to adjudicate between Henry and Scotus here.

In any event, by adopting the Aristotelian view that the intelligible species is formally identical with the object, and that no *inference* from the one to the other is needed, Scotus is of course leaving himself open to the standard Aristotelian problem: how to explain the fact that we can mistakes at all.

Here is the upshot of Scotus' argument. Illumination, as a special influence of the uncreated light, is not necessary, on the *correct* way of looking

Discussion Study of Class Issues

Of the two models - one is the "class" model and the other is the "status" model. The class model is based on the idea that there are two main groups in society: the rich and the poor. The status model is based on the idea that there are many different groups in society, each with its own status.

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A Survey of Mediaeval Philosophy

at things. And on the *erroneous* view - Henry's view (and others, for that matter) - according to which illumination is necessary, it is still insufficient. That is to say, the very grounds that led Henry and others to think that something like illumination is going to be needed for certain knowledge are also sufficient grounds to guarantee that illumination - and anything else, for that matter - will be insufficient. In short, they are *really* reasons for saying that we have no knowledge at all, which is a consequence Henry, like Scotus, will not accept.

Nevertheless, despite this rejection of Henry's theory of illumination, Scotus is willing to continue to talk about the need for something he calls illumination. But it turns out that this is only a case of what Bonaventure called the *general* influence or cooperation of God with his creatures. We *are* illumined, Scotus says. We *do* participate in the divine light. But we do this by our having our purely natural agent intellect. (For Scotus, each of us has his own private agent intellect.) That is sufficient, and that is all there is to it.

This was also the view held by Aquinas (see Chapter 51 above), and goes back at least to a certain John de la Rochelle (d. 1245).

After looking at the text of Scotus, you are perhaps utterly confused by all the jargon and technical fancy business. If so, that can't be helped. Recall how, a long time ago, I told you that we would gradually see philosophy become more and more technical and academic after about 1000. Well, here we are!

Some Texts for Aristotelian Epistemology. These texts will be discussed in the next section. I list them here for convenient reference.

(1) De anima, II, 12, 424a17-24: By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; we say that what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but its particular metallic constitution makes no difference: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding, but it is indifferent what in each case the substance is; what alone matters is what quality it has, i.e., in what ratio its constituents are combined.

(2) Ibid., III, 2, 425b26-31: The activity of the sensible object and that of the percipient sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains. Take as illustration actual sound and actual hearing: a man may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that which has a sound is not always sounding. But when that which can hear is actively hearing and that which can sound is sounding, then the actual hearing and the actual sound are merged in one (these one might call respectively hearkening and sounding).

(3) Ibid., III, 4, 429a12-17: If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.

(4) Ibid., III, 4, 429a18-25 (immediately after (3)): Therefore, since every thing is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body.

(5) Ibid., III, 4, 429b4: ... while the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from it.

(6) Ibid., III, 4, 429b21-22: To sum up, in so far as the realities it knows are capable of being separated from their matter, so it is also with the powers of the mind.

(7) Ibid., III, 5, 430a10-25: Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a cause which is productive in the sense

that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g., an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul. And in fact mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things; this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours. Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms). Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time. Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks.

(8) Ibid., III, 4, 429b5-10: Once the mind has become each set of its possible objects, as a man of science has, when this phrase is used of one who is actually a man of science (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind too is then able to think itself.

(All these passages use the Oxford translation.)

**P710 Thomas Aquinas
Some Aristotelian Texts on the
Soul**

(9) *De anima* II, 1, 413a3-7: From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts) - for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all.

(10) *De anima* II, 2, 413b24-29: We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers.

(11) *De anima* II, 2, 414a17-21: ... it is the soul which is the actuality of a certain kind of body. Hence the ~~existence~~ of the view that the soul cannot be without the body *right*

(12) *De anima* II, 1, 412b5: The soul is "the first grade of actuality of a natural organized body".

(13) *De anima* II, 1, 412a28-29: The soul is "the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it".

(14) *De anima* II, 1, 412a23 ff.: Now the word *actuality* has two senses, corresponding respectively to the *possession* of knowledge and the *actual exercise* of knowledge. It is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense, viz. that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed, and in the history of the individual, knowledge comes before its employment or exercise.

(15) *De anima* II, 1, 412b13-24: Suppose that what is literally an 'organ', like an axe, were a *natural* body, its 'essential whatness', would have been its essence, and so its soul; if this disappeared from it, it would have ceased to be an axe, except in name. As it is, it is just an axe; it wants the character which is required to make its whatness or formulable essence a soul; for that, it would have had to be a *natural* body of a particular kind, viz. one having *in itself* the power of setting itself in movement and arresting itself. Next apply this doctrine in the case of the 'parts' of the living body. Suppose that the eye were an animal - sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name.

PHIL THOMAS
SOME PRINCIPLES AND FACTS ON THE
SOUL

1. The soul is a spiritual entity, not a material one. It is immortal and cannot be destroyed. It is the seat of the mind and the source of the will. It is the principle of life and the source of the soul's power. It is the principle of the soul's unity and the source of the soul's identity. It is the principle of the soul's immortality and the source of the soul's eternal life.

2. The soul is a spiritual entity, not a material one. It is immortal and cannot be destroyed. It is the seat of the mind and the source of the will. It is the principle of life and the source of the soul's power. It is the principle of the soul's unity and the source of the soul's identity. It is the principle of the soul's immortality and the source of the soul's eternal life.

3. The soul is a spiritual entity, not a material one. It is immortal and cannot be destroyed. It is the seat of the mind and the source of the will. It is the principle of life and the source of the soul's power. It is the principle of the soul's unity and the source of the soul's identity. It is the principle of the soul's immortality and the source of the soul's eternal life.

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5. The soul is a spiritual entity, not a material one. It is immortal and cannot be destroyed. It is the seat of the mind and the source of the will. It is the principle of life and the source of the soul's power. It is the principle of the soul's unity and the source of the soul's identity. It is the principle of the soul's immortality and the source of the soul's eternal life.

6. The soul is a spiritual entity, not a material one. It is immortal and cannot be destroyed. It is the seat of the mind and the source of the will. It is the principle of life and the source of the soul's power. It is the principle of the soul's unity and the source of the soul's identity. It is the principle of the soul's immortality and the source of the soul's eternal life.

7. The soul is a spiritual entity, not a material one. It is immortal and cannot be destroyed. It is the seat of the mind and the source of the will. It is the principle of life and the source of the soul's power. It is the principle of the soul's unity and the source of the soul's identity. It is the principle of the soul's immortality and the source of the soul's eternal life.

Some Texts on the later doctrine of illumination:

From Bonaventure, Quaestio disputata de cognitionis humanae suprema ratione, in De humanae cognitionis ratione anecdota ... Sancti Bonaventurae, (Quarrachi, 1883) The following text is part of the responsio. (My translation):

In order to understand the above, note that when it is said that everything that is known (cognoscitur) with certainty is known in the light of the eternal reasons (rationes aeternae)¹, this can be understood in three ways:

(1) In one way, so that it is understood that for certain cognition the evidence of the eternal light concurs as the whole and sole reason for knowing (ratio cognoscendi). And this way of understanding it is less correct, insofar as, according to this way, there would be no cognition of things except in the Word. And then cognition in this life² would not differ from cognition in the next,³ nor cognition in the Word from cognition in a proper genus, nor cognition by science from cognition by wisdom, nor cognition by nature from cognition by grace, nor cognition by reason from cognition by revelation. Since all of these things are false, this interpretation is by no means tenable. For from the view which some people held, namely, that nothing can be known (cognoscitur) with certainty except in the archetypal and intelligible world - the first Academics were of this view - there is born the error, as Augustine says in Contra academicos, Book II, that one can know (scire) nothing whatever, as the new Academics posited, insofar as the intelligible world is hidden from human minds. And therefore, wanting to uphold the first supposition, they fell into manifest error. For a small mistake in the beginning is a big one in the end.⁴

(2) In another way, so that it is understood that for certain cognition there necessarily concurs an eternal reason as far as its influence is concerned, in such a way that the knower (cognoscens) does not in knowing (cognoscendo) attain to the eternal reason itself, but only to its influence. And this manner of speaking is not enough, according to the words of blessed Augustine, who shows by his explicit words and arguments that the mind in certain cognition has to be regulated by incommutable and eternal rules, not as if by a habit of the mind, but as by things that are above it in the eternal truth. And therefore to say that our mind in cognizing does not extend itself beyond the influence of the uncreated light is to say that Augustine was deceived, since it is not easy to controvert his authoritative texts to this sense. And this is quite an absurd thing to say about such a Father and Doctor, the most highly authoritative among all the expositors of Sacred Scripture.

Moreover, that influence is either a general one, insofar as God "flows in" to all creatures, or it is special, as God "flows in" by grace. If it is general,

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1. i.e., the divine ideas.
 2. literally, "on the way".
 3. literally, "in the homeland". This pair of terms is frequent.
 4. See Aristotle, De caelo I, 5, 271b6-13. A famous text, frequently cited - e.g., by Aquinas at the beginning of his prologue to On Being and Essence.

then God ought no more to be called the "giver of wisdom" than "giver of the earth's fertility". Neither would knowledge (scientia) be said to be from him any more than poverty is. If it is special, as it is in the case of grace, then according to this every cognition is infused⁵ and none is acquired or innate. All of which is absurd.

(3) And therefore there is a third way of understanding this, as it were holding the middle ground between the other two, namely, that for certain cognition there is necessarily required an eternal reason as a ruling and moving reason - not, to be sure, alone and in its complete clarity, but together with a created reason, and as "in part"⁶ contuited by us according to our status as wayfarers in this life.

And this is what Augustine suggests in De trinitate, XIV, Ch. 15: "The reprobate remembers, so that he turns to the Lord, as to that light by which he is touched in a certain manner even when he turns away from it. For hence it is that even the reprobate think of eternity, and rightly reprove and rightly praise many things among the affairs of men." A little later he adds that they do this by the rules which are written in the book of that light which is called truth.

5. "infused knowledge" is a technical term in mystical theology.

6. An allusion to I. Cor. 13:12: "Now we know in part ...".

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From John Peter Olivi (pronounced "Oh-LEE-vee"), Quaestiones de deo cognoscendo, B. jansen, ed., app. to vol. III, pp. 512f.:

These things, because I do not know how to explain them fully, I propose only as caveats. For, although the above position is in itself solem and sane, yet it can be very dangerous to those who do not carefully pay attention to these things. And so I hold the aforesaid position in itself, because it is the position of most distinguished men. But the explanation of the above problems I leave to their wisdom.

that the matter was to be called the "United States" case, given by the
court's decision. (United States v. Smith, 1911) He said he had been
very much surprised to find it in the case of Smith.
According to the court's decision in the case, the matter is decided by the
all of them in the case.

(2) And therefore there is a third way of understanding this, as it may be
the whole ground between the other two, namely, that the court's decision
is necessarily limited to the case as a whole and not to the whole of the
case, which was in the whole of the case. And therefore, the court's decision
was in the case, and therefore it was decided by the court in the case.

and this is what the court's decision is in the case. And therefore, the court's
decision, as that is the case in the case, as it is the case in the case
in a certain sense, even though it is not the case in the case. And therefore, the
court's decision is in the case, and therefore, the court's decision is in the case.
And therefore, the court's decision is in the case, and therefore, the court's
decision is in the case, and therefore, the court's decision is in the case.

1. "United States" is a historical term in the case, and therefore,
2. the court's decision is in the case, and therefore, the court's decision is in the case.

And therefore, the court's decision is in the case, and therefore, the court's
decision is in the case, and therefore, the court's decision is in the case.

And therefore, the court's decision is in the case, and therefore, the court's
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decision is in the case, and therefore, the court's decision is in the case.

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

THE literature on the middle ages is vast and written in many languages. We give here not a "bibliography" but merely a few titles of books in English, mostly one-volume works, which are readily available, readable, and sound in scholarship.

Some readers may feel the need of a survey or an interpretation of the early middle ages, from about the fifth century to the eleventh. Carl Stephenson, *A Brief Survey of Medieval Europe* (New York: Harper, 1941), will serve as a good start; it covers the whole middle ages. A masterly interpretation of the early period can be found in C. H. Dawson, *The Making of Europe* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1932). The articles on the "Middle Ages" by J. T. Shotwell in the eleventh and by F. M. Powicke in the fourteenth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* are extremely helpful.

On the significance of the middle ages for our own times, see especially *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, edited by C. G. Crump and E. F. Jacob (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), and *Mediaeval Contributions to Modern Civilisation*, edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw (London: Harrap, 1921).

For an interpretation of the later period, c. 1250 to c. 1450, two valuable books, whose titles reveal their themes, are Johan Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (London: Arnold, 1924), primarily cultural, and E. P. Cheney, *The Dawn of Modern Europe* (New York: Harper, 1936), social and economic in emphasis.

For special aspects of medieval civilization we suggest the following:

Society and economics: Eileen Power, *Medieval People* (London: Methuen, 1924); Joan Evans, *Life in Mediaeval France* (London: Oxford University Press, 1925); Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1925); Bede Jarrett, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages, 1200-1500* (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1926).

Feudalism and chivalry: Carl Stephenson, *Mediaeval Feudalism* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1942); Sidney Painter, *French Chivalry* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940).

Crusades and expansion: Ernest Barker, *The Crusades* (London: Oxford University Press, H. Milford, 1923); *Travel and Travellers in the Middle Ages*, edited by A. P. Newton (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner; New York: Knopf, 1926).

Religion: F. M. Powicke, *The Christian Life in the Middle Ages*, 1935; C. H. Dawson, *Mediaeval Religion* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1934); J. Evans, *Monastic Life at Cluny* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931); the extensive work of C. G. Coulton, *Five Centuries of Religion* (3 vols. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1923-1936), primarily a history of monasticism.

Intellectual life and the universities: The works of C. H. Haskins, especially *The Rise of the Universities* (New York: Holt, 1923), and *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927); the works of E. H. Gilson, especially *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, (New York: Scribner, 1938), and *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York: Scribner, 1936). The monumental works of George Sarton and Lynn Thorndike on

medieval science are primarily for reference. H. O. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind* (4th ed. London: Macmillan, 1927) studies both "thought and emotion" down through Dante.

For Latin poetry and poets, see the unique works of Helen Waddell, especially her *Mediaeval Latin Lyrics* (New York, Holt, 1938), containing both text and translation, to be used in connection with *The Wandering Scholars* (London: Constable, 1927). Her "novel," *Peter Abelard* (New York: Holt, 1933), based entirely on the sources, should not be missed.

The art and architecture of the middle ages can best be studied in photographs of monuments, which are now abundant, and in facsimile reproductions of medieval manuscripts. C. R. Morey, *Christian Art* (London, New York: Longmans, Green, 1935), and *Mediaeval Art* (New York: Norton, 1942), serve as excellent introductions. The eager student will wish to go to Emile Mâle, *Religious Art in France*, translated by D. Nussey (London: Dent, 1913). Henry Adams, *Mont Saint Michel and Chartres* (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1919), uses architecture as a gateway to the culture of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

On music, consult Gustave Reese, *Music in the Middle Ages* (New York: Norton, 1940), especially his "Record List" (pp. 465-79) of medieval music available in records.

Several recent "source books" in special fields or periods are available to readers who have acquired a taste for contemporary records: R. P. McKeon, *Selections from Medieval Philosophers* (2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1929); Lynn Thorndike, *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944); E. B. Holt, *The Literary Sources of Art History* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University

Press, 1947); and *Chaucer's World*, edited by Edith Rickert (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

The best manual for students who wish to penetrate more deeply is L. J. Paetow, *A Guide to the Study of Medieval History* (New York: Crofts, 1931). A historical atlas is indispensable; the one prepared by W. R. Shepherd is especially recommended.

Among the finest historical novels ever written is Sigrid Undset's *Kristin Lavransdatter* (New York: Knopf, 1929), a picture of medieval life in Norway. A recent novel by Sylvia Townsend Warner, *The Corner That Held Them* (New York: Viking, 1948), brings to life the régime of an English nunnery.



Chronological Table

1050-1500

LATER ELEVENTH CENTURY AND TWELFTH CENTURY

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

- 1050 *Height of Holy Roman Empire*
Henry III, 1039-56
Papal reform movement and investiture conflict
Pope Gregory VII, 1073-85 vs. Henry IV, 1056-1106
Expansion of Normans
Conquest of England, William I, 1066-87; conquest of Sicily, Roger, d. 1101

36

- 1100 *Rise of feudal monarchy*
Anglo-Norman: Henry I, 1100-1135
French: Louis VI, 1108-37, and Abbot Suger, d. 1151
Spanish: expansion of Leon, Castile, Aragon
Papacy and empire
Concordat of Worms, 1122

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

← Feudalism →

← First Crusade, 1095 →

← Rise of communes →

Reclamation and colonization within Western Europe

← Second Crusade, 1147 →

RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL

- Reform movement in Church*
Peter Damiani, d. 1072
Cistercian Order founded, 1097
Revival of culture in Western Europe
Study of logic and theology
Romanesque art and architecture: Abbey of Cluny; St. Albans Abbey, 1078; Durham Cathedral, 1093; Abbey of Vezelay, 1096
Recovery of Greek and Arabic science, philosophy begins: Adelard of Bath, fl. c. 1130
Rise of cathedral schools: Chartres, Laon, Paris
Philosophy and theology: Peter Abelard, 1079-1142; Hugh of St. Victor, d. 1160; Peter Lombard, d. 1160
Humanistic studies: Bernard of Chartres; John of Salisbury, d. 1180

1105

- 1150 *Papacy and empire*
Continuation of conflict: Frederick I, Barbarossa, 1152-90, vs. papacy and Lombard communes
Height of Hohenstaufen empire

Feudal monarchy, expansion and conflict

- Anglo-Norman gain of Anjou and Aquitaine, Henry II, 1154-89, vs. Louis VII, 1137-80; Angevin-Capetian conflict: Richard I, 1189-99, vs. Philip II, 1180-1223; John, 1199-1216, vs. Philip II

Angevin loss of Normandy, Anjou, etc., Battle of Bouvines, 1215

37

Importation of sericulture to Sicily

Eastward expansion of German people

← Heretical movements →
Albigensian and Waldensian

← Third Crusade, 1189 →
First windmills in Europe

Agricultural economy predominant. Serfdom and manorial organization. Revival of trade; rise of towns and middle class.

Study of Roman and canon law
Beginning of Gothic style—art and architecture: Abbey of St. Denis, 1140

Latin literature: Goliardic poetry

Vernacular literature: French—chansons de geste; Chrétien de Troyes; Marie de France, *Lais*; Provençal—troubadour lyrics; Spanish—The *Cid*
Historical writing: Otto of Freising, d. 1158; William of Tyre, c. 1130-1190; Giraldus Cambrensis, c. 1146-1220

Rise of universities: Bologna, Paris, Salerno

Gothic cathedrals: Sens, Laon, Notre Dame de Paris, c. 1160

medicine

THIRTEENTH CENTURY

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

- 1200 *Feudal monarchy: constitutional and territorial growth*
 English: Henry II, centralization; John, feudal reaction, Magna Carta, 1215; Henry III, 1216-72, growth of constitutional principle
 French: Philip II, centralization in expanded royal domain
 Spanish: Union of Leon and Castile, 1230
Height of medieval church and papacy
 Centralization and extension of authority: Innocent III, d. 1216; Fourth Lateran Council, 1215; Papal Inquisition
 Papal conflict with empire for control of Italy

Fall of Hohenstaufen Empire
 Death of Frederick II, 1250

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

← Fourth Crusade, 1202 →
Sack of Constantinople, 1204

Fairs of Champagne

Pioneer engineering work in Northern Italy

← Expansion of Teutonic Knights in Prussia from c.1230

← Development of Italian and Flemish cities →

Spread of use of Hindu (Arabic) numerals

RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL

Height and synthesis of medieval culture 1200

Rise of mendicant orders: Order of Friars Minor, St. Francis, d. 1226; Order of Preachers, St. Dominic, d. 1221

Full development of universities: Paris, 1215; College of Sorbonne, 1250; Oxford; Padua, 1228; Rome, 1245; Salamanca, 1250

Philosophy and theology: Recovery of complete Aristotle; attempts at synthesis—Albertus Magnus, d. 1280; Bonaventura, d. 1274; Thomas Aquinas, d. 1274

Scientific interests: Robert Grosseteste, d. 1253; Albertus Magnus; Roger Bacon, d. c.1292

38

- 1250 *Feudal monarchy at height*
 English: Edward I, 1272-1307, conquest of Wales and Scotland; statutes and Model Parliament, 1295
 French: Louis IX, 1226-70, expansion and centralization; Philip IV, 1285-1314, growth of bureaucracy, Estates General, 1302
 Spanish: strong monarchy and estates in separate kingdoms
Holy Roman Empire
 Interregnum, 1254-73
 Rise of Habsburgs: Rudolf I, 1273-91
Papacy: assertion and decline of authority
 Boniface VIII, d. 1305; *Unam Sanctam*, 1302; conflict with national monarchies—France and England

Maritime rivalry of Venice and Genoa

Use of compass by Italian sailors

Invention of gunpowder in Europe or Syria

Travels to Far East
 Merchants →
 Marco Polo

Spectacles made in Northern Italy

Height of Gothic architecture: cathedrals of Rheims, Amiens, Chartres

Growth of vernacular literature: French—fabliaux, *Roman de la Rose*; Italian—lyric poetry; German—minnesang

Missionary efforts of Friars: John of Pian de Carпинi; William of Rubruck

39

Continuation of manorial economy. Expansion of trade; merchant and craft guilds; increase of urban centers and population; wealth and influence of middle class.

FOURTEENTH CENTURY

	POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL	SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC	RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL	
1300	"Babylonian Captivity"—popes at Avignon, 1305-76	Perfection of mechanical clock	<i>Increasing independence and secularization in life, art, and thought</i>	1300
	Pope John XXII, conflict with Louis of Bavaria and Spiritual Franciscans		Political theory: Pierre Dubois; Marsiglio of Padua, c.1270-1342; William of Ockham, d. c.1349	
	<i>Beginning of Hundred Years' War between France and England, 1337</i>	Use of firearms—small cannon	Philosophy and theology: Duns Scotus, d. 1308; William of Ockham, nominalism	
40	<i>Rise of tyrannies in Italian city-states</i>		Science and medicine: Arnald of Villanova, d. 1313?; Peter of Abano, d. 1320; John Buridan, fl. 1335	
	<i>Holy Roman Empire: dynastic rivalries, Habsburg, Luxemburg, Wittelsbach</i>		Universities: new foundations—Perugia, Valladolid, Prague, etc.	
	Henry VII, 1308-13; Louis of Bavaria, 1314-47		Vernacular literature: Italian—Dante, d. 1321, <i>Divine Comedy</i> ; Petrarch, d. 1374, <i>Sonnets</i> ; Boccaccio, d. 1375, <i>Decameron</i>	
	Independence of princes and free cities→			
	Rise of Hanseatic League →			
	Growth of Swiss Confederation, 1315-1386			
	Charles IV, 1346-78; King of Bohemia; Golden Bull, 1356, Seven Electors			
1350	<i>Advance of Ottoman Turks; cross to Europe, 1356</i>	← <i>The Black Death, 1348-50</i> →	Art and architecture: Giotto, d. 1336; flamboyant Gothic style in northern Europe	
	<i>National monarchies: France and England</i>		Increase of mysticism and of lay element in religious life: Ruysbroek, 1293-1381; Gerard Groot and the Brethren of the Common Life	
	Continuation of Hundred Years' War: Poitiers, 1356	← <i>The Jacquerie, 1358</i>	Further growth of vernacular languages and literature: French—Guillaume Machaut, Jean Froissart; English—William Langland, <i>Piers Plowman</i> ; Geoffrey Chaucer, John Wyclif, English Bible	
41	Political and constitutional development: France—Estates-General at Paris, 1356-62; the Great Ordinance, 1357; victory of Charles V, 1364-80; foundation of absolute monarchy; beginning of Burgundian power	<i>Lollard heresy in England</i> →	Humanistic interests: Richard de Bury, 1281-1345; Petrarch; Coluccio Salutati, 1331-1406; Leonardo Bruni, 1369-1444	
	England—Edward III, 1327-77; parliamentary control of taxation and anti-papal statutes; Richard II, 1377-99, attempt at absolute monarchy, Lancastrian revolution, Henry IV, 1399-1413	← <i>The Peasants' Revolt, 1381</i>		
	<i>Schism in the Church, 1378-1417</i>			
	Popes at Avignon and at Rome			
	Decline of manorial economy. Social and economic conflict in towns. Beginning of shift in trade routes and expansion of maritime trade.			

FIFTEENTH CENTURY

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

- 1400 *The Church, efforts toward reform, the triumph of papal monarchy*
Continuation of schism
Conciliar movement: Council of Pisa, 1409
End of schism: Council of Constance, 1414-18; burning of John Hus, 1415; election of Martin V, 1417
Restoration of papal monarchy: Council of Basel, 1431-39; Pope Eugenius IV, 1431-47; Pope Nicholas V, 1447-55
The national monarchies: continued conflict
English victory and domination: Agincourt, 1415, King Henry V; civil war—Anglo-Burgundian Alliance; career of Jeanne d'Arc, 1429-31
Restoration of French monarchy: Charles VII, 1422-61
Hundred Years' War ends, 1453

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

Economic leadership of cities of South Germany and Low Countries

RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL

- Continued dominance and development of scholastic philosophies and theology—especially in northern Europe*
Movements and theories of Church reform
Pierre D'Ailly, 1350-c.1420; Jean Gerson, 1363-1429; Nicholas of Cusa, 1401-1464
Humanist studies predominant in Italy
Poggio Bracciolini, 1380-1459; Lorenzo Valla, 1406-57; Aeneas Silvius (Pope Pius II), 1405-64
Pre-eminence of Italian and Flemish artists
Masaccio, 1401-29; the Van Eycks; Roger van der Weyden, c.1400-64; Donatello, d. 1466; Brunelleschi, 1377-1446; Alberti, 1404-72

- 1450 *The greater Italian states—consolidation and centralization*
Venice, Milan, Florence, Papal States, Sicily
The fall of Constantinople, 1453
The height and fall of the House of Burgundy
Philip the Good, 1419-1467; Charles the Bold, 1467-77
The Holy Roman Empire: beginning of Habsburg domination
Frederick III, 1440-93
Maximilian I, m. Mary of Burgundy, 1477
The "new" monarchies; territorial expansion and consolidation
France: Louis XI, 1461-1483
England: Wars of the Roses—York vs. Lancaster; Henry VII, Tudor, 1485-1509
Spain: Ferdinand of Aragon m. Isabella of Castile, 1469

Disintegration of manorial economy. Consolidation of tenures; emergence of free labor. Growth of capitalistic enterprise in trade, industry, banking.

- First printing with movable type, Mainz, c.1450*
Vernacular literature
Christine de Pisan, c.1363-1431; development of French and English religious drama; Charles of Orleans, 1391-1465; François Villon, 1431-1489; Philippe de Commines, 1447?-1511?

Decline of overland trade with Far East, search for new routes

Prince Henry the Navigator, 1394-1460

A SURVEY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY





Table 3: Relations of Influence in the 12th Century

arrow means taught $A \rightarrow B$ A taught B
 notice increased density prior to Anselm
 only 4 phil links P-D but not go further
 in first years
 diagrams selective



THE STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF [illegible]

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this [illegible] day of [illegible], 19[illegible]

appeared [illegible] and acknowledged to me that he executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.

Given under my hand and seal of office this [illegible] day of [illegible], 19[illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

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A SURVEY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Section 54: Chronology of Late Mediaeval Philosophy




Table 54-1: Chronology of Late Mediaeval Philosophy

Note: Some of these dates are only approximations. I have used lighter lines where things get especially uncertain.

Geology of Lake Michigan Drainage



Geological Map of Lake Michigan Drainage

	England	France	Germany	Italy	The East	Letters
1100	Henry I (1100-35)	Philip I (d. 1108) Louis VI (1108-37)	Henry IV (d. 1106) Henry V (1108-25)	Robert II (1101-54)	Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem County of Edessa Princ. of Antioch County of Tripolis	Omar Khayyam Averroes
10	Improved central government	Consolidation of Capetian domain				Rise of the Universities
20	Exchequer Privileged boroughs Angevin alliance	Communes and towns town charters	Concordat of Worms Lothair III		Templars and Hospitallers Trade concessions to Pisa, Genoa and Venice	Scholastic theology Abelard Peter Lombard
30			Guelf vrs. Hohenstaufen	King. of Sicily 1130		Canon Law Gratian
40	Stephen (1135-54) period of anarchy	Louis VII (1137-80) Angevins gain power and consolidate land holdings	Conrad III (1138-52)	Arnold of Brescia Peter Waldo Cathari (Albigensians)	Edessa falls	Revival of Roman Law Trans. of Greek and Arabic Science
1150	-----	-----	Second Crusade (1147) Frederick Barbarossa (1152-90)	-----	Second Crusade	John of Salisbury St. Bernard
60	Henry II (1154-89) Constitutional reforms Development of common law.	Eleanor of Aquitaine divorced, marries Henry II.	Italian expeditions conflict with papacy and communes.	Fall of Milan Lombard League		<u>Chansons de Geste</u> troubadours Marie de France and Chretien de Troyes Icelandic sagas The <u>Cid</u> .
70	Becket			Legnano		
80	Expansion into Wales and Ireland War with sons Richard I (1189-99)	Philip Augustus (1180-1223)	Sicilian alliance Henry VI (1190-97)	Peace of Constance	Jerusalem taken (1187)	Gothic art, architecture, sculpture stained glass
90	Third Crusade Angevin-Capetian War	Third Crusade divorce contest	Third Crusade	Innocent III	Third Crusade (1190-92) fails Teutonic Knights	
1200	John (1199-1216)					

	England	France	Germany	Italy	The East	Letters
1200	Loss of Normandy	Conquest of Normandy, Anjou Poitiers	Frederick II King of Sicily (1197-1230)	Height of Papacy Franciscan order	Fourth Crusade and capture of Constantinople	<u>Fabliaux</u>
10	Magna Carta (1215) Henry III (1216-72)	Bouvines (1214)		Lateran Council Dominican Order	Rise of Mongols Venetian maritime supremacy	
20		Louis VIII	Fred. II, Emperor of Germany			
30		Louis IX (St.) (1226-70) Blanche of Castile	Crusade Sicilian Code Contest with Gregory IX	Gregory IX Canon Law Papal Inquisition	Teutonic Knights In Prussia Mongols invade Russia, Bohemia Hungary	<u>Nibelungenlied</u>
40		Languedoc	Italian wars Germany ignored	Innocent IV		
1250	-----	Crusade (1248-54)	Conrad IV	Manfred, K. of Sicily	Louis IX Crusade	-----
60	Simon de Montfort	Peace with England	Interregnum		Kublai Khan	Scholastic learning Grosseteste Albertus Magnus Thomas Aquinas Roger Bacon
70	Edward I (1272-1307)	Philip III (1270-85)	Rudolph of Habsburg (1273-91)	Charles of Anjou K. of Sicily	Marco Polo	
80	Conquest of Wales Statutes	Philip IV (1285-1314)	Takes Austria	Ruin of Pisa Rise of Florence Sicilian Vespers		
90	Model Parliament	War with Ed. I	Swiss Confederation	Boniface VIII (1294-1303) <u>Clericis Laicos</u>	Fall of Acre	
1300	Scottish wars				End of Crusades	

	England	France	Germany	Italy	The East	Letters and Arts
1300		Estates General Trial of Templars		<u>Unam Sanctum</u> Anagni	Rise of Turks	Scholastic Learning Duns Scotus William of Ockham Marsiglio of Padua
10	Edward II Robert Bruce, K. of Scotland Bannockburn	Sons of Philip IV		John XXII Avignon Papacy		Dante
20			Growth of the Swiss Confederation			Giotto
30	Edward III Opening of Hundred Yrs. War	Philip VI, House of Valois	Rise of indep. princes and Free Cities	canon law		
40	Sullys Crecy, Calais			Papal taxation		
1350	Black Death Black Prince	Black Death John I	Black Death	Black Death		
60	Poitiers Anti-papal statutes	Estates at Paris Etienne Marcel Jacquerie (1358) Charles V	Golden Bull Seven Electors	Revival of Mysticism Brothers of the Common Life St. Catherine of Siena	Turks enter Europe	Humanism Petrarch
70	French successful against English Richard II		Height of Hansa	Gregory XI (Returns to Rome) The Great Schism (1378-1417)	Wenceslas, K. of Bohemia	
80	Great Peasant Revolt (1381) Lollardy	Du Guesclin Charles VI Philip of Burgundy acquires Flanders				Chaucer Wycliffe Langland, <u>Piers Ploughman</u>
90			Swiss victory			
1400	Revolution					

	England	France	Germany	Italy	The East	Letters
1400	Henry IV, Lancaster Parliamentary gov.		Hus in Bohemia			
10	Henry V Agincourt	Agincourt	Sigismund Hus Burned	Council of Pisa Martin V		Renaissance painting in Italy
20	Henry VI regency of Gloucester and Bedford	Peace of Troys Charles VII				Humanism
30			Council of Basel			
40	Defeat in France	Jeanne d'Arc Restoration of gov. in France	Failure of Councillier Movement	Nicholas V Papal triumph	Turks take Balkans	
1450		end of Hundred Yrs. War		Renaissance papacy	Fall of Constantinople (1453)	
60	Edward IV, York Wars of the Roses	Louis IX expansion of monarchy	rise of Habsburgs			
70						
80	Richard III	Charles VIII				Witch hunts begin
90	Henry VII, Tudor					
1500						

Date	Time	Place	Weather	Wind	Sea	Temp
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
10/10/51	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00

Fall, 1982: P302/P710, Spade

Books on Reserve

Note: Some of the following books are on reserve for P302, and some are on reserve for P710. The distinction is purely arbitrary. Books under either heading might very well be useful to students in either course.

Books on reserve in the Philosophy Department Reserve Collection, Sycamore Hall 023. Note: There are two doors to Sycamore 023. These books are behind the locked door (furthest to the east). You will need to get the key either from the secretary or from one of the other privileged few who have access to the room.

Hyman and Walsh, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Probably the best single collection of texts in translation. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* (Library of Liberal Arts edition). Students in P302 are supposed to have a copy of this already. This one is put on reserve purely for convenience.

Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* (Library of Liberal Arts)

Anselm, *Truth, Freedom, and Evil* (Harper Torchbooks)

Anselm, *Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption* (Harper Torchbooks)

Copleston, *Medieval Philosophy* (Harper Torchbooks). This is an earlier edition of his *A History of Medieval Philosophy*. Use the later edition where possible.

Wippel and Wolter, *Medieval Philosophy*. A collection of readings.

McKeon, *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, 2 vols.

Plantinga, Alvin. *The Ontological Argument*. Primarily meant for P302 students. A collection of readings.

McKeon, *Basic Writings of Aristotle*

Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (Library of Liberal Arts edition). Contains his *On the Principles of Nature*.

Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, Armand Maurer, tr., 2nd edition.

Aristotle, Loeb Classical Library editions of: *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, *On Sophistical Refutations*, *On Coming to Be and Passing Away*. Aquinas, *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 2 vols., Anton Pegis, ed.

The following books are on reserve in the main library, either under P302 or under P710. Note: I was going to arrange them in order by call number, but I decided you could do that for yourself.

B765 .T54 S72, Fernand van Steenberghen, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism*.

B721 .S8, Fernand van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*

B725 .S76 1970, Fernand van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*

B765 .T54 W42, James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work*

B434 .T46, Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*. 2 volumes

Q151 .A74 T53 1963, Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

B439 .T4513 1962, Thomas Aquinas, *Aristotle: On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan*

B415 .A4 F7, Thomas Aquinas, *Aristoteles: De anima, in the Version of William of Moerbeke, and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas*

BT 740 .T45, Thomas Aquinas, *The Soul*

BT 110 .B65T4, Thomas Aquinas, *The Trinity and the Unicity of the Intellect*

B441 .T452 1970, Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*

B434 .T46, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*. 2 volumes.

BX 1749 .T4 1962. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*. I'm sorry about the translation of the title. The Latin is *Somma contra gentiles*. Only the first two volumes are on reserve.

B765 .T53T7 1963, Thomas Aquinas, *Treatise on Separate Substances*

BT133 .T46, Thomas Aquinas, *On the Power of God*

General and Summary

The following is a summary of the results of the study of the effect of the concentration of the solution on the rate of reaction.

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The results of the study of the effect of the concentration of the solution on the rate of reaction are shown in the following table.

BD493 .D 512, Thomas Aquinas, *On the Eternity of the World*

BD150 .T44, Thomas Aquinas, *The Disputed Questions on Truth*. 3 volumes.

BD420 .T45 1958, Thomas Aquinas, *The Division and Method of the Sciences*. *not there*

B765 .T54 C482, M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*

B765 .T54 K36, Anthony Kenny (ed.), *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays*.

B765 .T54 K42 1980, Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas*

B72 .C78, Frederick Copleston, SJ, *A History of Philosophy*, volume 2: *Mediaeval Philosophy, Augustine to Scotus*, and volume 3: *Ockham to Suarez*.

B765 .T54642 1956, Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas*

B765 .T53D4 1926, Thomas Aquinas, *Le "De ente et essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin*.

ref. *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Norman Kretzmann, ed.

The first of these is the fact that the
 data are not normally distributed. This is
 evident from the fact that the distribution
 is skewed to the right. The second is
 the fact that the data are not
 independent. This is evident from the
 fact that the data are collected from
 the same source. The third is the fact
 that the data are not normally
 distributed. This is evident from the
 fact that the data are skewed to the
 right. The fourth is the fact that
 the data are not independent. This is
 evident from the fact that the data
 are collected from the same source.

Giving the Devil His Due

Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages

by Jeffrey Burton Russell.

Cornell University Press, 356 pp., \$29.95

Norman Cohn

During the past two decades Jeffrey Burton Russell has established himself as a respected historian of medieval religion. Though some of his extraordinarily abundant writings have dealt with the Roman Catholic mainstream, more have dealt with varieties of religion that flourished outside, and in opposition to, the Church. *Dissent and Reform in the Early Middle Ages* (1965), *Religious Dissent in the Middle Ages* (1971), *Witchcraft in the Middle Ages* (1972), and (with C.T. Berkhout) *Medieval Heresies: A Bibliography* (1981) are all concerned with types of belief and behavior that lay well beyond the limits of orthodoxy and orthopraxis. In the work of which *Lucifer* is the concluding installment Russell has cast his net much wider still. Taken together, the three volumes—*The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity* (1977), *Satan: The Early Christian Tradition* (1981), and the recent *Lucifer*—are an impressively wide-ranging history of the theme of the Devil, starting in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia and ending in fifteenth-century Europe. The third volume can be fully appreciated only when it is considered in relation to its precursors.

Early in the first volume Russell indicates the angle from which he has approached his vast theme: the work belongs to "the history of concepts." The history of concepts differs from the history of ideas in that "it attempts to integrate the study of 'high' thought with 'low' thought, theology and philosophy with myth and art, the products of the unconscious with those of the conscious.... A concept, then, is different from an idea in that (1) it is socially and culturally more broadly based, and (2) it includes psychological levels deeper than the rational." Such an approach is not, of course, novel. Many writers have adopted it, in varying degrees, in their analysis of the social and political myths of the past three centuries; while others, including myself, have followed it in their attempts to interpret various beliefs current in the Middle Ages.

What is new about Russell's enterprise is the period it covers in dealing with its subject. Admittedly, the opening chap-

ters of the first volume deal with personifications of evil which, because of their remoteness in time or space or both, have little bearing on the Western concept of the Devil—but even with these excluded, the period covered is still enormous. In fact it is longer than Russell realizes. Quite correctly, he finds the origins of the Western concept of the Devil in the teachings of the Iranian prophet Zarathustra, commonly known under his Greek name of Zoroaster. But the date that he gives for Zarathustra, around 600 BC, is no longer accepted by specialists; it is now generally agreed that Zarathustra lived several centuries earlier, some time between 1400 and 1000 BC.

Russell's account of the teachings both of Zarathustra himself and of later Zoroastrians is not very accurate—not surprisingly, since he has relied overmuch on that well-known but misleading work, *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism*, by the late Robert Zaehner, and obviously did not come across the first volume of Mary Boyce's *History of Zoroastrianism*, which was published some two years before his own first volume. Nevertheless, Russell certainly does bring out the deep originality of Zoroastrian thought.

Zarathustra conceived of the existing world as the scene of a prodigious struggle between the first and greatest god, Ahura Mazda (meaning "Lord Wisdom"), and the spirit of disorder and destructiveness, called Angra Mainyu (later Ahriman). For the purpose of fighting Angra Mainyu, Ahura Mazda brought time into existence; but he has also set a limit to the struggle, and to time. In the end Angra Mainyu will be defeated and destroyed. Thereafter the world will continue not in time but in eternity, where change, old age, death will be unknown—and which will be enjoyed by all faithful Zoroastrians, including the dead, resurrected for the purpose. Russell is absolutely right to stress the influence which these teachings exerted on Judeo-Christian notions of the Devil, his works, and his final fate.

Hebrew religion as presented in the Old Testament has no place for a figure personifying the principle of evil, because God himself is perceived as responsible for evil as well as for good. But this changes during the period between 200 BC and 100 AD. In the body of literature

generally known as apocalyptic, which includes such works as the First Book of Enoch, the Book of Jubilees, and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, responsibility for evil is shifted from God to angels who, for one reason or another, have fallen from heaven and become demons roaming the earth. Their leader, variously called Azazel, Mastema, Belial, or (already) Satan, is clearly recognizable as the Devil.

Now God and Devil each stand at the head of an angelic host, ready for the impending final conflict at the end of the world. Human beings too are involved: it is open to each Jew to choose to remain faithful to the God of Israel or else to abandon God in favor of the Devil. The Common Rule of the Qumran community (or Dead Sea sect) presents the same picture; here too the present age is shown as delivered over to the Devil, who is struggling to forestall the triumph of God. God will triumph nevertheless, the Devil and his hosts will be cast down and punished for ever and ever, his human followers—meaning everyone except members of the community—will meet the same fate. Then the age of the Lord will dawn, pure goodness and light will reign forever.

The similarity between all this and Zoroastrian beliefs is striking, and Russell is fully justified in suggesting that the apocalyptic writers and the Dead Sea sect alike may have come under Zoroastrian influence. He could indeed have made the point far more strongly, and found powerful support in more recent studies than the ones he cites.

The books of the New Testament were composed over a period from 50 to 100 AD, by Jews whose world view derived in part from the apocalyptic tradition. Some present-day theologians slur over the central importance of the Devil in that world view. Not Russell: with admirable forthrightness he insists that the notion of a cosmic struggle between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan, which elevates Satan almost to the status of a principle of cosmic evil, is an essential part of original Christianity. And he has found an appropriate label for that religion: semidualist. In the Christianity of the New Testament God's goodness is preserved by giving him an antagonist almost as powerful and auton-

omous as the Zoroastrian Ahriman. Almost, but not quite: for unlike Ahriman, the Christian devil is himself a creature of God—a creature who became evil by his own free choice, but who remains in a sense subordinate to and dependent on God.

In Judaism the Devil soon lost his importance. In the teachings of the rabbis in the Talmud the dualistic tendency of apocalyptic is consciously rejected. The early Christian church, on the other hand, was convinced that human beings from Adam and Eve onward have always been living under the Devil's dominion. The late second century saw the development of the doctrine of original sin. For the first time, the tempter in the Garden of Eden was identified with the Devil; and for the first time, too, the sin into which he lured Adam and Eve came to be seen as something in which all human beings have participated ever since. The early Christian theologians drew the conclusion that, because our first parents turned their backs on God of their own free will, Satan was entitled to hold us in slavery—unless and until we were redeemed. On the basis of this belief various theories were developed concerning the meaning of redemption. These granted that the power of the Devil and his cohorts to attack, tempt, and torment human beings will be finally destroyed only when Christ returns in majesty to carry out the Last Judgment; but already here and now that power has been weakened by the Incarnation and the Passion of Christ. Just what that meant was a subject of intense debate from the second century onward. Russell's analysis of the two main competing theories, the sacrifice theory and the ransom theory, is a model both of learning and of lucidity.

The first two volumes of Russell's work carry the story down to the mid-fifth century; *Lucifer* is concerned with the concept of the Devil during the following thousand years. In both western Latin and eastern Orthodox Christianity, the idea of the Devil grew out of the thought of the Fathers of the early Church; but it did not attain the same importance in both. Russell notes that intensely mystical and unitary models of religious thought tend to allow little place for an active spirit of evil, since all things in the cosmos proceed from God and return to him; and he is no doubt correct in saying that this is why the Devil seldom loomed very large in Byzantine thinking. The great exception is the Bogomile heresy, which was founded in Bulgaria around

950 and which some two centuries later spread to Western Europe in the form of Catharism. According to the Bogomiles the very cosmos in which we live is the creation of the chief of the fallen angels, Satan; only the human soul comes from the true, good God, and even that is trapped inside a disgusting, Devil-created body. At the end of time the entire material world, including all bodies, will be destroyed, to be replaced by a cosmos of wholly immaterial spirituality: the Bogomile version of the kingdom of God.

By far the greater part of *Lucifer* is devoted to the Latin West. Here at last Russell moves into his own field, and the treatment of his theme rises from the competent to the expert. The available sources are so numerous that rigorous selection was essential. Russell has drawn on the most varied material, ranging from scholastic and mystical theology, through art, literature, and drama, to popular religion, sermons, saints' lives, and folklore; and he has selected most judiciously.

The Devil in the medieval West is a very complex figure indeed. In folklore he is commonly presented as ridiculous or powerless, and, curiously, this is still the case in the folk dramas of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, at the very time when supposed witches were being burned by the hundreds for supposed dealings with the Devil. Russell suggests a plausible explanation of the paradox: the more that preachers in their sermons dwelt on the appalling aspects of the Devil for the purpose of terrifying their auditors into good behavior, the more lay folk made him comic in order to relieve the tension of fear. In many plays he certainly appears in a most undignified light. On his expulsion from heaven, for instance, we find him lamenting, "Now I make my way to hell to be thrust into endless torment. For fear of fire I crack a fart." And he has a curious habit, too, of placing his hand on the genitals of the lesser demons, in parody of priestly benediction. But popular imaginings too had their grim aspects and sinister consequences: both Moslems and Jews were regarded as worshipers and agents of the Devil, and this has some bearing on the ruthlessness with which Moslem civilians were slaughtered by crusaders and Jews were slaughtered in pogroms.

As for professional theologians, their ideas changed greatly during the thousand-year span we call the Middle Ages.

The ideas of such early medieval thinkers as Pope Gregory the Great in the sixth century, Isidore of Seville in the seventh, Bede and Alcuin in the eighth, and Gottschalk in the ninth, were still very dependent on traditions inherited from the first centuries of the Church. But later, from the twelfth to the thirteenth century, leading scholastics such as Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas greatly reduced the Devil's status. As they saw it, God willed balance and harmony for the cosmos—but he also built freedom into the cosmos. No doubt it was the Devil who, by the exercise of his free choice, introduced the option of sin into the world—but it is human beings who, by choosing to sin, have continuously shattered the state of balance and harmony. Moreover, in the typical scholastic world view (which owed much to Neoplatonism), evil had no being—it was simply privation of good. In such a world view the concept of the Devil was bound to become very abstract indeed.

In imaginative literature the Devil is presented with far greater force. In Old English (or Anglo-Saxon) texts he figures above all as a rebel against his lord, God, and so against the proper order of society. But the sermons that proliferated in the later Middle Ages draw on an even more picturesque tradition. The *Life of Saint Anthony*, by the fourth-century bishop of Alexandria Athanasius, tells how on one occasion the Devil appeared to the saint in the form of a pretty woman and almost seduced him; how on another occasion demons irrupted into his cell in the form of lions, bulls, bears, leopards, serpents, asps, scorpions, and wolves; and again, how the Devil and a pack of demons waylaid him, beat and whipped him, and left him unconscious on the ground. Such tales, imitated over and over again in later "biographies" of saints, were still inspiring preachers, and terrifying their flocks, a thousand years later.

Even while theologians were finding less and less to say about him, in the imagination of parish priests and their flocks the Devil was looming ever more terrifyingly. It was largely thanks to the influence of biographies of saints not only on sermons but on the theater that the Devil retained and strengthened his grip on the mind of the laity. Some mystics, too, have left horrifying accounts of their personal encounters with the Devil, as a monster who beat or choked them, and through whose huge, gaping nostrils

they could see the fires of hell. In his treatment of all these aspects of medieval conceptions of the Devil Russell shows an admirable mastery of a vast and varied array of sources, and an equally admirable skill in summarizing them.

Russell's three volumes can be read simply as a history of the concept of the Devil down to the close of the Middle Ages, and as such it is easily the most considerable study available. Not since Gustav Roskoff's two-volume *Geschichte des Teufels* has anything on a comparable scale been attempted—and that appeared in 1869. If Russell declines to pursue his subject beyond the close of the Middle Ages, that is his right. It is a pity, nevertheless, that he did not extend his study to cover the great European witch hunt—which, though it began in the fifteenth century, reached its height only later, between 1580 and 1660. That extensive killing was surely the most devastating result ever to be produced by obsession with the Devil. Russell does indeed glance at it, but he allots it only five pages out of a text that numbers more than three hundred. It is true that he has dealt with the medieval antecedents of the great witch hunt in *Witchcraft in the Middle Ages*, and with the witch hunt itself in *A History of Witchcraft*. But the former is in many respects out of date, and the latter was never meant to be more than a popular introduction. A less cursory treatment here would have enabled Russell to show how, during the past seven years or so, our understanding of the great witch hunt, and of the role of Devil-beliefs in it, has been transformed by the work of such scholars as Robert Muchembled (*Culture populaire et culture des élites*, 1978) and the late Christina Larner (*Enemies of God: The Witch-hunt in Scotland*, 1981). It would also have ensured that the conclusion of his story would be at the same high level as the rest.

Less puzzling is the omission of any reference to the history of the concept of the Devil in modern times (and I am not thinking of the ridiculous cult of Satanism). Russell may not be aware of the extent to which the Devil was still a living presence in peasant imagination, from Russia to France, right down to the late nineteenth century, or of the part that fantasies about the Devil and his human servants played in nineteenth-century anti-Masonic and anti-Semitic propaganda. He may never have heard of such

works as *La Franc-Maçonnerie, Synagogue de Satan*, by Archbishop Meurin (1893); he may not know that the famous forgery *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* first became a force in world history when it appeared, in the revolutionary Russia of 1917, as part of a mystical work entitled *He is Near, At the Door... Here comes Antichrist and the reign of the Devil on earth*. Or perhaps he knows all that, and has simply decided that enough is enough. Nobody could blame him for that.

My major criticism lies elsewhere. Sometimes Russell writes as a historian, concerned to produce an accurate historical survey of the concept of the Devil—or rather, of the various concepts of the Devil that have appeared down the centuries. Sometimes he writes as a twentieth-century Christian, wrestling with the problem of evil. And the two enterprises do not harmonize at all well.

Russell makes it abundantly clear how deep his Christian commitment is, and the inspiration behind his work clearly comes from that commitment. At intervals throughout the three volumes he asks the question: If the world is the creation of a good God, why is there so much evil in it? The clarity with which he poses the question, the honesty with which he disposes of various pseudoanswers, are impressive. In a noble peroration to *Lucifer* he propounds the one answer that he finds convincing:

...that a real force is actively present in the cosmos urging to evil. This evil force has a purposive center that actively hates good, the cosmos, and every individual in the cosmos. It urges us too to hate good, the cosmos, other individuals, and ourselves.... For Christians, then, the person of the Devil may be a metaphor, but it is a metaphor for something that is real, that really brings horror to the world every day and threatens to lay the entire earth waste.

The incongruity that I find is that the kind of evil that preoccupies Russell has little in common with the evils which, in the days when the Devil was taken most seriously, were commonly attributed to him. Russell stands appalled at the amount of suffering and cruelty there is in the world; it so dominates his thinking that he equates evil with "the infliction of pain upon sentient beings," "abuse of a sentient being, a being that can feel pain." He is particularly horrified by the sufferings of the defenseless, especially

children. Nor does he draw much distinction between suffering "from natural causes" and suffering deliberately inflicted by human beings; in both he sees the work of the same evil, purposive agent. He sees it also in nuclear weapons, and draws a conclusion from this: "Only by grappling with evil now, with clear sight and with courage, can we have any chance of avoiding the ruin that looms."

I find it strange that such a widely read and gifted historian should be unaware of the extent to which his own values derive less from two thousand years of Christian thought and experience than from the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and from the European and American humanitarianism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Russell insists that "the Devil is what his concept is, and his concept is the tradition of human views about him." Yet, as his work abundantly shows, the sins to which the Devil of Christian tradition has tempted human beings are varied indeed: apostasy, idolatry, heresy, fornication, gluttony, vanity, using cosmetics, dressing luxuriously, going to the theater, gambling, avarice, quarreling, spiritual sloth have all, at various times, figured in the list. Only rarely—notably in the thought of Augustine—have the sufferings of children been ascribed to the Devil; and I have looked in vain for a single instance, in Russell's great panorama, of the Devil tempting a human being to cruelty. On the other hand, if the Devil has seldom been imagined as encouraging cruelty, belief in him has often done just that. The conviction that certain categories of human beings—Jews, dissident Christians, supposed witches—were servants and agents of the Devil has at times sanctioned torture, killing, and burning alive on a vast scale.

We are left with a paradox. A twentieth-century American historian, inspired by the loathing of cruelty and injustice that is characteristic of American civilization at its best, has produced a huge study of a concept of evil which, through the ages, has seldom laid much stress on cruelty and injustice—and which, treated by another historian, could be shown itself to have legitimized enormous amounts of cruelty and injustice. Still, this is a work of historical scholarship that, within its limits, is likely to remain authoritative for many years, if not for generations, to come. □

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

TAKE HOME MID-TERM EXAMINATION

Due Date: Monday, June 22

I prefer that your answers are typed, double-spaced, with ample margins on all four sides.

There is no space limit on the answers to these questions, but by all means, do stick to the point. Your essays should be liberally laced with "facts." Make textual references wherever it is appropriate. (In other words, try not to rely solely on class notes.)

1. ✓ What problems arise when the Judaeo-Christian concept of creation is combined with the elements of Greek philosophy? Be precise in answering the question.
2. Is there a difference between late antiquity and the early Middle Ages? Make reference to specific people or works as well as to specific themes or concepts in answering the question. Consider the opposition: why would someone disagree with you, and why do you believe your answer is nonetheless correct?
- 10
2
3. ✓ Is Augustine's conversion a conversion to Christianity or to Platonism? Explain your answer, once again, acknowledging the opposition. You might think here of the literary structure of, for example, the Confessions.
4. ✓ What is the theory of illumination? Explain how the theory grows, for Augustine, out of his Christianity as well as out of his adoption of elements of Greek philosophy.
5. ✓ Use Augustine's Neoplatonic hierarchy to characterize his solution to the problem of evil in as much detail as possible. Is Augustine's solution adequate? Explain.
6. ✓ How does Boethius improve on Augustine's solution to the problem of foreknowledge and free will?
7. ✓ Why might someone say that early mediaeval culture is monastic culture?
8. ✓ What is the problem of universals? (Porphyry's three questions might help here.) Does the problem have anything to do with theology? State precisely one of Boethius' solutions to the problem of universals.

NOTE

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

TAKE-HOME FINAL EXAMINATION

INSTRUCTIONS: This examination must be completed and returned by Friday, July 3, 1987. Write a concise, yet thorough, detailed, precise, well organized, clearly conceived essay in response to three of the following questions. You may write as much as you wish. These are not meant to be research essays. You should be able to write them on the basis of class discussion and the assigned readings. If you do not heed this recommendation and use additional sources, please indicate the sources along with your essays.

1. Etienne Gilson writes, in History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 540-541

Every time educated Christians came in contact with Greek philosophical sources, there was a blossoming of theological and philosophical speculation . . . Practically every notable event in the history of Western thought in the middle ages is tied up with the presence of a man who had studies in Greece, or who knew Greek and had translated some Greek philosophical writings, or who had access to such translations.

Comment in detail on the accuracy of this claim.

2. Platonism (broadly construed) dominated Latin philosophy down to the thirteenth century. Then there was a short flash of Aristotelianism. The Aristotelians never wholly died out of course, but the field was soon lost to the Platonists once again in the Renaissance. Why did Aristotelianism lose ground so fast? This suggests that, whereas Platonism is a relatively stable philosophy, internally at peace with itself and able to be sustained for long periods, Aristotelianism is an unstable philosophy with internal tensions that more or less guarantee that it will never dominate for long.

Evaluate the first part of this thesis for historical accuracy. Explore the suggestion in the second part (whatever your verdict about the first part). Draw out and examine the main doctrines in the two traditions. Your essay should be firmly tied down with historical references.

3. You have been asked to conduct an hour long, one-time seminar, open to the public at a nominal charge, for the Alabama Humanities Foundation, entitled "Mediaeval Culture." What will you say?

4. Trace the influence of the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation on mediaeval Latin philosophy. What philosophical problems did it introduce for the first time? What old philosophical problems did it put in a new light? Explore this influence in several particular cases. Your discussion should be liberally laced with facts.

5. What is the difference between history and literature in the Middle Ages? Discuss, using several primary texts as evidence for your discussion.

6. What is the doctrine of illumination? What reasons lead to holding it? What difficulties are there with the doctrine? Sketch the history of the doctrine in the Middle Ages from Augustine to Aquinas and Duns Scotus.

7. In many respects a culture's development in the Middle Ages resulted from the impact of outside peoples on it and its relations to outside peoples. Discuss the development of the culture of mediaeval Europe taking into consideration the various barbarian invasions, and, to a more limited extent, the Byzantines and the Arabs.

8. Write a short history of the problem of universals (and the correlative problem of individuation) in the Middle Ages. Include in your discussion a consideration of the philosophical and theological principles that motivated the dispute.

1. Aristotle's philosophy had been kept alive in Byzantine circles, Syrian circles and through the latter in Persia. In the 5th c. Islam conquered Persia and Syria and enlightened Arab rulers employed the Syrians who passed on to the Arabs (in 750-900 translation) Aristotle, Euclid, Galen, etc. The Arabs spread ^{CHRISTIANIZED} into Southern Spain, Sicily, etc. and, as the Christians moved southward, thus running into (or even seeking) the advanced learning of the Arabs & Jews and it was at that point (in the 12 c.) that Aristotle's major corpus became available & was translated into Latin.

2. Handwriting reform under Charlemagne and his successors, particularly Alcuin, provided good copies of all the best models of text books and this accumulation of clearly (LATIN & PATRISTIC) copied books were available two centuries later when a much greater revival of learning took place. ^{at the Benedictine Monastery of Monte Cassino} ^{at the University of Naples}

3. Aquinas studied under St. Albert the Great at Cologne in 1248-1252. He taught first in Paris & then at the Papal Curia; at Angni, Orvieto, Rome & Viterbo.

4. Aquinas took doctorate was in ^(New discipline?) Theology and his nickname was "The Angelic Doctor" (1667, Pius V.) (also Doctor communis)

5. Aquinas was born in the castle of Rocasecca, near Aquino, Italy in 1225.
He entered the Monastery of Monte Cassino (Benedictine) where he remained from 1231-1239 as an oblate.

6. Abelard's son's name was Astralabe, after the navigational instrument.

10. Roland comes out of the oral tradition; hence there is no one author. Apparently it was composed (and known) over a period of 300 years by a succession of bards.

12. The subject matter of Roland is the legendary Charlemagne and a battle in the Pyrenees against the Saracens.

14. Heloise was the niece of a canon named Fulbert who loved her + wanted her educated in all literary pursuits (at which she excelled). Abelard induced Fulbert to take him in as a ^{paying} boarder and he would also teach Heloise.

16. Dates for the following are:

Ancenna - 980-1037

Alfarabi (- d. 950)

Algarabi (1058-1111)

Averroës (1126-1198)

Averroës had the most influence on Aquinas.

2. *Spizella monticola* (L.) 1822.
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)

3. *Spizella monticola* (L.) 1822.
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)

4. *Spizella monticola* (L.) 1822.
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)

5. *Spizella monticola* (L.) 1822.
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)

6. *Spizella monticola* (L.) 1822.
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)

7. *Spizella monticola* (L.) 1822.
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)

8. *Spizella monticola* (L.) 1822.
1822-1823, near *Spizella monticola* (L.)

18. The Franciscans were essentially
conservative theologians, following
^{Neoplatonists} Augustine. The Benedictines were
essentially modernists, following
Aquinas and were Aristotelians.

20. Chartres for 50 years had a succession
of philosophic masters which drew
many to study there in the 12th C. Beginning
c. Adelard of Bath, St. Bernard, Gilbert de la
Porree, Wm. of Conches, ^(Tutor to Henry of Plantagenet) + John of Salisbury
<sup>Rep. best of 12c
humanism</sup>
were foremost. The Chartres was a
center of ^{Platonic thought} ~~Aristotelian~~ thought; however
~~with a strong addition of Platonism~~ in
which certain Aristotelian doctrine
began to come into pre-eminence ^{and}
~~introduced~~ ^{introduced} ~~by~~ ^{(forms of things are copies of the} ~~idea of)~~
interpreting it in light of Plato's teachings
about mutability & the evanescent
character of material things.
(What do you think of John of Salisbury's
idea that sometimes tyrannicide may
be obligatory and would Reagan qualify?)

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

Handwritten:
Final
Fri

TERM PAPER TOPICS

The following topics can be viewed as suggested or recommended topics rather than as a list of precise topics on which you must write. Since you are supposed to be writing a term paper, your paper (at least the final draft) should be a concise distillation of what you have learned this term. Since the required readings are often rather limited glimpses of what an author has to say about a topic, in the case of most topics, you will need to do a little extra reading. Your extra reading should be mainly from primary sources. For many topics, use of a secondary source may be appropriate. However, you should not consult more than three secondary sources. In any case, your paper should reflect your careful consideration of some text(s).

Prior to turning in your paper, you should come talk with me to make sure you understand fully the topic on which you have chosen to write. At this time, you should be able to state the thesis of your paper. (One sentence may be all that is necessary as a thesis at this point.) Please arrange to meet with me by June 29, so that if there are any problems with what you propose to do, you will have adequate time to resolve them before your paper is due.

I would be happy to read and comment on a first draft of your paper. If you would like to take advantage of this offer, please turn in your first draft by July 1 (and consult with me about your topic suitably earlier). Remember that I will be out of town from July 9 until July 24.

The final draft of your term paper is due July 29.

Please note that the order in which these topics are arranged is not supposed to be significant.

And remember again that these are only **suggestions**. The following list is in no way meant to be exhaustive.

1. Compare and contrast the views of two mediaeval philosophers of your choice on the problem of universals. Explain what motivated their respective theories and discuss what particular difficulties arise on each of their views.
2. State and critically evaluate Augustine's solution to the problem of evil. What main themes of Augustine's overall philosophy are illustrated by his approach to this problem? Compare Augustine's solution with that of some other mediaeval thinker.

3. Discuss the understanding of the imperial role and imperial function by comparing the position presented in some secondary source on the subject, and the position presented in Einhard's Life of Charlemagne OR Notker Balbulus' Charlemagne.
4. Can Aquinas account for the immortality of the human soul without contradicting his views on the individuation of persons? Discuss.
5. Explain and discuss Aquinas' view of the soul, as presented in On Being and Essence with respect to its being a separated substance, its being the form of the body, and the unity of the composite human being.
6. State the so-called "ontological argument" in Anselm's form. Explain and evaluate both Gaunilo's and Aquinas' criticisms of it. Discuss some secondary source's view on the argument.
7. Explain Augustine's theory of the sign. Discuss the theory's significance for one or two of his philosophical positions, his attitude toward classical culture, his literary style.
8. Compare and contrast Boethius' and Ockham's solutions to the problem of foreknowledge and free will. What strengths and weaknesses do you find in each?
9. In Summa Theologiae I, q. 2 a. 3, Aquinas gives his five famous arguments for the existence of God. How does Aquinas go on to show that there are not five gods, one of each kind, or worse, five kinds of gods, with perhaps several of each kind, but rather one God? In short, how does Aquinas argue that his five proofs converge on a single being? How successful is he?
10. Explain why the monastic movement was a pivotal movement in the Middle Ages. Make use of the Rule of St. Benedict among other primary sources in your explanation.
11. Compare and contrast the views of two of: Augustine, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, on the nature and extent of the need for divine illumination requisite for knowledge. Set illumination theory in the context of epistemology more generally.
12. Critically discuss Aquinas' view of the distinction between essence and esse. What is the importance of this distinction for Aquinas' philosophy? Be specific.
13. In Book XI of the Confessions, Augustine says "What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who does ask me, I do not know.." Well, did he know or didn't he? Discuss critically his theory of time, using a secondary source.

Monks, Bishops & Pagans.

14. Critically discuss various concepts of history writing in the Middle Ages. Be sure to include at least two primary sources (in history) in your discussion.
15. What sort of work is a 'consolatio'? What are its literary ancestors? Why is the work philosophically, theologically, artistically significant?
16. In many respects a culture's development in the Middle Ages resulted from the impact of outside peoples on it and its relations to outside peoples. Discuss the development of the culture of one of England, France or Germany taking into consideration the Viking invasions, the Arabs, the Magyars, and the Slavs, as well as relations with other countries. Limit your chronological discussion from the death of Charlemagne to 1077.
17. How would you reconcile the technological, theological and so on, developments of the early middle ages with the description of the period as the Dark Ages?
18. Discuss the interaction between Church and State that followed Constantine. Limit your discussion to the Latin West, that is, the Germanic kingdoms, the Carolingians, the popes, and the German emperors.
19. Some historians have argued that the Carolingian Empire would have been impossible without Charlemagne's personal influence. Others have said that the large Frankish kingdom was an inevitable result of historical circumstances. Discuss.
20. Trace the history of universities from their start in imperial schools. Critically discuss the university curriculum at Paris in the thirteenth century.

PROPOSAL FOR A PAPER

TOPIC: Roots and Parallels of Metropolitan Community Church Beliefs and Practices in the Radical Reformation.

AUTHOR: Marjorie F. Ragona

RESOURCES: Perry, Troy: The Lord is My Shepherd and He Knows I'm Gay, Universal Fellowship Press, L.A. 1973.
By-Laws and Statement of Faith, Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches, 8/3/81.

Marty, Martin E.: Protestantism: Its churches and culture, rituals and doctrines, yesterday and today.

Hillerbrand, Hans J.: The Protestant Reformation, Harper and Row, N.Y., 1968.

Bainton, Roland H.: The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century. Beacon Press, Boston, 1952.

PURPOSE: To show that the beliefs and practices of the Metropolitan Community Church are a direct descendant of beliefs and practices originally begun during the Radical Reformation of the Sixteenth Century and that these beliefs and practices come out of a tradition of struggle for religious freedom, personal piety, and personal freedom within the church.

DISCUSSION: For a very long time the church has affected the civil liberties of citizens of nations of the West, particularly those who are homosexual. Metropolitan Community Church was organized to "provide a"church home for all who confess and believe" in a faith based upon the principles outlined in the historic creeds but which permits a greater degree of personal freedom. This freedom has often come in conflict with the established church. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss ways in which the beliefs and practices of the M.C.C. are not new and merely a response to "Gay Liberation", but have a longer root into the Radical Reformation, particularly the Spiritists. M.C.C. worship is characterized by a warm spirit, personal devotion despite oppression by the established church, and tendencies of both mysticism and rationalism. While it might be expected that oppressed persons within the church might be either cowed or rebellious, yet M.C.C. churches are characterized by exuberance, zeal, Messianism, prophesying, and revivalism. These characteristics point to a faith rooted in Pentecostalism, the Charismatic renewal,

Evangelicalism, and even Universalism. With these roots, it becomes possible to see Metropolitan Community Church not only as a modern 20th century phenomenon, but part of a tradition in the church which goes back to groups operative during the Reformation.

Certainly, the founder's personal beliefs have their root in Pentacostalism, and the variety and ecumenical spirit of M.C.C. would account for the variety of beliefs present; however, there is a more pervasive spirit of freedom in worship, doctrine, and personal piety which indeed is rooted in the Radical Reformation. This paper will attempt to trace those roots and branches and describe how M.C.C. is firmly attached to a main source and not merely an independent phenomenon.

Since nearly one-half of the clergy in M.C.C. are Baptists and nearly one-half are Methodists, a brief tracing of Anabaptist and Wesleyan ties will also be made.

Rufus Jones
George
Williams?

The Spiritual Reformers 16+17c.

The Radical Reformation

Well-thought through + defined
✓ +

